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Recent Developments in FederalIncome Taxation
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE YEAR

2007

by
Martin J McMahon, Jr.
Ira B. Shepard
DanielL. Simmons

This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to
understand the significance of the most importantjudicial decisions and
administrative rulings and regulationspromulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service and Treasury Department during 2007 - and sometimes a little
farther back in time if we find the item particularlyhumorous or outrageous.
Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they cannot be
discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read them
all the way through; just the basic topic and fundamental principles are
highlighted.Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not
discussed except to the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they
have led to administrative rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected
previously issued rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline,
or (4) they provide Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected
representatives. The outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general
interest (to the three of us, at least) - income tax accounting rules,
determination of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital
gains and losses, corporateand partnershiptaxation, exempt organizations,
and procedure andpenalties. It deals summarily with qualifiedpension and
profit sharingplans, andgenerally does not deal with internationaltaxation
or specialized industries,such as banking, insurance,andfinancialservices.
Please read this outline at your own risk; we take no responsibilityfor any
misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our advancing ages or our
increasing indifference as to whether we get any particularitem right. Any
mistakes in this outline are Marty's responsibility; any political bias or
offensive language is Ira's;and any useful information is Dan's.
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ACCOUNTING
A.

Accounting Methods

1.
The method of determining "fair market value"
under § 475 falls within the definition of "method of accounting" for
§ 446(b)'s requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting must
clearly reflect income. In re Heilig Meyers Co., 232 F.App'x 240 (4th Cir.
5/9/07). The determination of the fair market value of accounts receivable
under the mark-to-market rules of § 475 is an accounting method subject to
§ 446(b)'s clear reflection of income requirement. The court relied heavily
on JPMorganChase & Co. v. Commissioner,458 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 8/9/06),
which held that the valuation of interest swaps, which also were subject to
the § 475 mark-to-market rules, was an accounting method, in rejecting the
taxpayer's argument that "the dispute was 'a valuation case,' as opposed to a
method of accounting case."
2.
Notice 2007-88, 2007-46 I.R.B. 993 (11/13/07).
This Notice requests comments regarding a proposal to change the process
by which taxpayers obtain the consent of the Commissioner to change a
method of accounting. It describes the automatic and nonautomatic consent
processes, and suggests they be replaced with a system under which a
taxpayer requests "standard consent," "specific consent," or "letter ruling
consent" and describes these processes.
B.

Inventories
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
C.

Installment Method
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
D.

Year of Inclusion or Deduction

1.
The IRS just says 'no" to the recurring item
exception. Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 20074 I.R.B. 350 (1/22/07). Under the
recurring-item exception to the economic performance rule in § 461(h)(3),
taxpayers can accrue deductions no sooner than the year in which the allevents test is satisfied. The IRS concluded that liabilities were not
"established" under the all-events test in the year in which two contracts
were executed. In the first situation, the contract, executed in Year 1, did not
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require the performance of services and payment until Year 2. In the second
situation, the contract, executed in Year 1, did not provide insurance
coverage or payment for that coverage until Year 2. The IRS concluded that,
in both cases, the mere execution of the contract, "without more," did not
establish the taxpayer's liability. Thus, the recurring-item exception could
not apply.
2.
Deducting payroll taxes in a year before the
compensation is deducted. Rev. Rul. 2007-12, 2007-11 I.R.B. 685
(3/12/07). Section 404 does not control the year of deduction of an
employer's liability for payroll taxes, even if the payroll tax liability relates
to deferred compensation subject to the rules of § 404. Section 404 does not
affect the timing of the accrual of payroll tax liability under § 461; if the allevents test and the recurring item exception in § 461 and Reg. § 1.4615(b)(1) are otherwise met, an accrual method taxpayer may deduct payroll
tax liability in Year 1, even though the compensation to which the liability
relates is deferred compensation that is deductible under § 404 in Year 2.
This Ruling modifies Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B. 36, which concluded
that, under the all-events test, an accrual method employer may deduct in
Year 1 its otherwise deductible payroll taxes imposed on year-end wages
properly accrued in Year 1 but paid in Year 2, provided the employer
satisfies the requirements of the recurring item exception in Reg. § 1.461-5.
3.
Rev. Rul. 2007-32, 2007-21 I.R.B. 1278 (5/21/07).
An accrual method bank is required to take interest into income with respect
to loans that are declared by Federal Banking Rules to be a "non-accrual
loan" for which the bank is required to treat interest payments as a return of
principal. Where the bank uses the conformity method of accounting under
Reg. § 1.166-2(d), uncollected accrued interest is treated as worthless for
§ 166 purposes in the year that the amount is charged off for regulatory
financial accounting purposes.
a.
Rev. Proc. 2007-33, 2007-21 I.R.B. 1289
(5/21/07). This Revenue Procedure describes procedures for automatic
consent to a change of accounting method that uses a prescribed safe-harbor
to determine for each tax year the amount of uncollected accrued interest
that is expected to have a reasonable expectancy of repayment using a
recovery percentage for the bank.
4.
The saga of whether advance trade discounts are
currently includible in gross income.
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a.
Yes, says the Tax Court. Karns Prime &
Fancy Food, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-233 (10/5/05). A $1.5
million advance received by the taxpayer-retailer from a supplier that was
evidenced by a promissory note with the proper indicia of debt nevertheless
was not a true debt. Because the parties concurrently entered into a supply
agreement pursuant to which the debt would be forgiven if the taxpayer
purchased the quantity of product required under the supply agreement over
its term, there was no unconditional obligation to repay the advance. The
amounts under the note were due only if the supply agreement was
materially breached by the taxpayer.
b.
The Ninth Circuit disagrees. Westpac
Pacific Food v. Commissioner, 451 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 6/21/06), rev'g T.C.
Memo. 2001-175 (7/16/01). "Cash advance trade discounts" received by a
retailer from a manufacturer in exchange for volume purchase commitments,
subject to pro rata repayment if the volume commitments were not met, were
not includable in gross income when received because these amounts were
adjustments to the cost of goods sold and the cash advances were includible
in income by virtue of taxpayer's inventory accounting system.
c.
And the IRS caves. Rev. Proc. 2007-53,
2007-30 I.R.B. 233 (7/23/07). The IRS will follow Westpac Pacific Food v.
Commissioner and allow accrual method taxpayers who receive advance
trade discounts to adopt the "Advance Trade Discount" method of
accounting as a change of accounting method. Taxpayers who report
advance trade discounts as reductions in the price of inventory for financial
purposes may do so for tax reporting purposes. Taxpayers who lack
applicable financial statements must reduce the cost of the specific items of
inventory to which the discount relates.
d.
But the Third Circuit disagrees with the
Ninth Circuit and affirms the Tax Court decision in Karns. Did the IRS
cave too soon in issuing Rev Proc 2007-53? Karns Prime & Fancy Food,
Ltd v. Commissioner, 494 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 7/20/07). The Third Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court decision in Karns and specifically rejected the
reasoning and Ninth Circuit's holding in WestPac Foods. The court (Judge
Sloviter) reasoned that the key question is whether, at the time of receipt of
the funds, the recipient was unconditionally obligated to make repayment.
Under the logic of Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493
U.S. 203 (1990), a receipt is not a loan if the taxpayer controls whether it
will be entitled to retain the payment. Because Karns alone controlled
whether it would meet the contractual requirements, the receipt was
analogous to an advance payment includable in gross income. Although
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Judge Sloviter acknowledged that the facts in Westpac Pacific Foods
differed somewhat, he concluded that in Westpac the Ninth Circuit had
completely ignored the significance of Indianapolis Power. The Third
Circuit treated payments under a supply agreement as advance payments
includible in income because the taxpayer was free to keep the money as
long as it fulfilled its part of the bargain. The taxpayer thus had complete
dominion and control over the money. The court rejected the taxpayer's
assertion that the advance was a loan because the taxpayer, by performing
under the agreement, was in a position to control whether it was obligated to
repay.
Judge Ambro caustically entitled a
section of his concurring opinion "The Ninth Circuit Tax Shelter, or How to
Make Money By Buying Things." The concurring opinion noted that the Third
Circuit's position has always been that income may be considered to be a loan
only when there is an unconditional repayment obligation; it characterized the
Ninth Circuit as the "first and only" Court of Appeals to conclude that trade
discounts paid by the supplier to a taxpayer to offset the taxpayer's required
minimum purchases are loans rather than advance payments.
* Judge Brody dissented on the ground that
the agreements between the supplier and Kams did not assure that Karns could
keep the funds, because the supplier retained "immense latitude" to cancel the
agreement before Karns had met its purchase obligations, a factual conclusion
with which the majority disagreed.
0 In light of Rev. Proc. 2007-53, in which
IRS indicated that it will generally follow Westpac Pacific Foods, the Third
Circuit's decision appears to be of little importance with respect to the specific
issue of whether advance trade discounts must be taken into gross income
when received, but it nevertheless is an important general precedent regarding
the determination of whether other receipts are a loan versus an income item.
5.
Not all accruals are created equal. The Charles
Schwab Corp. v. Commissioner, 495 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 8/2/07). Schwab
was required to pay a yearly California franchise tax. For the years in
question, California calculated a corporation's franchise tax liability based
upon the corporation's income from the preceding year - the so-called
"income" year. Schwab used the accrual method of accounting; under
§ 461(a) it deducted expenses for the year in which they accrued. Under
California law, Schwab's state franchise tax liability accrued on the last day
of the year in which Schwab earned the income forming the basis for the tax
assessment (December 31 of the "income" or "measuring" year). However,
§ 461(d)(1) provides, that a taxpayer's accrual date for federal tax purposes
may be no earlier than it would have been under state law as it existed at the
end of 1960. Under pre-1961 California law, the franchise tax did not accrue
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until the first day of the year following the income year (January 1 of the
"taxable" year). California amended its franchise tax in 1972. Under pre1972 law, a corporation that stopped doing business did not pay any
franchise tax on the income earned during its final year of operation. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court, 122 T.C. 191, 203 (2004), holding
that § 461(d)(1) required Schwab to determine the timing of its franchise tax
accruals pursuant to pre-1961 law. As a result, Schwab's liability accrued on
January 1 of the taxable year rather than December 31 of the preceding
income year, meaning Schwab was entitled to deduct on its 1989-1992
federal tax returns its franchise tax obligations based upon its 1988-1991
income.
6.
Who needs constructive receipt when you have
actual receipt? Bums v. Commissioner T.C. Memo. 2007-271 (9/12/07).
The taxpayer was owed over $145,000 as the last installment of an award
under a whistleblower statute. A private investigator, who had assisted the
taxpayer in the investigation that led to the award, obtained a judgment
against the taxpayer for failure to pay him pursuant to their contract. To
avoid execution of the private investigator's judgment lien on the funds, the
taxpayer filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, and the funds were paid
over to the bankruptcy trustee by the taxpayer's debtor. Judge Carluzzo held
that the funds were actually received by the taxpayer in the year they were
paid over to the bankruptcy trustee. No reference to the constructive receipt
doctrine was necessary. The funds were actually received because the
taxpayer's voluntary action resulted in the payment to the bankruptcy
trustee.
II.

BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS

A.

Income

1.
Settlement funds beneficially owned by a
governmental entity are tax-exempt. Tax Increase Prevention and
Reconciliation Act of 2005 § 201(a) added Code §§ 468B(g)(2) and (3),
which provide that certain settlement funds established before 2011 pursuant
to consent decrees in order to resolve claims under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) are treated as beneficially owned by a state or federal
governmental entity, and are thus exempt from tax under § 468B(g)(1).
These provisions were made permanent by
a.
the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 409.
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2.
Here's how the IRS's vigorishly reconstructed a
bookie's income from 4 days of records that we bet he wishes he hadn't
kept. Paterson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-109 (4/30/07). The Tax
Court (Judge Kroupa) upheld the IRS's complex reconstruction of an illegal
bookmaker's income based on records for 4 days of betting seized in a
police raid. The method applied consisted of five computational steps: (1)
adding 10 percent vigorish to the bets listed on the sheet that did not carry
vigorish and adding all bets together to find the gross wagers; (2) dividing
total gross wagers by 4 days of betting to obtain the average daily bet; (3)
using the call records for the taxpayer's cellular phones to determine the
number of days people called the taxpayer to place bets; (4) multiplying the
average daily bet by the number of days people placed bets for each year to
arrive at the gross wagers for each year; and (5) multiplying the gross
wagers for the year by 4.54 percent, which represented the profit percentage
a bookmaker would make if his or her books were balanced.
3.
Notice 2007-63, 2007-33 I.R.B. 353 (8/13/07). This
Notice deals with the tax treatment of "market gain" associated with the
repayment of Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) loans under the
nonrecourse marketing assistance loan program authorized under the Farm
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat.
134 (2002). A taxpayer that has made an election under § 77 to take the loan
into income accounts for market gain for the year in which a CCC loan is
repaid by making an adjustment to the basis of the commodity that secures
the loan. A taxpayer that has not made an election under § 77 reports market
gain as income for the year in which a CCC loan is repaid.
B.

Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization

1.
Big loser in 1996 Olympics: Corporate president
paid $5 million to indemnify his corporation, lost his job, and got no
deduction either. Tigrett v. United States, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-5649 (W.D.
Tenn. 8/3/05), as amended, 96 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-6431 (9/2/05). The $5
million paid to a corporation by its president/minority shareholder in
satisfaction of his contractual obligation to indemnify the corporation
against losses from a specific venture (the House of Blues venue in
Centennial Park in Atlanta during the 1996 Olympics) that he advocated the
corporation to undertake constituted a capital contribution - not a business
expense - because taxpayer had no possibility of personal business profit
from the specific venture by the corporation.
a.
Affirmed, 213 F.App'x 440 (6th Cir.
1/12/07). Taxpayer failed to prove that the contribution to capital was an
ordinary business expense or a business loss.
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2.
Simplifying complexity. T.D. 9318, Guidance
Regarding the Simplified Service Cost Method and the Simplified
Production Method, 72 F.R. 14675 (3/29/07). The Treasury has promulgated
final regulations under the uniform capitalization rules of 263A with respect
to the simplified service cost method and simplified production method of
capitalizing mixed service costs (costs that benefit production activities and
other activities) and production costs that were not capitalized under the
taxpayer's method of accounting before the effective date of § 263A. The
rules are applicable to eligible property that consists of self-constructed
assets produced by the taxpayer on a routine and repetitive basis in the
regular course of the taxpayer's trade or business. The regulations provide
that property is produced on a routine and repetitive basis if numerous
substantially identical units of tangible personal property are produced
within a tax year using standardized designs and assembly line techniques
and the recovery period for the assets is not longer than 3 years.
3.
The cost of double-wides just went up. Load, Inc.
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-51 (3/6/07). Costs attributable to
placement of model manufactured homes on leased retail sales lots for sale
by local independent sellers are includible in inventory under § 263A. The
costs are not on-site storage costs under Reg. § 1.263A-l(e)(3)(iii)(I)
because transfers to independent re-sellers prevented taxpayer from being
considered as selling exclusively to retail customers.
4.
The IRS adopts an uncharacteristic position by
requiring deduction instead of capitalization. ILM 200721015 (1/16/07).
In this legal memorandum the IRS has determined under Reg. § 1.266l(b)(1)(iv) that a flat fee paid to a stockbroker for investment services is not
a carrying charge. The legal memorandum arrived at this result by virtue of
the following reasoning:
Fees for consulting and advisory services are better viewed
as currently deductible investment expenses. Consulting and
advisory fees are not carrying charges because they are
incurred independent of a taxpayer's acquiring property and
because they are not a necessary expense of holding
property. Stated differently, consulting and advisory fees are
not closely analogous to common carrying costs, such as
insurance, storage, and transportation. (citation omitted).
* This prevents taxpayers from capitalizing
§ 212 expenditures, the deduction of which would produce no tax benefit as a
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result of either the § 67 limitation on miscellaneous itemized deductions or the
disallowance of such deductions under the AMT.
5.
Environmental remediation may or may not be
deductible depending upon the facts. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. United States,
77 Fed. Cl. 309 (6/29/07). The Court of Federal Claims denied summary
judgment to the taxpayer on a claim for refund based on deductions for
environmental remediation of the site of an oil refinery and uranium
processing operation. Kerr-McGee purchased the site, which had
continuously operated as an oil refinery since 1915, in 1956, sold it in 1972,
and reacquired portions in 1984 and 1987. The court (Judge Sweeney) held
that environmental remediation costs are deductible if the taxpayer caused
the contamination and incurred expenses to return the property to the
condition it was in before the contamination, regardless of whether the
taxpayer continuously owned the property. Expenses are required to be
capitalized if the remediation allowed the taxpayer to put the property to a
new or better use, whether or not the taxpayer caused the contamination, or
if the remediation is part of a plan of renovation, rehabilitation, or
improvement. Ultimately the court determined that the record before it
presented factual determinations necessary to reach a judgment. The court
specifically noted, however, that it was "not prepared, based on the record
before it, to find that Kerr-McGee can deduct remediation expenses for
contamination that occurred from 1915 to 1956. In order to make such a
ruling, the court would need evidence that contamination on the ... site prior
to 1956 can be attributed to Kerr-McGee."
6.
Tarter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-320
(10/25/07). The taxpayer was denied deductions for his employee benefits
and payroll taxes, outside services, equipment rental, and depreciation for
his business of pouring concrete foundations and flatwork for residential
projects because he failed to meet the burden of countering the IRS claim
that these items had been included in cost of goods sold by the taxpayer.
Accuracy-related penalties were sustained.
C.

Reasonable Compensation

1.
Group affected by limitations on executive
compensation is redefined. Notice 2007-49, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1429 (6/18/07).
Section 162(m) limits deductible compensation paid to covered employees
to $1,000,000 (plus performance bonuses). This Notice responds to revisions
of regulations by the SEC defining covered employees, which the IRS says
will now include the principal executive officer and compensation paid to
employees that is required to be reported to shareholders under the
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Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by virtue of being among the three highest
paid officers of the corporation during the taxable year other than the
principal executive officer or the principal financial officer.
2.
Healthy $2 million and $1 million annual
compensation to the CEO and sole owner of the taxpayer corporation is
reasonable given the CEO's skill at developing and marketing skin care
products, tanning lotions, diet aids, sports performance products,
nutritional supplements, health food products, and indoor tanning
salons. Vitamin Village, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-272
(9/12/07). In a case appealable to the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court (Judge
Haines) substantially rejected the IRS's arguments that the taxpayer paid its
sole shareholder (Daniel Reeves) unreasonable compensation. Judge Haines
allowed taxpayer to deduct compensation in the form of bonuses in the
amounts of $2,000,000 (out of $2,278,000 paid) in one year and of the entire
$1,012,000 paid in another year. The Tax Court applied the five factor test
of the Ninth Circuit from Elliotts, Inc. v. Commissioner,716 F.2d 1241 (9th
Cir. 1983): (1) The employee's role in the company; (2) comparison with
other companies; (3) the character and condition of the company;
(4) potential conflicts of interest; and (5) internal consistency in
compensation.
* The shareholder functioned as the
corporate president, secretary, and treasurer. In the prior 13 years, Reeves'
compensation had never exceeded $310,000 and in 11 of those years was
$47,000 or less. The court found that Reeves, who was the taxpayer's sole
executive officer and manager, was the driving force behind its success. "His
vision and hard work resulted in ... a shareholders return on equity of 93
percent and 25 percent in the respective fiscal years at issue," and Reeves had
been underpaid in prior years.
* The Tax Court also allowed deductions
for $1.1 million of advertising expenses for promoting suntan products paid to
the taxpayer's sister corporation, wholly owned by Reeves, but disallowed
depreciation deductions on a newly constructed houseboat and floating garage
on the Willamette River adjacent to Reeves's residence, which were sold in
2002 to Mr. Reeves wife's company in Reeves's bankruptcy.
a.
Reeves v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
The
Tax
Court
held that amounts expended by the
2007-273 (9/12/07).
corporation for construction of the houseboat and floating garage did not
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result in a constructive dividend to Reeves, noting that the corporation was
reimbursed from the proceeds of Reeve's bankruptcy sale.
But salary paid by a related support
b.
organization proves to be too much. Universal Marketing, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-305 (10/9/07). An additional $509,000
paid to Reeves was too much for Judge Haines on top of the compensation
paid by Vitamin Village. Applying the Elliotts, Inc. factors, the Tax Court
found that the taxpayer failed to establish that the amount of time spent on
the affairs of the corporation whose sole source of receipts was its sister
corporation, Vitamin Village, justified the salary.
D.

Miscellaneous Deductions

The IRS never seems able to catch up with
1.
movements in the price of gasoline. Rev. Proc. 2006-49, 2006-47 I.R.B.
936 (11/20/06). The optional standard mileage rate for business use of
automobiles for 2007 is 48.5 cents per business mile. The optional standard
mileage rate for medical and moving expenses is 20 cents per mile. The
statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i) remains at 14 cents per
mile.
The IRS keeps chasing increases in the
a.
price of gasoline. Or, is the groundhog sending out mixed signals? Rev.
Proc. 2007-70, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1162 (12/10/07), superseding Rev. Proc.
2006-49, 2006-47 I.R.B. 936. The optional standard mileage rate for
business use of automobiles for 2008 increases to 50.5 cents per business
mile. The depreciation component of the mileage rate is 21 cents. The
optional standard mileage rate for medical and moving expenses goes down
to 19 cents per mile. The statutory rate for charitable mileage under § 170(i)
remains at 14 cents per mile.
Oh, the joy of legitimately deducting large
2.
capital expenditures (except for SUVs)! The Small Business and Work
Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 amended § 179 to increase the amount
deductible under § 179 to $125,000 for tax years beginning after 2006 and
before 1/1/11. The phase-out threshold was increased to $500,000. Both
amounts are indexed for inflation after 2007, using 2006 as a base year. The
2007 Act also extends the inclusion of off-the-shelf computer software as
§ 179 property for one year, until 1/1/11, and likewise extends the increased
deductible amount (up to an additional $100,000), and the increased phaseout ($600,000) for Gulf Opportunity Zone Property until 1/1/11.
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3.
Wouldn't it just have been easier to cut rates in
October 2004? No. Was it because that's what the French-looking
Vietnam War veteran was proposing? No, it was a replacement for the
FSC/ETI export subsidies. Section 102 of the Jobs Act of 2004 added new
Code § 199, which provides a magical 9 percent deduction of a percentage
of taxable income attributable to domestic manufacturing activities.
a.
Partnership that extracts minerals is a
qualified in-kind partnership. Rev. Rul. 2007-30, 2007-21 I.R.B. 1277
(5/21/07). Under Reg. § 1.199-9(i)(1) and Temp. Reg. § 1.199-3T(i)(7)(i),
each partner of a qualifying in-kind partnership is treated as having
manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted property that is manufactured,
produced, grown, or extracted by the partnership that is distributed to the
partner. The IRS ruled that the extraction and processing of minerals (as
defined in Reg. § 1.611-1(d)(5)) is an activity qualifying a partnership under
these provisions. Thus, a partnership engaged solely in the extraction and
processing of minerals within the United States will be a qualifying
partnership as of the effective date of § 199.
b.
Rev. Proc. 2007-34, 2007-23 I.R.B. 1345
(6/4/07). This Revenue Procedure provides procedures that allow certain
large partnerships and widely held Subchapter S corporations to calculate, at
the entity level, qualified production activities income and W-2 wages for
purposes of the § 199 domestic production deduction.
c.
Rev. Proc. 2007-35, 2007-23 I.R.B. 1349
(6/4/07). This Revenue Procedure provides statistical sampling
methodologies for various allocations between domestic and non-domestic
production activities.
4.
IRS rules on accountable plans. Rev. Rul. 200656, 2006-46 I.R.B. 874 (11/13/06). If employers pay expense allowances in
excess of the amount that may be deemed substantiated without requiring
actual substantiation of all the expenses or repayment of the excess amount,
and the expense allowance arrangement has no mechanism or process to
determine when an allowance exceeds the amount that may be deemed
substantiated, then the failure of the arrangement to treat the excess
allowances as wages for employment tax purposes causes all payment made
under the arrangement to be treated as made under a nonaccountable plan.
This rule is not effective for taxable periods ending on or before 12/31/06 in
the absence of intentional noncompliance.
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* The facts of this ruling involve
reimbursement of long-haul truck drivers for meal and incidental expenses on
a "cents-per-mile driven" basis that regularly exceeds $52 per day - the
amount determined by § 4.04 of Rev. Proc. 2005-67, 2005-2 C.B. 729.
5.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 108 extends the § 62(a)(2)(D) above-the-line $250 deduction for K-12
teacher classroom expenses to 2006 and 2007.
6.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 109 extends the expensing of brownfields remediation costs under § 198 to
2006 and 2007. It also provides that sites contaminated by petroleum
products will be eligible for the deduction.
7.
Deductions go up in smoke. Distributing
California legal medical marijuana is illegal drug trafficking.
Californians Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v. Commissioner,
128 T.C. 173 (5/15/07). Taxpayer is a California public benefit corporation
engaged in the business of providing care services to its members with a
secondary purpose to provide medical marijuana to members pursuant to the
California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 and to instruct those individuals
on how to use medical marijuana to benefit their health. Section 280E
disallows deductions in a trade or business of trafficking in controlled
substances within the meaning of schedules I or II of the Controlled
Substances Act, which includes marijuana. The Tax Court (Judge Laro) held
that supplying medical marijuana to taxpayer's members is trafficking in a
controlled substance, and disallowed all deductions with respect to
distributing the marijuana. However, the court also found that the taxpayer's
care-giving activities for terminally ill patients were a separate trade or
business from its medical marijuana delivery. Expenses allocable to the caregiving activity remained deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses. The court allocated expenses between the two businesses on the
basis of the number of employees and the portion of the taxpayer's facilities
devoted to each.
* The Commissioner conceded that § 280E
did not operate to deny the cost of goods sold to the taxpayer. That concession
was based on case law predating the enactment of the last sentence of
§ 263A(a)(2). See, e.g., Franklin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-184
(1993). The last sentence of § 263A(a)(2) states: "Any cost which (but for this
subsection) could not be taken into account in computing taxable income for
any taxable year shall not be treated as a cost described in this paragraph."
This provision was intended to preclude taking into account as inventory costs
items that could not be deducted as business expenses if they did not relate to
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inventory, e.g., fines and penalties, bribes, etc. A straightforward reading of
§ 280E and the last sentence of § 263A(a)(2), taken together, would deny any
recovery of cost of goods sold for illegal drug dealers. The concession appears
to have been erroneous.
8.
Proposed regulations outline rules for deducting
entertainment use of business aircraft. REG-147171-05, Deductions for
Entertainment Use of Business Aircraft, 72 F.R. 33169 (6/15/07). The
Treasury has proposed new detailed regulations, Prop. Reg. § 1.274-9,
regarding deductions for entertainment use of business aircraft. In
SutherlandLumber-Southwest, Inc. v. Commissioner,255 F.3d 495 (8th Cir.
2001), the court allowed a deduction under the exception of § 274(e)(2) that
exceeded the amount included in income by the employee for personal use
of the company aircraft (the corporation was an S corporation so the
deduction passed through to the employee/owner and more than offset the
amount included in income). The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004
enacted § 274(e)(2)(B), reversing the result in SutherlandLumber-Southwest
to limit the deduction for expenses attributable to personal use to the amount
included in income by the employee, but the provision only applies to
personal use by officers, directors, and more-than-10 percent owners. The
proposed regulations identify the persons subject to the limitations of
§ 274(e)(2)(B), including related parties under §§ 267(b) and 707(b),
provide rules for the allocation of expenses between entertainment and other
uses (including an option to allocate expenses on a flight-by-flight basis
rather than using the occupied seat per mile basis or hour formula), rules for
allocating expenses for travel that involves both business and entertainment
(the entertainment portion is the excess of total expenses over the business
portion), among other things.
9.
Revisiting what is insurance? This fund for
clean-up costs is not a deductible insurance premium. Rev. Rul. 2007-47,
2007-30 I.R.B. 127 (7/23/07). A domestic corporation that engages in a
business practice that is "inherently harmful to people and property"
acquired an insurance policy for future clean-up costs. While the exact cost
of the future clean-up was unknown, there was no uncertainty that the cost
will be incurred. The corporation estimated that the present value of the
future cost is $150x. The corporation acquired an insurance policy with a
premium of $150x that would reimburse future clean-up costs up to $300x.
The ruling concludes that the arrangement is not insurance because of the
absence of any risk that the corporation will be required to incur the cleanup costs. The arrangement is described as a prefunding of the corporation's
future costs. The corporation is not allowed a deduction for the insurance
premium. In addition, the insurance company is not allowed to account for
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the arrangement as an insurance contract, meaning that the premium is taken
into income without any offset for discounted unpaid losses under
§ 832(b)(5).
* Note Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Commissioner, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992), in which Judge Easterbrook
stated:
What is "insurance" for tax purposes? The Code
lacks a definition. Le Gierse mentions the combination of
risk shifting and risk distribution, but it is a blunder to treat
a phrase in an opinion as if it were statutory language.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 460-62,,
98 S. Ct. 2441, 2450-51 (1978), 57 L. Ed. 2d 337. Cf.
United States v. Consumer Life Insurance Co., 430 U.S.
725, 740-41, 97 S. Ct. 1440, 1448-49, 52 L. Ed. 2d 4 (1977).
The Court was not writing a definition for all seasons and
had no reason to, as the holding of Le Gierse is only that
paying the "underwriter" more than it promises to return in
the event of a casualty is not insurance by any standard. ...
Corporations accordingly do not insure to protect their
wealth and future income, as natural persons do, or to
provide income replacement or a substitute for bequests to
their heirs (which is why natural persons buy life insurance).
Investors can "insure" against large risks in one line of
business more cheaply than do corporations, without the
moral hazard and adverse selection and loading costs: they
diversify their portfolios of stock. Instead corporations
insure to spread the costs of casualties over time. Bad
experience concentrated in a single year, which might cause
bankruptcy (and its associated transactions costs), can be
paid for over several years. See generally David Mayers &
Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Corporate Demand for
Insurance, 55 J. Bus. 281 (1982). Much insurance sold to
corporations is experience-rated. An insurer sets a price
based on that firm's recent and predicted losses, plus a
loading and administrative charge. Sometimes the policy is
retrospectively rated, meaning that the final price is set after
the casualties have occurred. Retrospective policies have
minimum and maximum premiums, so the buyer does not
bear all of the risk, but the upper and lower bounds are set
so that almost all of the time the insured firm pays the full
costs of the losses it generates. Both experience rating and
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retrospective rating attempt to charge the firm the full cost
of its own risks over the long run, a run as short as one year
with retrospective rating. The client buys some time-shifting
(very little in the case of retrospective rating) and a good
deal of administration. Insurers are experts at evaluating
losses, settling with (or litigating against) injured persons,
and so on. A corporation thus buys loss-evaluation and lossadministration services, at which insurers have a
comparative advantage, more than it buys loss distribution.
If retrospectively rated policies, called "insurance" by both
issuers and regulators, are insurance for tax purposes--and
the Commissioner's lawyer conceded for purposes of this
case that they are--then it is impossible to see how risk
shifting can be a sine qua non of "insurance."
10.
Professional gamblers can have net operating
losses. Tschetschot v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-38 (2/20/07). A
professional tournament poker player's net gambling losses are limited by
§ 165(d). However, the IRS conceded that deduction of non-wagering
expenses was not limited by § 165(d).
11.
Blue Cross/Blue Shield wins again on the fresh
start basis of cancelled health insurance contracts. Highmark, Inc. v.
United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 146 (8/22/07). Following Trigon Ins. Co. v.
United States, 215 F. Supp. 2d 687, 701, 706 (E.D. Va. 2002) and Capital
Blue Cross v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 224, 237-38 (2004), rev'd on other
grounds, 431 F.3d 117 (3d Cir. 2005), the Court of Federal Claims granted
partial summary judgment in favor of the successor to Blue Cross/Blue
Shield on refund claims of $21 million plus interest. When Blue Cross and
Blue Shield were transformed into taxable entities by the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Congress included a provision that "for purposes of determining gain
or loss, the adjusted basis of any assert held on" January 1, 1987, will be its
fair market value. The taxpayer claims that assets include terminated and
cancelled contracts in existence on that date. The court rejected the
government's assertion that "assets" did not include the insurance contracts
issued by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and that losses included only losses
realized on a sale or exchange of assets, not termination of contracts. The
court held that the plain language of the statute applies to allow the claimed
losses. The court also rejected the government's argument that the amended
returns claiming the losses represented a change in accounting method.
12.
The interest deduction for a bank with taxexempt interest income is limited. PSB Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner,
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129 T.C. 131 (11/1/07). Peoples Bank and Peoples Investment Company
were wholly owned members of a consolidated group filing consolidated
returns whose widely held parent company is PSB Holdings. The Bank and
the Investment Company held tax-exempt securities. Some of the Investment
Company's tax-exempt securities were purchased by the Bank and
transferred to the Investment Company as contributions to capital. Other taxexempt securities were purchased directly by Investment Company. Only
Bank claimed deductions for interest expense.
0 Section 265(a)(2) disallows deductions
for interest on indebtedness incurred to purchase or carry tax-exempt
obligations. In the case of a bank, § 265(b), adopting a fungibility approach,
provides that interest subject to the § 265(a)(2) limitation is the portion of the
amount of interest that bears the same ratio to total interest as "the taxpayer's
average adjusted bases ... of tax exempt obligations," bears to the average
adjusted bases of all of the taxpayer's assets. While § 265(a)(2) under this
formula disallows 100 percent of a bank's interest attributable to tax-exempt
obligations, § 291(e), enacted prior to § 265(b), disallows 20 percent of a
bank's interest attributable to tax-exempt obligations, determined under the
same formula as § 265(b)(2). See § 291(e)(1)(B)(ii). Section 291(e) applies to
interest expense attributable to tax-exempt obligations acquired before August
8, 1986, the date § 265(b) was enacted. However, the 20 percent reduction of
§291(e) (rather than the 100 percent reduction of § 265(a)(2)) continues to
apply to tax-exempt obligations of small issuers. All of the taxpayer's exemptobligations were qualified small issues.
* The IRS argued that for purposes of
determining Bank's interest deduction under the allocation formulas of §§
265(b)(2) and 291(e)(1)(B), the numerator of the allocation formula should
include tax-exempt obligations held by Investment Company because Bank
included the basis of its Investment Company stock in the denominator.
Focusing on the "text" of the allocation formula, the Tax Court concluded that
the numerator included only tax-exempt obligations held by the taxpayer, here,
the bank alone. (Bank itself included in the numerator tax-exempt obligations
purchased by Bank and transferred to Investment Company.) The Tax Court
rejected the contrary holding of Rev. Rul. 90-44, 1990-1 C.B. 54, stating that a
revenue ruling, while representing an interpretation based on experience and
informed judgment, is not entitled to the same deference as regulations under
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalRes. Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
13.
The Third Circuit cans Alcoa's claim of right
doctrine benefits. Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.
11/28/07). Alcoa's production of aluminum products produces substantial
waste. Under heightened environmental clean-up standards enacted in the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
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of 1980 (CERCLA), and others, Alcoa was forced to incur substantial
environmental remediation expense to clean up several of its manufacturing
sites. Alcoa deducted these expenses in 1993 then filed a $12 million claim
for refund in the District Court. Alcoa cleverly argued that its 1993 expenses
should have been included in its cost of goods sold in manufacturing
operations for the years 1940-1987. Its reduced cost of goods sold for those
years generated excess income, received under a claim of right, which it was
forced to return in the form of the deductible environmental remediation
expenses incurred in 1993. Alcoa then claimed under § 1341 that, rather than
taking the deduction in 1993 for the expense, that it was entitled to a return
of the taxes paid in 1940-1987 on its increased gross income resulting from
the under-inclusion of disposal costs in its cost of goods sold. The Third
Circuit concluded that Alcoa's obligation to return gross income in the form
of increased remediation expenses "did not arise from the same
circumstances, terms, and conditions as the initial failure to spend additional
funds on environmental clean-up. Rather, the obligations were created by
new circumstances, terms, and conditions, namely, by an intervening change
in environmental legislation." Thus, there is no nexus between the income
asserted to have been received under a claim of right, and the expenditure
claimed as a refund of that income. The court ultimately concluded that the
§ 1341 benefits are not available "because Alcoa's expenditure of funds in
1993 was not the restoration of particular moneys to the rightful owner and
did not arise from the same circumstances, terms, and conditions as Alcoa's
original acquisition of the income."
14.
A sole proprietor can create deductible medical
plans by hiring a spouse. Frahm v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-351
(11/27/07). A taxpayer farmer (who reported farming income on Schedule F)
claimed deductions under § 162(a) (ordinary and necessary business
expense) for health insurance premiums on plans for his sole employee, his
spouse. The employee health plans and medical reimbursement plans
included coverage for the employee's spouse, the sole-proprietor. For the
years at issue, deductions under § 162(l) for health insurance premiums paid
by a sole-proprietor were limited. The Tax Court held that all premiums paid
by the taxpayer for the employee health benefit plans that covered the
employee's spouse were deductible.
a.
But you have to follow proper form to
create the employee benefit. Eyler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007350 (11/27/07). The taxpayer operated a tiling business that had one fulltime employee, the taxpayer's spouse. Judge Cheichi rejected the taxpayer's
claim that the taxpayer's health insurance policy under which the taxpayer
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was the primary beneficiary was part of an unwritten benefit's plan
established for the taxpayer's sole employee. The court noted the lack of any
credible evidence that the health insurance premiums paid directly by the
taxpayer were a contribution to a health benefit plan for the taxpayer's
employee. The taxpayer was allowed by the IRS to deduct the insurance
premiums under § 162() up to the applicable percentage allowed for 2003,
which was 60 percent.
b.
The IRS disagrees with its Web Site and
affirms deductibility of medical plan premiums for an S corporation
shareholder. Notice 2008-1, 2008-2 I.R.B. 251 (1/14/08). Contrary to
advice posted in the IRS web site last year, the IRS has indicated that a two
percent shareholder-employee of a Subchapter S corporation is entitled to
deduct under § 162(1) accident and health insurance premiums paid or
reimbursed by the S corporation. This is an above-the-line deduction.
Following Rev. Rul. 91-26, 1991-1 C.B. 184, an S corporation is treated as
maintaining a medical care coverage plan if the corporation makes premium
payments on behalf of a two percent shareholder-employee (and the
employee's spouse and dependents), or the two percent shareholderemployee pays the premiums and on furnishing proof of payment is
reimbursed by the S corporation. The Notice adds that in order for the
employee to deduct the premiums under § 162(), the S corporation must
report premiums paid as wages to the employee on a Form W-2 for the year
of payment, and the employee must report the premiums as gross income.
E.

Depreciation & Amortization

1.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 113 extended the § 168(e)(3)(E) 15-year depreciation periods for leasehold
improvements and for restaurant improvements to 2006 and 2007.
2.
Using the tax code for subsidies where direct
action has failed: First-year depreciation recovery for specified Gulf
Opportunity Zone extension property. Notice 2007-36, 2007-17 I.R.B.
1000 (4/23/07). This Notice provides guidance with respect to the 50 percent
original first year deprecation deduction provided under § 1400N(d). A 50
percent first year depreciation allowance is provided for property placed in
service in the so-called GO Zone. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006 § 120, adding Code § 1400N(d)(6), extends the place in service date
for GO Zone extension property to 12/31/10. GO Zone extension property is
property the substantial use of which is on one or more portions of the GO
Zone (listed in the Notice) and which is either nonresidential real property or
residential rental property, or personal property that is used in such real
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property and is installed within 90 days of the date the building is placed in
service. Otherwise, property eligible for the 50 percent first year
depreciation must have been placed in service by 12/31/07, or 12/31/08 for
qualified nonresidential real property and residential rental property. The
Notice also explains the requirement that original use of the property must
commence with the taxpayer.
3.
Wine grape trellises don't make good fences, but
they are in the same class. Trentadue v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 91
(4/3/07). The Tax Court held that wine grape trellises (in one of our favorite
wine areas) are ten year class life property under Rev. Proc 87-56, 1987-2
C.B. 674, as agricultural equipment in class 01.1, which includes machinery
and equipment, grain bins, and fences, but no other land improvements. The
court analogized the trellises to fences "with the major difference being that
one is intended to keep things in or out and the other to support grape
growing equipment or train grapevines." The taxpayer's irrigation system
and wells, however, were found to constitute land improvements with a 20
year class life in class 00.3. The court noted that components of the
taxpayers' drip irrigation system are buried in the ground and that a
substantial portion of it will remain buried until the vines are removed.
Applying the six factor test from Whitco Industries, Inc. v, Commissioner,
65 T.C. 664 (1975), the court focused to some degree on the fact that the
trellises, but not the irrigation pipes (and especially not the well), were
movable and in fact were moved on occasion.
4.
Rotable spare parts are depreciable property.
Rev. Proc. 2007-48, 2007-29 I.R.B. 110 (7/16/07). After losing the issue in
the courts and announcing in Rev. Rul. 2003-37, 2003-1 C.B. 717, that
rotable spare parts maintained by a manufacturer for the purpose of repairing
customers' equipment (mostly computers) are depreciable assets rather than
inventory, the IRS has announced a safe-harbor method of accounting with
automatic consent to treat rotable spare parts as depreciable. The revenue
procedure applies to a taxpayer that repairs customer-owned equipment
under warranty or maintenance agreements for no charge or for a
maintenance fee and which has a depreciable interest in a pool of spare parts
that are exchanged for defective parts in the customers' equipment. The
taxpayer is required to capitalize the cost of the parts and depreciate the
assets in the asset class specified in the revenue procedure. The safe-harbor
is available only if the taxpayer's gross sales of rotable spare parts do not
exceed 10 percent of the taxpayer's gross revenues from its maintenance
operations.

Recent Developments in FederalIncome Taxation

2008]

F.

Credits

1.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 104 extended the § 41 research credit through 2007 and creates an
additional alternative simplified credit for 2007.
a.
More time to make research credit
elections for 2006 years. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 123 extends the time for making research credit elections for taxable years
ending after 2005 to the later of 4/15/07 or such time as specified by the
Treasury. A similar rule shall apply to other elections under expired
provisions.
2.
The 2007 Act, § 8211(a) extends the § 51 Work
Opportunity Credit to wages paid before August 31, 2011.
0 "High Risk Youths"' are redesignated as
"designated community residents." Youths include otherwise qualifying
individuals between ages 18 and 40 on the hiring date. The credit is extended
to employment of individuals with a work plan under the Social Security Act
"ticket to work plan," and qualified veterans who are certified as meeting the
local food stamp requirement.
3.
This telephone booth does not shelter income.
Sita v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-363 (12/10/07). This is another
Alpha Telcom telephone equipment investment shelter where the taxpayer
claimed depreciation deductions and disabled access credits under § 44 on
the purchase of seven pay phones for $5,000 each. See Arevalo v.
Commissioner, 469 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2006). The taxpayer was provided
with legal title to pay phones under an equipment purchase agreement that
described telephone equipment but did not identify the pay phones subject to
the purchase or their locations. The agreement included a service agreement
under which Alpha Telcom selected the pay phone locations, installed and
serviced the phones, and collected the revenue. Alpha Telcom filed for
bankruptcy in the year the taxpayer's purchased the phone equipment and
was the subject of a civil action by the SEC for selling unregistered
securities. Judge Haines denied the taxpayer's claim for disabled access
credits because the taxpayers failed to demonstrate that they maintained an
eligible small business that operated a place of public accommodation or
were a common carrier of voice transmission services. The court also denied
depreciation deductions because the taxpayers did not obtain the benefits
and burdens of ownership with respect to the pay phones.

1. Pronounced "Utes" by people from New York City.
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Natural Resources Deductions & Credits

commercial
buildings;
1.
Energy
efficient
"greening-up" an existing building. Section 179D, added to the Code by
the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a deduction for the cost of
"energy efficient commercial building property" placed in service during
2006 or 2007. Qualified property must be installed in a building within the
United States as part of: (1) the interior lighting systems; (2) the heating,
cooling, ventilation, and hot water systems; or (3) the building envelope, and
must be certified as being installed pursuant to a plan designed to reduce the
building's total annual energy and power costs by at least 50 percent in
comparison to a hypothetical reference building. The deduction may not
exceed $1.80 per square foot of the property. The statute directs the
Treasury Department, in consultation with the Department of Energy, to
promulgate regulations setting forth methods of calculating and verifying
energy and power costs. In the case of an expenditure made by a public
entity (such as a public school), the statute directs the Treasury Department
to promulgate regulations allocating the deduction to the designer of the
property in lieu of the owner.
0 If a building does not satisfy the overall
50 percent reduction standard, a partial deduction (limited to $0.60 per square
foot) is allowed for system-specific energy efficient property, if a specific
system (i.e., (1) interior lighting, (2) heating, cooling, ventilation and hot
water, or (3) building envelope) satisfies system-specific targets to be
established by regulation (with the statute providing an interim target, in the
case of lighting system retrofits).
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
a.
2006 § 204 extends the § 179D deduction for energy efficient commercial
buildings to 2008.
Energy efficient home credit. Section 45L, added
2.
to the Code by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides a credit, in
the amount of either $2,000 or $1,000, to an eligible contractor (including
the producer of a manufactured home) who constructs and sells an energy
efficient home to a person who will use the home as a residence. To qualify
for the $2,000 credit, the home must be certified (in accordance with
guidance to be prescribed by the Treasury Department) as having a level of
annual heating and cooling energy consumption at least 50 percent below the
level of a comparable hypothetical reference dwelling unit, with at least onefifth of the energy savings attributable to the building envelope. The $1,000
credit, which applies only to manufactured homes, requires at least a 30

2008]

Recent Developments in FederalIncome Taxation

percent reduction in energy consumption, of which at least one-third must be
attributable to the building envelope. Manufactured homes are also eligible
for the $2,000 credit if they satisfy the usual requirements for that credit.
The credit is available only with respect to homes, the construction of which
is substantially completed after 2005, and which are purchased during 2006
or 2007. The credit is part of the general business credit.
.
The credit is effective for homes
substantially completed after 8/08/05 and sold after 12/31/05 but before
1/01/08.
Procedures for getting the home certified.
a.
Notice 2006-27, 2006-11 I.R.B. 626 (2/21/06), updated by Announcement
2006-88, 2006-46 I.R.B. 910 (10/30/06). The IRS has published procedures
that an eligible contractor may follow to certify that a dwelling unit, other
than a manufactured home, is an energy efficient home that satisfies the
requirements of § 45L(c)(1). Certification must be performed by RESNET
or an equivalent energy rating network. RESNET's website is located at
http://www.natresnet.org.
Notice 2006-28, 2006-11 I.R.B. 628. This
b.
Notice contains procedures that an eligible contractor may follow to certify
that a dwelling unit that is a manufactured home satisfies the requirements of
§§ 45L(c)(2) and (3).
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
c.
§
45L credit for new energy efficient homes
the
Code
2006 § 205 extends
through 2008.
Credit for residential energy efficient property,
3.
e.g., solar panels. Section 25D, added to the Code by the Energy Tax
Incentives Act of 2005, provides a nonrefundable credit for certain
expenditures on residential energy efficient property. Qualifying property is
of three types: photovoltaic property (which uses solar energy to generate
electricity), solar water heating property, and fuel cell property (which
converts a fuel into electricity using electrochemical means). The property
must be installed in a dwelling unit located in the United States and used by
the taxpayer as a residence (principal residence, in the case of fuel cell
property). Expenditures allocable to a swimming pool or hot tub are not
eligible for the credit. The credit equals 30 percent of qualifying
expenditures, subject to annual ceilings (on the credit amounts, not on
credit-eligible expenditures) of $2,000 for photovoltaic property, $2,000 for
solar water heating property, and $500 per half-kilowatt of capacity of fuel
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cell property. The credit originally was available only for property placed in
service in 2006 or 2007.
a.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006 § 206 extends the Code § 25D credit for residential energy efficient
property placed in service in 2008.
4.
Credit for biodiesel and renewable diesel used as
fuel. Section 40A, added to the Code by the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004, and amended by the Energy Tax Incentives Act of 2005, provides
a nonrefundable credit of 50 cents per gallon of biodiesel mixed with regular
diesel in the production of a qualified biodiesel mixture, 50 cents per gallon
of straight biodiesel used in the taxpayer's trade or business or sold at retail,
a $1 per gallon credit for agri-biodiesel, and a $1 per gallon credit for
renewable diesel, which is diesel fuel derived from biomass using a thermal
depolymerization process.
a.
Renewable diesel defined. Notice 2007-37,
2007-17 I.R.B. 1002 (4/23/07). This revenue ruling clarifies that
depolymerization is defined broadly to include processes that use heat and
pressure with or without the presence of catalysts, and otherwise defines
renewable diesel.
5.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 118 extends the Code § 613A(c)(6)(H) temporary suspension of the 100
percent of taxable income limit on percentage depletion for oil and natural
gas produced from marginal properties to taxable years beginning in 2006
and 2007.
6.
Guidance Issued for the § 30C alternative fuel
vehicle refueling property credit. Notice 2007-43, 2007-22 I.R.B. 1318
(5/29/07). Pending issuance of regulations, this Notice provides definitions
of qualified alternative fuel vehicle (QAFV) refueling property, dual use
property, alternative fuel, qualifying biodiesel mixture, and rules for
computing the credit. The credit is 30 percent of the cost of depreciable
property placed in service as a QAFV refueling property, up to $30,000 per
property, or $1,000 for other property. Proposed technical corrections would
limit the credit to a single $30,000 or $1,000 amount.
7.
Notice 2007-64, 2007-34 I.R.B. 385 (8/20/07). The
§ 43 enhanced oil recovery credit for taxable years beginning in the 2007
calendar year is phased out completely, because the reference price for the
2006 calendar year ($59.68) exceeds $28 multiplied by the inflation
adjustment factor for the 2006 calendar year ($39.82) by $19.86.
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8.
Notice 2007-65, 2007-34 I.R.B. 386, (8/20/07). The
applicable percentage under § 613A to be used in determining percentage
depletion for marginal oil and gas properties for the 2007 calendar year is 15
percent.
H.

Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs

1.
Heads the government wins, tails the taxpayer
loses. Bilthouse v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6191 (N.D. Ill.
9/28/07). The taxpayer was a shareholder in an S corporation engaged in the
construction of public works that sustained substantial losses. In 1995 the
corporation was insolvent and, as found by the court, the corporation had
zero liquidation value. Also in 1995, the corporation was unable to obtain
construction bonds required for public works projects. The taxpayer had
substantial passive activity losses from the S corporation. The taxpayer
asserted that cancellation of indebtedness income realized by the insolvent S
corporation in 1997 increased the taxpayer's stock basis and that the stock
became worthless in 1997, thereby allowing the taxpayer to treat the
worthlessness as a disposition, permitting deduction of the passive activity
losses. Without addressing whether the corporation had cancellation of
indebtedness income in 1997, the court concluded that the taxpayer failed to
meet his burden of proving that the stock was not worthless in 1995, when
the corporation became insolvent, had zero liquidation value, and could no
longer perform work, rather than in 1997 when a lawsuit against the City of
Jacksonville was terminated without recovery. The court noted that the mere
hope of a recovery from the lawsuit did not preclude a finding of
worthlessness in the earlier year.
I.

At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses

1.
The Ninth Circuit upholds self-rental regulations
to the taxpayer's disadvantage: Following decisions in the First, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayers'
arguments that the regulation is arbitrary and capricious in its
application to C corporations. Beecher v. Commissioner, 481 F.3d 717
(9th Cir. 3/23/07). The taxpayers worked full time for two wholly owned C
corporations that rented office space from the taxpayers. The taxpayers also
owned other rental properties. They reported net income from the leases of
the office space to their corporations and losses from the other rental
properties that exceed the net income from the office rental. The taxpayers
treated all of the rental activities as passive under § 469 and offset their
rental income from the offices with the losses. The IRS determined that the
income from the office leases was non-passive income under the "self-
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rental" rule in Reg. § 1.469-2(0(6) (applying to rentals to an activity in
which the taxpayer materially participates). Applying the Chevron (Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984)) standard, requiring that because "there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation," the court must afford the Commissioner's interpretation
"controlling weight unless . . . [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute," the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the
regulation. Furthermore the court rejected the taxpayer's argument that
Congress's delegation of authority to issue the self-rental rule under § 469(l)
was unconstitutional, following Krukowski v. Commissioner, 279 F.3d 547,
552 (7th Cir. 2002), which held the same. Finally, the court rejected the
taxpayers' argument that the self-rental rule applies only to "abusive tax
shelters" and does not apply to bona fide business transactions. "The
relevant statutory distinction under Section 469 is not between taxpayers
who contrive to limit their tax liability and those who do not. ... Rather, the
distinction between passive and non-passive activities is that in the case of
passive activities, the 'taxpayer does not materially participate' in the
business. ... This question hinges on the extent to which the taxpayer is
involved in the affairs of both sides of a given transaction, not the taxpayer's
motivation for structuring the transaction in a particular manner."
2.
Due process does not protect this tax attorney's
real estate investments from the passive activity loss rules. Ziegler v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-166 (6/27/07). The Tax Court rejected
Stephen Ziegler's argument that application of the passive activity loss rules
to investment real estate purchased in 1984, two years before the effective
date of § 469, was a retroactive application of the law constituting a taking
under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court observed
that tax legislation is not a promise and that the taxpayer has no vested right
in the Internal Revenue Code.
3.
Seeing through entity boundaries, an equipment
leasing LLC is treated as part of the same economic unit as a
radiological services limited partnership. Candelaria v. United States, 518
F. Supp. 2d 852 (W.D. Tex. 10/05/07). Under Reg. § 1.469-4(c)(2), activities
that constitute an appropriate economic unit may be treated as a single
activity under the facts and circumstances. Reg. § 1.469-4(d) provides that a
rental activity may not be grouped with a trade or business unless either the
rental activity or the trade or business is insubstantial in relation to the other.
The taxpayer was a principal in an LLC formed to lease imaging equipment
to a related limited partnership that provided radiological services. The
ownership of the two entities was not identical, but the owners of the LLC
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owned identical interests in the general partner of the limited partnership.
The gross receipts of the leasing LLC, which only leased equipment to the
limited partnership, were between three and eleven percent (depending on
the taxpayer's or the IRS' position) of the combined gross receipts of the
two entities. The District Court granted summary judgment to the taxpayer
holding that the two entities constituted a single economic unit under the
regulation's facts and circumstances test, and that the activities of the
leasing LLC were insubstantial next to the trade or business income of the
limited partnership. The taxpayer was permitted to treat losses from the
leasing company as active business losses.
III.

INVESTMENT GAIN

A.

Capital Gain and Loss

Consigning McAllister to the dustbin of history.
1.
Prebola v. Commissioner, 482 F.3d 610 (2d Cir. 3/27/07) (per curiam). The
taxpayer sold all of her rights to future lottery payments. The court followed
Watkins v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 1269 (10th Cir. 2006), to hold that the
sales proceeds were ordinary income under the "substitute-for-ordinaryincome" principle. This decision is significant because is was handed down
by the Second Circuit, the court that decided McAllister v. Commissioner,
157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), holding that a taxpayer could treat as a capital
gain the lump-sum payment she received when she sold her entire rights to
future payments from a life estate in a trust. The court stated: "We recognize
that there are contexts in which the substitute-for-ordinary-income doctrine
does not or should not apply.... But whatever the doctrine's outer limits, this
case falls squarely within them ... ." The court further noted that McAllister
was decided before the Supreme Court decided Commissioner v. P. G. Lake,
Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958), which held that capital gains treatment was not
applicable where "[t]he substance of what was assigned was the right to
receive future income" and the "substance of what was received was the
present value of income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the
future."
Capital gain treatment for sales of self-created
2.
musical works. TIPRA § 204 added new § 1221(b)(3) to permit taxpayers
to elect to treat the sale or exchange of self-created musical compositions or
copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged after 12/31/06 and before
1/1/11 as the sale or exchange of a capital asset. This capital asset treatment
is to be inapplicable for § 170(e) purposes, so the amount of the charitable
deduction of such assets continues to be reduced by the amount of
appreciation inherent in such assets.
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a.
Section 1221(b)(3) was made permanent by
the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 412.
3.
Proposed regulations would treat taxpayers who
exchange property for an annuity as if they had sold the property. REG141901-05, Exchanges of Property for an Annuity, 71 F.R. 61441
(10/18/06). The Treasury has published proposed regulations (Prop. Reg.
§§ 1.72-6(e)(1), 1.1001-1(j)) that would provide a single set of rules for the
taxation of an exchange of property for an annuity contract. Essentially, the
proposed rules would treat the transaction as if the property was sold for
cash equal to the value of the annuity contract (as determined under § 7520)
and the proceeds were used to buy an annuity contract; however, taxpayers
may continue to structure transactions as § 453(b) installment sales. These
proposed regulations would not change existing Reg. § 1.1011-2 for
charitable gift annuities, but would change prior law on exchanges of
appreciated property for private annuities to the extent it permitted open
transaction treatment or ratable recognition as the annuities were paid. The
effective date is 10/18/06, with a delayed effective date of 4/18/07 for nonabusive transactions.
* These proposed regulations would bring
the current treatment of exchanges of appreciated property for private
annuities into line with the tax treatment of exchanges for commercial
annuities. Before these regulations are applicable, the law generally postponed
tax on the exchange based on the assumption that the value of a private annuity
contract could not be determined for federal income tax purposes.
* Note that under Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1
C.B. 184, a transfer of assets to a grantor trust is not a recognition event.
4.
Distributorship agreement is a capital asset if
you've invested in it. Rev. Rul. 2007-37, 2007-24 I.R.B. 1390 (6/11/07).
The cancellation of a distributor agreement between a manufacturer and a
distributor is treated as a sale or exchange of property that results in capital
gain (or § 1231 gain) if the distributor has made a substantial capital
investment in the distributorship and the investment is reflected in physical
assets. The ruling refers to automobile distributorships that receive payment
from the manufacturer for cancellation of the agreement when the
manufacturer decides to no longer produce the car. Amounts received in
cancellation of certain distributor agreements are treated as capital gain by
§ 1241, which provides deemed "sale or exchange" treatment for
cancellation of a lease or distributorship, but does not itself provide capital
asset status. Gain from the disposition of a distributorship agreement that
was subject to amortization under § 197 is treated as § 1231 gain. The ruling
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also concludes that gain attributable to amortization of the acquisition costs
of a distributorship agreement under § 1253 (25 year amortization prior to
the effective date of § 197) will also be treated as property subject to the
depreciation allowance of § 167 thereby producing § 1231 gain. Section
1231 gain on cancellation of the distributorship is subject to recapture under
§ 1245.
5.
Gain is recognized on an exchange even if the
taxpayer didn't yet have what she got and she might not have gotten to
keep it. United States v. Culp, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-618 (M.D. Tenn.
12/29/06). The government was granted summary judgment in an erroneous
refund suit. The taxpayer exchanged her partnership interest in Ernst &
Young for stock of a corporation acquiring E&Y's consulting business, in a
transaction that was not a statutory nonrecognition event; however, the stock
was held in escrow to enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer
failed to perform certain services as an employee of the acquiring
corporation. The court held that the open transaction doctrine was not
applicable. If a taxpayer exchanges one property for a different property, the
gain realized on the exchange must be recognized in the year the exchange
occurs, even though the property received in the exchange is forfeitable if
contractual provisions or representations in the contract for exchange are not
subsequently satisfied, and even though the property received in the
exchange is held in escrow to assure enforcement of the forfeitability
provisions.
The ever-expanding deemed sale or exchange
6.
concept limits ordinary loss deductions. REG-101001-05, Abandonment
of Stock and Other Securities, 72 F.R. 41468 (7/30/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.1655(i) would provide that a security that has been abandoned is treated as a
wholly worthless security. To abandon a security, a taxpayer must
permanently surrender and relinquish all rights in the security and receive no
consideration in exchange for it. Thus, if the abandoned security (other than
a security in an affiliated corporation subject to § 165(g)(3)) is a capital
asset, the resulting loss is a capital loss incurred on the last day of the
taxable year. All the facts and circumstances determine whether the
transaction is properly characterized as an abandonment or other type of
transaction, such as an actual sale or exchange, contribution to capital,
dividend, or gift. These proposed regulations will be effective after the date
of publication of final regulations.
7.
The same brokerage account can't be both a
trader's account and an investor's account. Arberg v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-244 (8/27/07). The duty of consistency prevented the taxpayers
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from treating losses incurred on stock traded in a brokerage account as
ordinary losses incurred by the husband as a securities trader when gains
from the same account in a prior closed year had been reported as capital
gains on the wife's separate return in a prior year.
B.

Interest

1.
Interest-free loans to continuing care facilities
may be without limit through 2010. TIPRA § 209 added new § 7872(h),
which removes the $100,000 dollar cap for excepting interest-free loans to
continuing care facilities from the imputed interest rules for years through
2010. It also reduces the minimum age of qualifying lenders from 65 to 62.
a.
This provision was made permanent by the
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 425.
C.

Section 121

1.
More tax breaks for exiting home ownership. The
Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007 amended § 121 to extend
the $500,000 ceiling for excludable gain on the sale of a principal residence
to a sale by an unmarried surviving spouse, if the sale occurs not later than
two years after the death of the deceased spouse, and the surviving spouse
and the deceased spouse would have qualified for the $500,000 ceiling
immediately before the death of the deceased spouse. For all taxpayers other
than married couples filing joint returns and qualifying surviving spouses,
the ceiling on excludable gain remains $250,000.
D.

Section 1031

1.
Regulations explain depreciation for MACRS
property acquired in a §1031 exchange of MACRS property, or
acquired in replacement of involuntarily converted MACRS property to
which §1033 applies.
a.
Temporary regulations. T.D. 9115, REG106590-00 and REG-138499-02, Depreciation of MACRS Property That Is
Acquired in a Like-Kind Exchange or as a Result of an Involuntary
Conversion, 69 F.R. 9529 (3/1/04). The Treasury published final, temporary,
and proposed regulations dealing with depreciation of property acquired in a
§ 1031 like-kind exchange or as § 1033 replacement property and withdrew
Prop. Reg. §§ 1.168(a)-i and 1.168(b)-i (which were in the July 2003
proposed regulations). Under these temporary and proposed regulations, to
the extent the taxpayer's basis in the acquired MACRS property does not
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exceed the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the exchanged or involuntarily
converted MACRS property, the acquired property is depreciated over the
remaining recovery period of, and using the same depreciation method and
convention as that of, the exchanged or involuntarily converted property if
the useful life of the replacement property is the same or shorter than the
relinquished property. Any additional basis in the acquired property is
treated as newly purchased MACRS property. (This is the same method as
provided for ACRS property in Prop. Reg. § 1.168-5(f) (1984).) If the
replacement property has a longer useful life, depreciation is computed as if
the replacement property had originally been placed in service when the
relinquished property was placed in service by the acquiring taxpayer. Any
excess basis is treated as property placed in service in the year the acquiring
taxpayer places it in service. There are specific rules for deferred exchanges
and reverse exchanges, as well as for automobiles. As announced in Notice
2000-4, 2000-3 I.R.B. 313, these rules are effective for acquired MACRS
property placed in service on or after January 3, 2000, in a like-kind
exchange of MACRS property under § 1031, or as a result of an involuntary
conversion of MACRS property under § 1033. For property acquired before
January 3, 2000, taxpayers who treated the entire basis as new MACRS
property may continue to do so, or may change accounting methods to
conform.
Final regulations. T.D. 9314, Depreciation
b.
of MACRS Property That is Acquired in a Like-Kind Exchange or As a
Result of an Involuntary Conversion, 72 F.R. 9245 (3/1/07). The proposed
regulations have been adopted, with the addition of some clarifying language
and examples provided in response to comments. The rules for MACRS
property exchanged in §§ 1031 and 1033 transactions are in Reg. § 1.168(i)6.
Have you heard about how you can do § 10312
2.
like-kind exchanges of vacation homes? Don't drink that Kool-Aid!
Moore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-134 (5/30/07). The taxpayer
exchanged land with a mobile home, which the taxpayer used as a vacation
residence, for another vacation property, and claimed the transaction
qualified for nonrecognition under § 1031 because both vacation properties
were acquired and held with the expectation that they would appreciate and
thus were "investment" property. The court (Judge Halpern) held that the
exchange did not qualify. The mere expectation that property will appreciate
does not establish investment intent if the taxpayer uses the property as a

2. More correctly, Grape Flavor-Aid.
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residence. There was no evidence that taxpayer made either property
available for rent or held either property primarily for sale at a profit.
a.
And renting it out for a few weeks just
before the exchange does not work. The IRS provides a safe-harbor for
vacation home swappers. Rev. Proc. 2008-16, 2008-10 I.R.B. 547
(3/10/08). This revenue procedure provides safe-harbor guidance regarding
whether a residential property that the taxpayer held or intends to hold for
mixed uses, e.g., personal vacation use and rental/investment purposes
qualifies as property held for productive use in a trade or business or for
investment under § 1031. Under the revenue procedure, the relinquished
property qualifies if: (1) the property was owned by the taxpayer for at least
24 months immediately before the exchange, and (2) within that period, in
each of the two 12-month periods immediately preceding the exchange, (a)
the taxpayer rented the property to another person or persons at a fair rental
for 14 days or more, and (b) the taxpayer's personal use of the property did
not exceed the greater of 14 days or 10 percent of the number of days during
each 12-month period that the dwelling unit was rented at a fair rental. (For
this purpose, the first 12-month period immediately preceding the exchange
ends on the day before the exchange takes place (and begins 12 months prior
to that day) and the second 12-month period ends on the day before the first
12-month period begins (and begins 12 months prior to that day)). The
replacement property qualifies if (1) the property is owned by the taxpayer
for at least 24 months immediately after the exchange, and within that
period, in each of the two 12-month periods immediately after the exchange
(a) the taxpayer rents the property to another person or persons at a fair
rental for 14 days or more, and (b) the taxpayer's personal use of the
property does not exceed the greater of 14 days or 10 percent of the number
of days during each 12-month period that the property is rented at a fair
rental. (For this purpose, the first 12-month period immediately after the
exchange begins on the day after the exchange takes place and the second
12-month period begins on the day after the first 12-month period ends.)
Personal use of a dwelling unit occurs on any day on which a taxpayer is
deemed to have used the dwelling unit for personal purposes under
§ 280A(d)(2) (taking into account § 280A(d)(3) but not § 280A(d)(4)).
E.

Section 1033
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
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F.

Section 1035

1.
A check in hand leaves the § 1035 tax-free
exchange of annuities behind the bush. Rev. Rul. 2007-24, 2007-21 I.R.B.
1282 (5/21/07). Section 1035 provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss on
the exchange of an annuity contract for another annuity contract. Applying a
rule similar to the rule of § 1031 barring the receipt and control of cash in a
like-kind exchange, the IRS has ruled that the taxpayer's receipt of a check
from an insurance company issuing one annuity, which the taxpayer
endorsed over to another insurance company for a replacement annuity, is
not entitled to nonrecognition under § 1035. The transaction was not an
exchange of the annuity contracts. The taxpayer was required to recognize
gross income under § 72. The ruling seems to contradict the holding in
Greene v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 1024 (1985), which allowed
nonrecognition treatment under § 1035 where, without a binding obligation,
the taxpayer received a check from one annuity contract that she endorsed in
the purchase of a new annuity contract. The annuities in Rev. Rul. 2007-24
were not in qualified plans. In Greene the funds were moved between
qualifying § 403(b) plans, but the rollover rules of § 403(b)(8) were not
applicable in Greene.
IV.

COMPENSATION ISSUES

A.

Fringe Benefits

1.
Guidance on Health Savings Accounts. Notice
2004-2, 2004-1 C.B. 269 (1/12/04). The IRS has issued guidance in Q&A
form on Health Savings Accounts under new § 223 (added by § 1201 of the
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003). This guidance provides basic information about HSAs. This new
provision offers health spending accounts without the "use it or lose it"
requirement of health FSAs.
a.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006 § 302 adds new Code § 106(e) to permit one-time transfers to health
savings accounts from health flexible spending arrangements and health
reimbursement arrangements.
b.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006 § 303 amends Code § 223(b)(2) to repeal the annual deductible
limitation on HSA contributions and allow monthly contributions of $2,250
for individuals and $4,500 per family, adjusted for inflation, $2,700 ($5,454
family) even if the deductible is less that those amounts. For 2007, the
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inflation adjusted amount was $2,850 for individuals and $5,650 per family.
Rev. Proc. 2006-53, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996, § 3.24.
c.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006 § 306 adds new Code § 4980G(d) to provide for an exception to the
current requirement that employer contributions to HSAs be "comparable"
for all employees by allowing employers to provide additional contributions
to lower-paid workers.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
d.
2006 § 307 adds new Code § 408(d)(9) to permit one-time distributions from
IRAs to fund HSAs. This would allow those who cannot afford to fully fund
an HSA with direct contributions to move IRA money to a more taxadvantaged position.
2.
Rev. Rul. 2007-17, 2007-13 I.R.B. 805 (3/26/07).
This Ruling updates mileage rates for employer-provided non-commercial
aircraft for the first half of 2007.
3.
T.D. 9349, Section 125 - Cafeteria Plans, 72 F.R.
41891 (8/1/07). The IRS has removed temporary regulations on benefits that
may be offered under a § 125 cafeteria plan because these temporary
regulations - published more than two decades ago - have been rendered
obsolete by subsequent proposed regulations and other § 125 guidance.
a.
REG-142695-05, Employee Benefits Cafeteria Plans, 72 F.R. 43937 (8/6/07). New cafeteria plan regulations
under § 125 are proposed, including: general rules on qualified and
nonqualified benefits in cafeteria plans (new Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1); general
rules on elections (new Prop. Reg. § 1.125-2); general rules on flexible
spending arrangements (new Prop. Reg. § 1.125-5); general rules on
substantiation of expenses for qualified benefits (new Prop. Reg. § 1.125-6);
and nondiscrimination rules (new Prop. Reg. § 1.125-7). The new proposed
regulations, Prop. Reg. §§ 1.125-1, 1.125-2, 1.125-5, 1.125-6 and § 1.125-7,
consolidate and restate Prop. Reg. § 1.125-1 (1984, 1997, 2000), § 1.125-2
(1989, 1997, 2000) and § 1.125-2T (1986).
B.

Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans

1.
Beginning in 2008, 401(k) plans may contain an
automatic contribution feature. Pension Protection Act § 902 adds new
Code § 401(k)(13) to permit qualified automatic enrollment in 401(k) plans,
under which an employee is enrolled to make elective contributions unless
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he or she affirmatively elects otherwise. This provision is effective for plan
years beginning after 12/31/07.
* Note that employer matching costs
should be expected to increase because participation can be expected to
increase.
a.
Polly want a QACA? REG-133300-07,
Automatic Contribution Arrangements, 72 F.R. 63144 (11/8/07). Proposed
regulations relating to automatic contribution arrangements. These proposed
regulations would amend Reg. § 1.401(k)-3 to provide a new design-based
safe-harbor for a qualified automatic contribution arrangements ("QACA")
under § 401(k)(13).
2.
Congress - in reaction to Enron - requires that
401(k) participants get what Peter Lynch calls "di-worse-ification"
rights with respect to employer securities. Pension Protection Act § 901
adds new Code § 401(a)(35) to provide diversification rights with respect to
publicly traded employer securities held by a defined contribution plan. This
paragraph is effective with respect to plan years beginning after 12/31/06.
Notice 2006-107, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1114
a.
(12/18/06). This Notice provides transitional guidance regarding
§ 401(a)(35), together with a model notice, to plan participants concerning
employer securities.
3.
District Court finds that IBM cash balance plan
violates ERISA - but case is reversed after Congress passes the Pension
Protection Act of 2006. Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 274 F. Supp.
2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 7/31/03). The court held that the plan violated ERISA
§§ 204(b)(1)(G) (reduction of accrued benefit solely on increases in age or
service) and 204(b)(1)(H) (rate of benefit accrual decreases once a certain
age is attained).
a.
Seventh Circuit reverses IBM case, but
only after Congress acts to legalize cash balance plans. Cooper v. BM
Personal Pension Plan, 457 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 8/7/06), rehearing denied,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23227 (7th Cir. 9/1/06), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1143
(1/16/07), rev'g 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill. 7/31/03). The Seventh
Circuit (Judge Easterbrook) analyzed the situation by comparing ERISA
§ 204(b)(1)(H) (the anti-age discrimination provision applicable to defined
benefit plans) with ERISA § 204(b)(2)(A) (the anti-age discrimination
provision applicable to defined contribution plans). Judge Easterbrook made
the point that "benefit accrual" in § 204(b)(1)(H) does not have the same
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meaning as "accrued benefit," which is defined in ERISA § 3(23)(A) as an
amount "expressed in the form of an annual benefit commencing at normal
retirement age."
Judge Easterbrook ascribed to the district
court a conclusion that cash balance plans discriminate on account of age
based on an example comparing the benefit received by a 30-year-old who
leaves IBM at age 50 with the benefit received by a 45-year-old who retires at
age 65, and stated that the district court based its conclusion of discrimination
on the fact that the difference in accrued benefit at age 65 - attributable to 15
additional years of compound interest - is not counterbalanced by the fact that
older workers generally draw higher salaries. He rejected this interpretation of
the statute that "treats the time value of money as age discrimination."
* Judge Easterbrook reinforced this
conclusion by noting it is identical to the view of the Treasury Department
expressed in the December 2002 proposed regulations which concluded that
the proper question to ask is, "if this employee were younger, would the
hypothetical balance have grown more this year?"
b.
The world is now safe for cash balance
plans. Pension Protection Act § 701 amends ERISA §§ 203, 204 and 205,
Code §§ 411 and 417, and ADEA § 4(i)(2) to provide that cash balance
plans do not per se violate the prohibition on age discrimination.
C.
Or is it? In re Citigroup Pension Plan
ERISA Litigation, 470 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D. N.Y. 12/12/06). The court
(Judge Scheindlin) disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's Cooper decision
and found that cash balance plans violate the prohibition on age
discrimination.
d.
It is! Register v. PNC Financial Services
Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 56 (3d Cir. 1/30/07). The Third Circuit followed
Cooper, and noted that only a few district courts in the Second Circuit have
held otherwise.
e.
And, further, it is! Wheeler v. Pension
Value Plan for Employees of The Boeing Co., 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1557
(S.D. Ill. 3/13/07). This decision followed Cooper with respect to
McDonnell Douglas employees moved to the Boeing cash balance plan.
Also, rejects the employees' assertion that the plan is backloaded because
swings in interest rates on 30 year Treasury securities are "likely" to cause
interest credits allocated to plan participants' cash balance accounts at a rate
more than one-third higher (under the 133-1/3% test) than the rate of accrual
of the benefits in early years. The court pointed to Reg. § 1.411(b)-
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l(b)(2)(ii)(D) that provides that relevant factors used to compute plan
benefits are treated as remaining constant.
f.
The IRS opens the door for cash balance
plans. Notice 2007-6, 2007-3 I.R.B. 272 (1/16/07). The IRS announced that
it is beginning to process a determination letter and examine cases in which
an application for a determination letter or a plan under examination
involves an amendment to change a traditional defined benefit plan into a
cash balance plan. This Notice also provides transitional guidance on the
requirements of Code §§ 411(a)(13) and 411 (b)(5), which were added by
§ 701(b) of the Pension Protection Act.
4.
T.D. 9319, Limitations on Benefits and
Contributions Under Qualified Plans, 72 F.R. 16878 (4/5/07). The Treasury
has updated regulations last issued in 1981 addressing contribution and
benefits limits with respect to qualified plans under § 415. Among other
things, the final regulations incorporate statutory changes to the § 415
limitations subsequent to 1981, including the 2001 Act (EGTRRA).
5.
Final regulations
are issued
regarding
distributions from Roth accounts in 401(k) and 403(b) qualified plans.
T.D. 9324, Designated Roth Accounts Under Section 402A, 72 F.R. 21103
(4/30/07). These final regulations provide guidance on the taxation of
distributions of amounts designated in § 401(k) plans and § 403(b) plans as
Roth type contributions, requiring separate accounting. Exclusion from
income or permissible rollover to a Roth type IRA depends on whether the
distribution is a qualified distribution determined under the regulations.
6.
T.D. 9340, Revised Regulations Concerning Section
403(b) Tax-Sheltered Annuity Contracts, 72 F.R. 41128 (7/26/07). The IRS
has published final regulations providing a comprehensive revision of the
current regulations on § 403(b) tax-sheltered annuity contracts of public
schools and § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations. These regulations
generally apply for taxable years beginning after 12/31/08.
7.
Notice 2007-94, 2007-51 I.R.B. 1179 (12/17/07).
This Notice publishes the 2007 cumulative list of changes in plan
qualification requirements.
C.
Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and
Stock Options
1.
Section 409A added a new layer of rules for
nonqualified deferred compensation. Section 885 of the Jobs Act of 2004
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added new § 409A, which modifies the taxation of nonqualified deferred
compensation plans for amounts deferred after 2004. Section 409A has
changed the tax law governing nonqualified deferred compensation by
making it more difficult to successfully avoid current inclusion in gross
income of unfunded deferred compensation. Nevertheless, § 409A has not
completely supplanted prior law. The fundamental principles of prior law
continue in force but have been modified in certain respects.
a.
Section
409A
guidance
provides
transition rules and excludes stock appreciation rights from the purview
of that section. Notice 2005-1, 2005-1 C.B. 274 (1/10/05), modified by
Notice 2006-100, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1109 (12/18/06). These Notices provide
guidance in Q&A form with respect to the application of § 409A.
b.
Proposed regulations incorporate much
of the guidance in Notice 2005-1. REG-158080-04, Application of Section
409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 70 F.R. 57930
(10/4/05). These proposed regulations incorporate much of the guidance
provided in Notice 2005-1, as well as "substantial additional guidance."
They identify the plans and arrangements covered by § 409A and describe
the requirements for deferral elections and the permissible timing for
deferred compensation payments. They also extend the deadline for
"documentary compliance" to 12/31/06, but 1/1/05 remains as the effective
date for statutory compliance (although there are transition rules applicable
for 2005).
c.
Interim guidance on withholding and
reporting requirements for 2005 and 2006. Notice 2006-100, 2006-51
I.R.B. 1109 (12/18/06). This Notice provides interim guidance to employers
on their wage withholding requirements for calendar years 2005 and 2006
with respect to compensation and amounts includible in gross income under
§ 409A, as well as guidance to service providers on their income tax
reporting and payment requirements for amounts includible in gross income
under § 409A for those years.
d.
Final regulations. T.D. 9321, Application
of Section 409A to Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plans, 72 F.R.
19234 (4/17/07). Final regulations have been adopted that generally follow
the format and structure of the proposed regulations with a number of
clarifications and additions in response to comments.
e.
Transition relief extended for NQDC
under § 409A. Notice 2006-79, 2006-43 I.R.B. 763 (10/23/06). Although
the IRS expects that the proposed regulations will become final by the end of
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2006, the proposed effective date of 1/1/07 for the final § 409A regulations
is extended to 1/1/08. Additional transition relief is provided through
12/31/07.
And is sort-of extended for one more year
f.
through the end of 2008. Notice 2007-78, 200741 I.R.B. 780 (10/9/07).
This Notice provides some 2008 transition relief and additional guidance on
the application to § 409A to nonqualified deferred compensation plans.
Now, transition relief is really extended
g.
through the end of 2008. Notice 2007-86, 2007-46 I.R.B. 990 (11/13/07),
revoking and superseding Notice 2007-78. This Notice extends to 12/31/08
the transition relief that was scheduled to expire on 12/31/07, as provided in
Notice 2006-79.
More guidance. Notice 2007-89, 2007-46
h.
I.R.B. 998 (11/13/07). This notice provides interim guidance to employers
regarding reporting and wage withholding requirements for calendar year
2007 with respect to deferrals of compensation and amounts includible in
gross income under § 409A. It also provides interim rules on calculating
amounts includible in gross income under § 409A. Notice 2005-1 was
modified; Notice 2006-100 was not affected by this Notice.
Section 409A as applied to split-dollar life
i.
insurance contracts. Notice 2007-34, 2007-17 I.R.B. 996 (4/23/07). This
Notice provides guidance regarding the application of § 409A to split-dollar
life insurance contracts. Split-dollar life insurance arrangements (other than
arrangements that provide only death benefits to the service provider) are
deferred compensation arrangements subject to § 409A. A split-dollar life
insurance arrangement entered into before September 17, 2003, is not
subject to § 409A unless the arrangement has been materially modified. This
Notice also provides guidance with respect to which modifications to
comply with § 409A will not be treated as material modifications for
purposes of the transition rule.
* Section 409A is not applicable to
benefits, which include any increase in the
grandfathered
on
§
409A
earnings
policy cash value attributable to continued services, compensation earned, or
premium payments, or other contributions made on or after January 1, 2005.
The portion of benefits attributable to grandfathered arrangements can be
determined by any reasonable method, but the Notice describes a proportional
method as reasonable.
* A split-dollar insurance plan provides
of § 409A if the arrangement provides a
for
purposes
compensation
deferred
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service provider with economic benefits in the current year (access to policy
cash value or any other economic benefit) payable to the service provider in a
later taxable year.
* Split-dollar insurance arrangements that
are treated as loans (the policy is owned by the service provider with
premiums from a non-owner) generally will not give rise to deferred
compensation subject to § 409A.
2.
Remember when "inappropriate dating" was
just a reference to Wayne Hays and Elizabeth Ray, Gary Hart and
Donna Rice, Bill Clinton and Monica Lewinsky, Gary Condit and
Chandra Levy, Rudy Giuliani and Cristyne Lategano, Newt Gingrich
and Callista Bisek, or Barney Frank and Steve Gobie? Backdated stock
options give rise to tax problems, but "innocent employees" may have
their § 409A taxes paid by their employer. Announcement 2007-18, 20079 I.R.B. 625 (2/26/07). This announcement institutes a compliance
resolution program that permits employers to pay the additional § 409A
taxes due to the exercise in 2006 of discounted stock options and stock
appreciation rights for employees who are not corporate insiders. This is
because the backdated stock options and stock appreciation rights were "in
the money" when issued, and are, therefore, not excluded from § 409A by
the regulations thereunder. Of course, these employer payments will be
additional wages in the year in which they are made.
* This program offers only administrative
convenience, and does not result in any benefit to the taxpayers involved.
3.
Did you know that § 409A will apply for the
2008-2009 school year to teachers who elect to receive their salaries over
a 12-month period instead of being paid only during the nine-month
school year? IRS (or, should it be Congress), give us a break! IR-2007142 (8/7/07). School districts that offer annualization elections to teachers
may have to make some changes in their procedures in the future, but the
IRS announced that the new deferred compensation rules will not be applied
to annualization elections for school years beginning before 1/1/08.
* This results from an anti-Enron provision
in the 2004 Act.
4.
Stock options are not exercised when the service
recipient provides nonrecourse financing because such exercise is
merely the continuation of the option, but they are exercised when a
third-party lender provides financing on a nonrecourse basis. Palahnuk
v. United States, 475 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2/12/07), aff'g 70 Fed. Cl. 87
(2/28/06). Taxpayers exercised nonqualified stock options in 2000 using
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funds obtained through borrowing on a margin account with a third party
lender (Oppenheimer) with the loan secured by the purchased stock. They
contended that the transfer took place in 2001 when they paid off the margin
loan used to purchase the stock. The purchase of employer's stock pursuant
to a nonstatutory stock option using funds obtained through borrowing on a
margin account with a third-party lender constituted a completed transfer for
purposes of § 83; the arrangement was not in substance a continuing option
under Reg. §§ 1.83-3(a)(2) and 1.83-1(a)(7), Ex. (2), because the benefits of
ownership and risk of decline in value had been transferred to taxpayers.
0 The Federal Circuit (Judge Mayer) held
that a transfer occurs when the employer corporation is paid for the stock,
whether the transfer was funded with the buyer's own cash or from a broker's
margin loan, and there was no evidence that taxpayer's rights to the stock
could have been revoked by the corporation.
a.
Ninth Circuit tells taxpayer, "That's
tough." United States v. Tuff, 469 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 12/4/06), affg 359 F.
Supp. 2d 1129 (W.D. Wash. 2/4/05). In this case, compensatory stock was
transferred and vested for purposes of § 83 when the option was exercised
with funds provided as margin debt by a third-party brokerage firm. These
stock purchases do not qualify for the Reg. § 1.83-3(a)(2) exception for
treating a stock option exercised with a nonrecourse note as in substance the
grant of an option.
Racine v. Commissioner, 493 F.3d 777 (7th
b.
Cir. 7/3/07). The Seventh Circuit reached the same result. There is some
discrepancy between the Court of Appeals opinion, which describes the
taxpayer as personally liable for a loan from the brokerage house to exercise
the option, and the Tax Court's (T.C. Memo. 2006-162) description of the
loan as nonrecourse.
It's hard to believe this case, but read it and
5.
wonder. Kimberlin v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 163 (5/8/07). In a mostly
factual determination, the Tax Court (Judge Foley) held that stock warrants
issued to a venture capital firm under a settlement and release agreement
executed following a dispute regarding termination of services for a private
placement offering were not received for past, present, or future services and
therefore not subject to § 83.3 The court determined that the warrants had an
ascertainable value in the year of the grant and were, therefore, includable in
income in that year rather than in the year of exercise when the value was
substantially higher. Finally, the warrants were treated as dividend income to
3. But note John Milton's, "They also serve who only stand and wait."
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the taxpayer as a distribution from the taxpayer's venture capital
corporation.
6.
Tax treatment of vested stock that becomes
subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture is explained. Rev. Rul. 2007-49,
2007-31 I.R.B. 237 (7/30/07). When in the course of corporate affairs
employee stock that is vested becomes subject to a risk of forfeiture, and,
therefore, non-vested, the transaction may or may not constitute a taxable
event.
* In situation 1, the taxpayer holding
vested stock makes an additional investment in the corporation for stock and
agrees that all of the stock will be subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture.
Since the vested stock is already owned by the taxpayer under § 83, there is no
transfer caused by the imposition of restrictions on the stock.
* In situation 2, the taxpayer receives
substantially non-vested stock for vested stock in a tax-free reorganization.
The substantially non-vested shares are treated as being received in exchange
for services subject to § 83. The fair market value of the vested shares is
treated as the amount paid for the non-vested shares, resulting in zero
recognition if the amount paid is greater than the value of the non-vested
shares.
* In situation 3, the taxpayer exchanges
vested stock for substantially non-vested stock in a taxable merger. The
transaction is treated as an exchange under § 1001.
7.
More AMT pain. Merlo v. Commissioner, 492 F.3d
618 (5th Cir. 7/17/07). The taxpayer exercised an incentive stock option and
purchased $1,075,289 worth of stock for only $9,225. The employer's
insider trading policy prevented employees from trading the company's
stock during certain blackout periods, but employees could exercise a stock
option during a blackout period. The taxpayer had exercised the stock option
during a blackout period. Less than a year later, the stock was worthless. The
Tax Court (Judge Haines), T.C. Memo. 2005-178, held that the restrictions
on the taxpayer's ability to sell the stock during the blackout period was not
a substantial risk of forfeiture under § 83, and that the spread was includable
in alternative minimum taxable income pursuant to § 56(b)(3). Judge Haines
later held, 126 T.C. 205 (4/25/06), that the limitations on capital losses
under §§ 1211 and 1212 apply for purposes of calculating alternative
minimum taxable income. Thus, the capital loss realized in 2001 upon
worthlessness of the stock acquired pursuant to the exercise of incentive
stock options did not create an AMT NOL that could be carried back to
reduce AMTI in 2000, the year of exercise. The Fifth Circuit (Judge King)
affirmed on both issues. First, Judge King held that "[t]he blackout period
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within the insider trading policy is insufficient to create a substantial risk of
forfeiture because the remedy for non-compliance does not include forfeiture
of the shares." Second, she rejected the taxpayer's argument that
§ 56(d)(2)(A)(i) creates an exception to the § 172(d) rule that capital losses
are taken into account in an NOL only to the extent of capital gains,
reasoning that the starting point for the AMT NOL is the NOL under
§ 172(c) and (d). None of the modifications made pursuant to § 56(d)(2)(A)
override the § 172 limitations.
The difference between the adjusted AMT basis
8.
and the regular tax basis of stock received through the exercise of an
ISO is not a tax adjustment taken into account in the calculation of an
AMT NOL in the year the stock is sold. Marcus v. Commissioner, 129
T.C. 24 (8/15/07). In a series of transactions between 1998 and 2000, the
taxpayer exercised incentive stock options (ISOs) to acquire 40,362 shares
of his employer's stock. In 2001, he sold 30,297 shares, which had a regular
tax basis equal to the $127,920 exercise price, for $1,688,875. The
taxpayer's AMT basis in the shares was $4,472,288 - the exercise price
increased by the amount included in alternative minimum taxable income
(AMTI) under § 56(b)(3) resulting from the exercise of the ISOs. Judge
Haines rejected the taxpayer's argument that the difference between the
adjusted AMT basis and the regular tax basis of the shares sold created an
AMT NOL under § 56(d) that could be carried back to 2000. The taxpayer's
argument was based on the rules in § 56(d)(1)(B)(i) and (2)(A) providing
that the AMT NOL is determined by taking into account adjustments to
taxable income under §§ 56 and 58 (and preference items under § 57). Judge
Haines reasoned that the only adjustment under § 56(b)(3) was made in the
year the option was exercised; there was no basis adjustment to take into
account in the year of the sale exercise. He explained that basis recovery
through depreciation deductions is not analogous to the recovery of basis
upon the sale of stock, because stock is a nondepreciable capital asset. When
stock is sold at a loss, the capital loss limitations in §§ 1211, 1212, and
172(d)(2) are applicable for AMT purposes as well as for the regular tax.
D.

Individual Retirement Accounts
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
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PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS

A.

Rates

1.
TIPRA § 510 amends § 1(g)(2)(A) to increase the
age below which the kiddie tax is applicable from 14 to 18, effective for
years beginning after 2005.
a.
The 2007 Act further tightens the kiddie
tax, but only from 2008 forward. The 2007 Act, § 8241(a), extends
application of the § l(g) kiddie tax to "children" over the age of 18 and
under 24 who are full-time students if their earned income does not exceed
the amount of their support. The amendment is effective for tax years
beginning after 5/25/07.
* For at least one of us, this is getting
personal.
" For another one of us, this is exactly
what he suggested in a 1981 law review article - five years before the kiddie
tax was enacted.
B.

Miscellaneous Income

1.
Who Threw the Overalls in Mrs. Murphy's
Chowder? Compensation for a personal injury that relates to something
that could have been enjoyed tax-free is not income under the Sixteenth
Amendment. Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79 (D.C. Cir. 8/22/06), vacated, 99
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-396 (12/22/06). Taxpayer received environmental
whistleblower damages of $70,000 from the New York National Air Guard
in 2000. The damages were awarded "for mental pain and anguish" and "for
injury to professional reputation." The court rejected taxpayer's argument
that her award was for "bruxism" which she argued was a physical injury or
physical sickness. However, the court (Judge Ginsburg) held that
§ 104(a)(2), as amended in 1996 to exclude non-physical personal injuries
from the exemption, was unconstitutional because "compensation for a nonphysical personal injury is not income under the Sixteenth Amendment if, as
here, it is unrelated to lost wages or earnings." Judge Ginsburg's rationale
was based upon the consideration that the award of compensatory damages
was a substitute for a "normally untaxed" personal quality, good or asset,
citing O'Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79 (1996) (punitive damages were
taxable pre-1996 Act because they were not a substitute for a normally
untaxed benefit), and Raytheon Prod.Corp. v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 110
(1st Cir. 1944) ("In lieu of what were the damages awarded?"). Judge
Ginsburg looked to the commonly understood meaning of the term
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"incomes" at the time of the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, and
found that the term did not include damages for nonphysical personal
injuries that were unrelated to lost wages or earning capacity.
9 The Government moved for rehearing en
banc. In response, the panel vacated its opinion. Before the opinion was
vacated, it temporarily threw the treatment of compensatory damages for
nonphysical personal injuries into a state of chaos. The court found that "the
damages were awarded to make Murphy emotionally and reputationally
'whole' and not to compensate her for lost wages or taxable earnings of any
kind. The emotional well-being and good reputation she enjoyed before they
were diminished by her former employer were not taxable as income." From
this starting point, the court reasoned that because the damages were received
in .'in lieu of something 'normally untaxed' ... her compensation is not
income under the Sixteenth Amendment; it is neither a 'gain' nor an
'accession[ ] to wealth."' The court found further support for its holding by
looking to what it determined to have been "the commonly understood
meaning of the term [income] which must have been in the minds of the
people when they adopted the Sixteenth Amendment." The court concluded
that "the framers of the Sixteenth Amendment would not have understood
compensation for a personal injury - including a nonphysical injury - to be
income." This conclusion was based largely on two 1918 rulings, one by the
Attorney General (31 Op. Att'y Gen. 304 (1918)) and one by the Treasury
Department (T;D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918)), both of which
predated the enactment of the statutory predecessor of § 104(a)(2), which
concluded that payments received as compensation for personal injuries
(without specifying the nature of the injury) were "'capital' as distinguished
from 'income' (in the Attorney General's opinion) and "doubtful whether ...
required to be included in gross income" (in the Treasury Department ruling).
The court considered its conclusion to be bolstered by a 1922 ruling of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (Sol. Op. 132, I-1 C.B. 92 (alienation of affection;
defamation of personal character)) that damages received for a nonphysical
tort were income, noting that the ruling "regarded such compensation not
merely as excludable under the IRC, but more fundamentally as not being
income at all."
* The court's reasoning in the opinion is
tenuous, at best, and it is unlikely that any other courts will follow this
opinion. There are two salient weaknesses, among others, in the court's
reasoning. First, it is very difficult to see any connection between the 1918
administrative pronouncements and the intent of those who adopted the
Sixteenth Amendment five years earlier. Second, the court ignored that in
1921, after the enactment of the statutory predecessor of § 104(a)(2), but
before the 1922 ruling cited by the court, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
changed its position and ruled that damages for nonphysical personal injuries
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were includable in gross income because they not specifically excluded by the
statute (Sol. Mem. 957, 1 C.B. 65 (1919) (libel); Sol. Mem. 1384, 2 C.B. 71
(1920) (alienation of affection)). In 1922 the Bureau reversed its position
solely because of the holding in Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920),
which at that time was read to limit the constitutional meaning of "income" to
"gain derived form capital, from labor, or from both combined." This narrow
crabbed view of the constitutional meaning of income has long since been
discredited by subsequent Supreme Court cases, allowing virtually all
accessions to financial wealth from any source, and in any form, to be
includable in gross income under the statute. After Eisner v. Macomber was
shorn of its vitality, the IRS again took the position that in many cases
damages for nonphysical personal injuries were includable in gross income,
but prior to 1996 the courts generally held such damages were excluded under
the statutory provisions of § 104(a)(2) and its predecessors, not because the
damages were not "income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment.
0 In other words, the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Murphy was grounded in the
Supreme Court's view of the constitutional meaning of "income" under the
Sixteenth Amendment in 1920. Congress, on the other hand, enacted the 1996
statutory amendments taxing all damages for nonphysical personal injury in
light of subsequent Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the constitutional
meaning of "income" under the Sixteenth Amendment that effectively
relegated the narrow Eisner v. Macomber view to the dustbin of constitutional
law history. Depending on the court's opinion following rehearing, the flawed
reasoning of the original decision in Murphy similarly should be relegated to
the dustbin ofjudicial history.
a.
Compensation
for
a non-physical
personal injury is income under the Sixteenth Amendment, and in any
event the tax is an indirect tax. By the way, forget about filing those
protective claims for refund. Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir.
7/3/07). Judge Ginsburg had a change of heart on rehearing. The court
ultimately concluded (1) that Murphy's award was not received on account
of physical injuries, (2) that gross income under § 61 includes an award for
non-physical injuries such as Murphy's, and (3) that even if the damages are
not income, the tax on damages is not a direct tax subject to apportionment.
2.
Congress serves up some Alka-Seltzer to those
caught by the AMT in the dot-com bubble. The Tax Relief and Health
Care Act of 2006 § 402 added new Code § 53(e) to make the AMT credits
for prior years' AMT liability into a refundable credit (as opposed to a credit
limited to the difference between the regular tax liability and the tentative
AMT liability for the year). A taxpayer who has unused AMT credits -
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including those arising from incentive stock option grants - will be allowed
to claim a refundable credit in the amount of the greater of (1) 20 percent of
his long-term unused AMT credits, or (2) the lesser of (a) $5,000 or (b) the
amount of the taxpayer's long-term unused minimum credit for the year.
This latter amount is the portion attributable to tax years before the third tax
year immediately preceding the tax year in question. The relief phases out
for higher income taxpayers in the same manner as the phase-out of personal
exemptions when AGI exceeds $150,000. These provisions are effective
only for years 2007-2012.
The Vietnam War era returns-religious
3.
objections to paying for the military don't avoid taxes. Jenkins v.
Commissioner, 483 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 3/6/07). The Second Circuit affirmed a
Tax Court judgment rejecting the taxpayer's claims that he had the right
under the First and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution to withhold a
portion of federal taxes on the basis of religious objections to military
spending. The court also affirmed a $5,000 penalty for frivolous arguments.
4.
There's no transition rule in § 104(a)(2). Polone
v. Commissioner, 505 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 10/11/07), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2003339. The application of the 1996 amendments to § 104(a)(2) (which denied
exclusion for damages received on account of non-physical personal injuries
for payments received after 8/20/96) to post-8/20/96 payments received on
account of a settlement agreement finalized in May 1996, was not a
retroactive application of a newly enacted tax statute. The Ninth Circuit
(Judge Thomas) held that three of four installment payments from settlement
of a defamation suit by the taxpayer talent agent before the effective date of
the physical injury amendment of § 104(a)(2) were includible in income.
The plain language of the statute applies to damages received after August
20, 1996, unless the parties contracted prior to September 13, 1995. The
taxpayer settled his claims for $4 million in May 1996 and received four
payments of $1 million each after the effective date of the amendments. The
court also rejected the taxpayer's Constitutional claims that application of
the statute to payments received after the effective date of the settlement was
an impermissible retroactive application of the statute in violation of the
taxpayer's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.
* Judge Thomas stated, "'[a] statute does
not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from
conduct antedating the statute's enactment,"' quoting Landgrafv. USI Film
Products,511 U.S. 244 (1994).
5.
A joint account is not a completed gift that
stock
sale. Estate of Freedman v. Commissioner, T.C.
transfers gain from
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Memo. 2007-61 (3/19/07). Taxpayer deposited stock, which she received
from her sale of an internet casino to a corporation, in a joint brokerage
account, naming her son as the other joint owner. The Tax Court held that
under the relevant state (Texas) law ownership of a joint account is
proportional to contributions. Since the evidence demonstrated that the
account was established with contributions from the taxpayer, her estate was
taxable on 100 percent of the gain from the sale of the stock in the joint
account.
6.
Form controls over asserted substance: Family
transactions produce income and an accuracy-related penalty where the
burden of producing "strong proof" was not met. O'Malley v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-79 (4/3/07). The taxpayer, Patrick
O'Malley, purchased a 48.5 acre parcel in Anne Arundel County, Maryland.
The parcel was subject to subdivision into lots held by family members for a
minimum of five years. Three lots had houses, one of which was occupied
by the taxpayer. Because he needed funds to meet various financial
obligations, the taxpayer transferred two lots to brothers Kevin and Edward.
Kevin borrowed $254,400 from a bank, transferred the proceeds to the
taxpayer, and gave the taxpayer a second deed of trust note for $47,000. The
written documentation described the transaction as a sale. Subsequently the
taxpayer issued a $54,400 check to Kevin with a notation indicating "loan
repayment." The taxpayer also forgave the $47,000 second loan. He did not
report this arrangement as a sale and claimed that the "venture" was a
financing arrangement. The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's arguments,
indicating that "strong proof' is required where the taxpayer asserts that a
transaction, in form a sale of property, is not a sale for tax purposes. The
Tax Court also rejected the taxpayer's somewhat novel argument that the
return of $54,400 to Kevin was a purchase price reduction under § 108(e)(5),
because there was no indebtedness from the taxpayer to Kevin that was
reduced. The taxpayer was also found liable for the § 6662(a) accuracyrelated penalty because of the substantial understatement of income
attributable to the sale to Kevin.
0 In a second transaction the taxpayer
conveyed a second parcel to brother Edward under an oral agreement that the
transaction was a sale. Edward borrowed $180,000 from a bank secured by the
property and transferred the proceeds to the taxpayer. The balance of the
property's fair market value was reflected as a loan to Edward by the taxpayer
on which no payments were required. The taxpayer made all payments on the
loan and paid the real property taxes. Edward was to retransfer the property to
the taxpayer at the end of five years. The Tax Court concluded, with respect to
this transaction, that the taxpayer satisfied his burden of showing by strong
proof that this transaction was not a sale.
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7.
Some tax exemptions are found in federal
statutes outside of the Internal Revenue Code. Wallace v. Commissioner,
128 T.C. 132 (4/16/07). Payments of $16,393 received by a veteran under a
compensated work therapy program administered by the Department of
Veterans Affairs were excluded from gross income even though the taxpayer
was required to perform work as part of a veterans' construction team as part
of the program. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) exempts from taxation benefits
payments to the beneficiary of veterans' benefits. See also I.R.C. §
140(a)(3). Broadly construing the exemption, the Tax Court rejected the
Commissioner's argument that amounts received under the work therapy
program were includible in gross income because of the work requirement.
a.
And the IRS now agrees. Rev. Rul. 200769, 2007-49 I.R.B. 1083 (12/3/07). Payments made by the U.S. Department
of Veterans Affairs under the compensated work therapy program described
in 38 U.S.C. § 1718 are exempt from income tax as veterans' benefits
pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), which provides that payments of
benefits due or to become due under any law administered by the VA made
to, or on account of, a beneficiary are tax-exempt.
8.
Forgiven accrued but unpaid interest on a
consumer loan is COD income. Hahn v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 200775 (4/2/07). The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that the black letter law
remains that discharge of indebtedness income can be realized under the
Kirby Lumber Co. "freeing of assets" rationale even though the debtor did
not receive any cash or other property when he incurred the liability. When a
creditor writes off accrued but unpaid interest owed by a cash method
debtor, discharge of indebtedness income is realized, unless the interest
would have been deductible if it had been paid and thus excludable under
§ 108(e)(2), because "[t]he right to use money represents a valuable property
interest." Taxpayer's motion for summary judgment was denied because
whether the interest expenses incurred in a horse breeding activity was
deductible as a trade or business expense was a question of fact on which a
trial was necessary.
9.
Selling your life insurance policy to yourself is
not a transfer for value. Rev. Rul. 2007-13, 2007-11 I.R.B. 684 (3/12/07).
A grantor who under the grantor trust rules is treated as the owner of a trust
that owns a life insurance contract on the grantor's life is treated as the
owner of the contract for purposes of the transfer for value limitations of
§ 101(a)(2). Relying upon Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, the IRS ruled
that the transfer of a life insurance contract between two grantor trusts that
are treated as wholly owned by the same grantor is not a transfer for value
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within the meaning of § 101 (a)(2). The transfer of a life insurance contract
to a grantor trust that is treated as wholly owned by the insured is a transfer
to the insured within the meaning of § 101(a)(2)(B) and is thus excepted
from the transfer for value limitations under § 101 (a)(2).
10.
Antarctica is not a foreign country. Income
earned in "outer space" is not excluded foreign source compensation.
Kunze v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-179 (7/5/07). On summary
judgment the Tax Court denied claims of 150 individuals that wages earned
for services performed in Antarctica are not excluded from income under
§ 911 as income earned in foreign country. The Court held that activity in
Antarctica is deemed space or ocean activity relying on Arnett v.
Commissioner, 126 T.C. 89 (2006), aff'd, 473 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2007).
11.
You have to prove physical injury, not just allege
it. Gibson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-224 (8/13/07). The taxpayer
received a damage award pursuant to a consent decree entered in a class
action lawsuit that provided payments for violation of civil rights, emotional
distress, physical injuries, and physical sickness. Judge Vasquez held that no
portion of the damage award was received on account of personal physical
injury or physical sickness, because the taxpayer failed to prove to the Tax
Court that the defendant in the class action lawsuit caused his alleged
personal physical injury or physical sickness.
12.
No exclusion for punitive damages in a wrongful
death deep in the heart of Texas, even though there is an exclusion
where the stars fell on Alabama.4 Benavides v. United States, 497 F.3d
526 (5th Cir. 8/17/07). Punitive damages received in a wrongful death suit
under Texas law were not excludable under § 104(c), because Texas law
provides for both compensatory and punitive damages in wrongful death
suits.
13.
All social security benefits are taxed the same
way, regardless of why you collect them. Green v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-217 (8/7/07). The exclusion under § 104(a)(1) (dealing with
worker's compensation) does not apply to Social Security disability benefits,
the tax treatment of which are determined under § 86. Social Security
disability benefits are taxed in the same manner as Social Security old-age

4. The difference is that § 104(c) is directed at only Alabama where the sole
remedy for wrongful death is denoted "punitive damages." Ala. Code §§ 6-5-391, 65-410 and 6-11-20. The reference to falling stars is to an 1833 Leonid meteor
shower, commemorated a century later by a jazz song.
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benefits, because the Social Security Act provides for disability benefits for
an injury regardless of whether the injury occurred in the course of
employment.
14.
Congress provides tax relief for sub-prime
mortgage borrowers. The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of 2007
added new § 108(a)(1)(E), which excludes from gross income the discharge
of "qualified principal residence indebtedness" (QPRI) that takes place on or
after 1/1/07 and before 1/1/10. The provision is, of course, a legislative
response to the subprime mortgage loan crisis. QPRI is defined as
acquisition indebtedness, a loan on a taxpayer's principal residence, as
defined in § 163(h)(3)(B), except that for purposes of § 108(a)(1)(E) the
ceilings are $2,000,000 (for married couples filing joint returns) and
$1,000,000 (for other taxpayers). QPRI does not include (1) indebtedness on
a home that is not the taxpayer's principal residence, or (2) home equity
indebtedness. The exclusion is not available if the discharge is not on
account of either (1) a decline in the value of the home or (2) the financial
condition of the taxpayer. The taxpayer's basis in the principal residence
must be reduced by the amount excluded under § 108(a)(1)(E). If only a
portion of the cancelled debt is QPRI, the exclusion applies only to the
extent the amount discharged exceeds the non-QPRI portion of the loan. If a
taxpayer qualifies for both the QPRI exclusion and the insolvency exclusion
of § 108(a)(1)(B), the QPRI exclusion applies unless the taxpayer elects the
application of the insolvency exclusion.
C.

Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions

1.
This one can bite a lawyer/fiduciary who is
employed by his own PSC if you're not careful. Chaplin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-58 (3/12/07). Judge Haines held that the expenses of a
professional fiduciary who was employed by a corporation in which he was
a shareholder, but which was not itself authorized to serve a fiduciary and
conducted business by having its employees serve as named fiduciaries,
were employee business expenses. The taxpayer was subject to the control
of the corporation in the exercise of his fiduciary powers and the manner in
which he conducted business. The opinion provides extensive discussion of
the factors that indicate an employment relationship exists.
2.
Employer reimbursement frozen? Ask anyway.
Contreras v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-63 (3/19/07). Taxpayer's
employer, Federal Express, froze travel reimbursement but allowed
employees to obtain reimbursement with approval of a company vicepresident. The court held that employee business expenses are deductible
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only to the extent that the taxpayer could not be reimbursed by the employer.
Taxpayer's deduction for unreimbursed employee travel was denied where
taxpayer did not try to obtain approval. In addition, taxpayer's offer of credit
card statements, ticket stubs, and conclusory testimony was inadequate to
substantiate the expenditures.
3.
Even a former IRS auditor can't get the
substantiation correct and ends up footing the bill. Karason v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-103 (4/26/07). Taxpayer had worked for
the IRS as an industry specialist in the fields of healthcare, horse operations,
farming operations, and as a large case manager in the San Francisco Office.
The Tax Court denied § 179 deductions and depreciation on medical
equipment that the taxpayer claimed to have purchased from his brother's
incorporated podiatry practice and leased back in the taxpayer's trade or
business of medical equipment leasing. The taxpayer's oral purchase and
leaseback arrangement with his brother was substantiated only by their oral
testimony at trial, which failed to satisfy the requirements of Reg. § 1.1795(a) that the taxpayer maintain records which specifically identify each item
of § 179 property, demonstrate how the property was acquired, and when the
property was placed in service. The taxpayer was also denied loss
deductions from a family investment partnership for failure to substantiate
the taxpayer's partnership basis. In addition, given his experience as an IRS
employee, the taxpayer was found liable for the 20 percent accuracy-related
penalty under § 6662(a).
4.
Lodging not away from home for the benefit of
the employer may still be deductible. The IRS comes to the rescue of
beloved tax-free company retreats. Notice 2007-47, 2007-24 I.R.B. 1393
(6/11/07). Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) provides that the costs of a taxpayer's
lodging not incurred in traveling away from home are personal expenses and
are not deductible unless they qualify as deductible expenses under § 217
(moving expenses). Treasury has apparently concluded that some employerprovided lodging while not away from home should be an excludable
working condition fringe benefit when provided for the convenience of the
employer. Thus, the Notice indicates that Treasury expects to amend Reg.
§ 1.262-1(b)(5) to add that employee expenses for lodging not incurred in
traveling away from home are personal expenses, unless they qualify as
deductible expenses under § 162 or § 217. The Notice indicates that pending
the issuance of additional guidance, Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) will not be applied
to limit deduction of employee expenses for lodging that an employer
provides or requires the employee to obtain under the following conditions:
(1) the lodging is on a temporary basis; (2) the lodging is necessary for the
employee to participate in or be available for a bona fide business meeting or
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function of the employer; and (3) the expenses are otherwise deductible by
the employee, or would be deductible if paid by the employee, under
§ 162(a). This position affects the exclusion of employer-provided working
condition fringe benefits under Reg. § 1.132-5(a), which requires that to be
excluded from income a working condition fringe benefit must be an
expenditure that is deductible under §§ 162 or 167.
5.
Bumped airline employees are not traveling
away from home at a new work location. Stockwell v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-149 (6/13/07). Taxpayer was a mechanic for Northwest
Airlines, who was laid off at his work location in Minneapolis. He exercised
seniority rights to bump others at different locations, and was himself
bumped in turn. He worked in Milwaukee and Detroit for indefinite periods.
Because of the indefinite nature of the employment at the alternative
locations, the taxpayer was not allowed to deduct living expenses as
temporarily away from home. The court allowed the taxpayer's deduction
for uniform cleaning expenses based on estimates, but disallowed deductions
for internet services, depreciation on tools, and cell phone expenses.
.
The Tax Court has reached the same
result in additional cases with the same issues: Wasik v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-148 (6/13/07); Bogue v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-150
(6/14/07); Farran v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-151 (6/14/07); Wilbert
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-152 (6/14/07); and Riley v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-153 (6/14/07).
6.
This salesman is an employee. Colvin v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-157 (6/19/07). Taxpayer, a computer
hardware salesman, was denied schedule C deductions because he was a
common law employee. The taxpayer signed an employment agreement and
was subject to control of the employer even though the taxpayer set his own
hours and sales territory, worked primarily from home, was not required to
utilize the employer's support staff, nor attend routine meetings. The court
noted that the employer had the right to control the taxpayer, whether or not
exercised.
7.
If you are trying to be in a trade or business for
tax purposes, it does not help that you are collecting unemployment.
Cameron v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-260 (8/30/07). The Tax Court
(Judge Laro) upheld the IRS's determination that the taxpayer was not a
trader in stock and securities, and disallowed deductions under § 162,
relegating them instead to § 212. In 2002, the taxpayer's activity consisted of
46 purchases and 14 sales. In 2003, he completed 109 purchases and 103
sales. During the years at issue, petitioner did not trade 5 days a week. Of
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the years at issue, he traded on more than 10 days in a given month only
twice. That the taxpayer was collecting unemployment compensation during
2003 further undermined his argument that he was engaged in a trade or
business during that year.
D.

Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation

Homes
1.
After divorce, do what you love, love what you
do, and they can be integrated into a single for-profit business. Topping
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-92 (4/17/07). After her divorce, the
taxpayer formed a profitable business designing homes and barns for the
wealthy Florida horse set. The taxpayer was an accomplished equestrian
who made contacts with potential clients while she competed in events at the
Jockey Club, described as an elite private club. She convinced the Tax Court
(Judge Goeke) that her riding activities were an integral part of her design
business, even though she reported her design and horse activities on
separate schedules C. 5 Thus, her horse-related expenditures were fully
deductible as a profit seeking activity.
.
Because the scope of an activity is a
factual issue, the presentation of the taxpayer's case can make all of the
difference. For example, in this case the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's
money-losing equestrian activities were an integral part of her profitable
business designing homes and barns, even though she reported her equestrian
and design activities on separate Schedule Cs, because she used the equestrian
activities to make contacts with potential "extraordinarily wealthy" clients
while she competed in events at an elite private equestrian club. The court
found that the taxpayer did not advertise her interior design business through
advertising media, because "the ethos of the Jockey Club and its members
perceive that kind of generic advertising of a personal service business as
tacky or gauche," and she instead "relie[d] on her exposure and reputation as
both a rider and owner, and also her popularity among the members of the
Jockey Club." Furthermore, she "use[d] her general knowledge of horses and
specifically her knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of each of her client's horses
to evolve her barn designs."
2.
A horse lover who mucks stalls must be in it for
profit rather than fun. Rozzano v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-177
5. Marty would change the penultimate sentence to read, "The citizen's
ingenious counsel convinced the Tax Court that her riding activities were an integral
part of her design business, even though she reported her design and horse activities
on separate schedule Cs." This is because taxpayer's attorney makes a practice of
never referring to a client as a "taxpayer," but only as a "citizen."
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(7/3/07). The taxpayer took a position as a corporate CEO that required a
move to Chicago. He then converted his Ohio farm into a horse boarding
facility. The farm had 27 stalls and an indoor arena. The taxpayer used his
business skills to develop computer-based spreadsheets and accounting
systems for the activity. He spent weekends doing the heavy work of the
farm such as mowing, mucking, and mending. In 1999 the taxpayer
determined that, due to events beyond his control, the farm would continue
to produce losses. The property was offered for sale in 2001 and sold in
2003. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer's careful accounting
systems and general business practices justified treating the activity as
engaged in for profit, notwithstanding the taxpayer's testimony that he
realized in 1999 that the activity would not be profitable. The taxpayer
maintained the operation in order to facilitate a sale of the property.
This taxpayer, a nurse and doctor's wife, was not
3.
able to treat her direct marketing activities as engaged in for profit.
Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-154 (6/14/07). While working as
a registered nurse, the taxpayer, who was a physician's wife, engaged in
numerous direct marketing enterprises in which she sold vitamins, energy
supplements, marketing opportunities on the internet, and for a company
called Renaissance the Tax People, Inc, she sold "Tax Relief Systems" that
were designed to generate federal tax deductions. The court noted however,
that most of her activity involved recruiting additional downline distributors.
All of these activities produced approximately $160,000 of losses over a
four year period. The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer did not operate
in a business-like manner because of the absence of any indicia of analysis
of the market, the potential for profit, or plan to alter the business to make it
successful. The business plan provided by the taxpayer was largely
prepackaged by the company for which she was selling. The court observed
that the records presented by the taxpayer were more indicative of someone
preparing for an IRS examination rather than someone seeking a profit. The
Tax Court declined to impose an accuracy related penalty on the ground that
the taxpayer reasonably relied on her accountant's advice that the deductions
were permissible.
E.

Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses

When will trust investment advisory fees get up
1.
off the § 67 floor? Rudkin Testamentary Trust v. Commissioner, 124 T.C.
304 (6/27/05) (reviewed, 18-0), aft'd, 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 10/18/06) (2-0),
aff'd sub noma. Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S. Ct. 782 (1/16/08).
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a.
No. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held
that amounts paid for investment management advice by trusts set up by a
family involved in the founding of the Pepperidge Farm food products
company (which was sold to Campbell Soup Company in the 1960s) are not
subject to the § 67(e) exception to the § 67(a) floor of 2 percent of AGI
(which limits the deductibility of employee business expenses and
miscellaneous itemized deductions to amounts exceeding that floor). In
reaching this result, the Court determined that these expenses did not qualify
for the exception in § 67(e)(1), under which costs paid or incurred in
connection with the administration of a trust that wouldn't have been
incurred if the property weren't held in the trust are allowed as deductions in
arriving at adjusted gross income. The Tax Court explained that the statutory
text of § 67(e)(1) creates an exception allowing for deduction of trust
expenditures without regard to the 2 percent floor where two requirements
are satisfied: (1) the costs are paid or incurred in connection with
administration of the trust and (2) the costs would not have been incurred if
the property were not held in trust.
0 The Tax Court previously held that a
trust's investment advice costs were subject to the 2 percent floor. O'Neill
Trust v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 227 (1992). However, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the Tax Court and held that investment counseling fees paid by the
trust to aid the trustees in discharging their fiduciary duty to the trust
beneficiaries were not subject to the 2 percent floor under the § 67(e)(1)
exception. (994 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1993)). Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit
approach was rejected by the IRS (nonacq, 1994-2 C.B. 1); the Federal Circuit
(Mellon Bank N.A. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); and the
Fourth Circuit (Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132 (4th Cir. 2003)). In
reaching their decisions, the Federal and Fourth Circuits emphasized the
importance of not interpreting the statute so as to render superfluous any
portion of it. They said that if courts were to hold that a trust's investmentadvice fees were fully deductible, the second requirement of § 67(e)(1) would
have been rendered meaningless.
• The Sixth Circuit's rationale was stated
as follows:
The Tax Court reasoned that "[i]ndividual investors
routinely incur costs for investment advice as an integral
part of their investment activities." Nevertheless, they are
not required to consult advisors and suffer no penalties or
potential liability if they act negligently for themselves.
Therefore, fiduciaries uniquely occupy a position of trust for
others and have an obligation to the beneficiaries to exercise
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proper skill and care with the assets of the trust. (994 F.2d at
304)
The Second Circuit affirms and gives a
b.
third interpretation of "an unambiguous statute." 467 F.3d 149 (2d Cir.
10/18/06) (2-0). Judge Sotomayor held that § 67(e) was unambiguous and
permitted a full deduction only for those types of trust expenses that an
individual could not possibly incur.
The Treasury tried to preempt the
c.
regulations. REG-128224-06, Section 67
proposed
Supreme Court with
Limitations on Estates or Trusts, 72 F.R. 41243 (7/27/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.674 would provide that costs incurred by estates or non-grantor trusts that are
unique to an estate or trust are not subject to the 2 percent floor of § 67.
Under Prop. Reg. § 1.67-4(b), a cost is unique to an estate or trust if an
individual could not have incurred that cost in connection with property not
held in an estate or trust. Any miscellaneous itemized deductions that do not
meet this standard are subject to the 2 percent floor. Prop. Reg. § 1.67-4(c)
prevents circumvention of the limitation by "bundling" investment advisory
fees and trustees' fees into a single fee. If an estate or non-grantor trust pays
a single fee that includes both costs that are unique to estates and trusts and
costs that are not, the fee must be allocated between the two types of costs.
The regulations provide a non-exclusive list of services for which the cost is
either exempt from or subject to the 2 percent floor. The regulations will
apply to payments made after the date final regulations are published in
Federal Register.
* Under the reasoning of National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass 'n v. BrandXlnternet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005),
a court's interpretation of a statute trumps an agency's subsequent regulation
"under the doctrine of stare decisis only if the prior court holding 'determined
a statute's clear meaning.' ... [A] court's prior interpretation of a statute ...
overrides an agency's interpretation only if the relevant court decision held the
statute unambiguous." Otherwise the validity of the regulation is determined
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
The Supreme Court issued the writ of
d.
certiorari to resolve the conflict between the Second and Sixth Circuits,
but decided to follow the Federal and Fourth Circuits. The Supreme
Court affirmed sub nom. Knight v. Commissioner, 128 S.Ct. 782 (1/16/08)
(9-0). The Court affirmed the Second Circuit in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Roberts but rejected the Second Circuit test in favor of the test of
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whether individuals commonly employ investment advisors set forth in
Mellon Bank and Scott.
e.
Meanwhile, bundled fiduciary fees may
be deducted in full. Notice 2008-32, 2008-11 I.R.B. 593 (2/27/08). This
Notice provides interim guidance on the treatment of investment advisory
costs subject to the 2 percent floor of § 67 that are bundled as part of a
single fiduciary fee for years beginning before 1/1/08. It provides that the
taxpayer may deduct the full amount of the bundled fiduciary fee without
regard to the 2 percent floor.
Who does the kid belong to? Notice 2006-86,
2.
2006-41 I.R.B. 680 (9/20/06). This Notice provides interim guidance to
clarify the rule under § 152(c)(4) (as amended by the Working Families
Tax Relief Act of 2004) for determining which taxpayer may claim a
qualifying child when two or more taxpayers claim the same child. The tiebreaking rule is to apply to the following provisions as a group: (1) head of
household filing status, (2) the § 21 child and dependent care credit, (3) the
§ 24 child tax credit, (4) the § 32 earned income credit, (5) the § 129
exclusion for dependent care assistance, and (6) the § 151 dependency
deduction.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
3.
§ 101 extends the above-the-line deduction for higher education expenses
under Code § 222 to 2006 and 2007.
4.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 102 extends the Code § 164(b)(5) election to deduct state and local general
sales taxes (instead of state income taxes) to 2006 and 2007.
5.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 302 adds new Code § 106(e) to permit one-time transfers to health savings
accounts from health flexible spending arrangements and health
reimbursement arrangements.
6.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 302 adds new Code § 4980G(d) to provide for an exception to the current
requirement that employer contributions to HSAs be "comparable" for all
employees by allowing employers to provide additional contributions to
lower-paid workers.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
7.
§ 303 amends Code § 223(b)(2) to repeal the annual deductible limitation on
HSA contributions and allow monthly contributions of $2,250 for
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individuals and $4,500 per family, adjusted for inflation, even if the
deductible is less that those amounts. For 2007, the inflation adjusted
amount was $2,850 for individuals and $5,650 per family. Rev. Proc. 200653, 2006-48 I.R.B. 996, § 3.24.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
8.
§ 307 adds new Code § 408(d)(9) to permit a once-in-a-lifetime tax-free
transfer from an IRA to fund the taxpayer's HSA deductible contribution
amount. This would allow those who cannot afford to fully fund an HSA
with direct contributions to move IRA money to a more tax-advantaged
position.
9.
Congress encourages sub-prime mortgage
lending. The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 added new Code
§ 163(h)(3)(E), providing an itemized deduction for the cost of mortgage
insurance on a qualified personal residence. The deduction is phased-out
ratably by 10 percent for each $1,000 by which the taxpayer's AGI exceeds
$100,000. Thus, the deduction is unavailable for a taxpayer with an AGI in
excess of $110,000. As originally enacted, the provision was effective for
amounts paid or accrued (and applicable to the period) after 12/31/06 and
before 1/1/08 for mortgage contracts issued after 12/31/06.
And Congress extends a provision
a.
encouraging sub-prime mortgage borrowing. The Mortgage Forgiveness
Debt Relief Act of 2007 extended the 12/31/07 termination date for
§ 163(h)(3)(E) to 12/31/10.
Jailed murderess qualifies for the earned income
10.
128 T.C. 13 (2/22/07) (reviewed, 5-5-6-1).6
Commissioner,
v.
Rowe
credit.
Taxpayer and her two young children lived together in 2002 until her arrest
on June 5; she continued to support her children after her arrest until July 2.
She was confined in jail for the rest of the year. The taxpayer was entitled to
the earned income credit because her absence due to being held in jail after
her arrest - she was convicted of murder in 2003 and sentenced to life
imprisonment - does not prevent her from qualifying for the EIC. There was
a whole lot of fuss as to (1) whether Reg. § 1.2-2(c)(1), which required that
it be reasonable to assume she would return to her home after the temporary
absence, would apply, or (2) whether Hein v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 826
(1957), acq., and Rev. Rul. 66-28, 1966-1 C.B. 31, which required only the

6. Five judges joined in Judge Kroupa's principal opinion, five judges
joined concurring opinions by Judges Gale and Goeke, six judges joined Judge
Halpern's dissent, and Judge Chiechi did not participate.
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absence of intent on the part of the taxpayer to change her place of abode,
would apply.
* Judge Halpern's dissent forcefully
rejected the applicability of Hein and Rev. Rul. 66-28 on the grounds that the
Tax Court should not lightly assume that the Commissioner has, sub silentio,
amended Reg. § 1.2-2(c)(1).
11.
Finding every last dollar of deductible medical
expenses in continuing care retirement community fees. Finzer v. United
States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1577 (N.D. Ill. 3/7/07). The court held that the
fact that a continuing care retirement community residency agreement
specified that the monthly fee included medical services does not necessarily
mean that the entrance fee did not also include medical services. That the
entrance fee can be refunded under certain circumstances and may be used
to cover a portion of the monthly fees if the taxpayer is unable to pay also
does not necessarily affect whether a portion of the entrance fee is allocable
to medical care. Whether the entrance fee also includes medical services is a
question of fact. The government was denied summary judgment.
a.
Well, then again, not every last dollar.
Finzer v. United States, 496 F. Supp. 2d 954 (N.D. I11. 7/20/07). After trial,
the court ruled against the taxpayers. The taxpayers filed an amended return
claiming a refund on the grounds that 41 percent of the $723,800 entrance
fee for the continuing care retirement community was for medical expenses,
not the 18 percent claimed on the original return. The court rejected the
claim on several grounds. First, there was undisputed testimony that the
CCRC residents paid different entrance fees based on the size of the
residential unit they selected, and that the taxpayers would have received the
same access to medical care if they had selected a smaller unit that required
an entrance fee of only $275,000. Thus the portion of the entrance fee over
$275,000 related solely to housing and had no relationship to medical costs.
The court noted that assuming arguendo that 41 percent of $275,000
properly could be deducted as a medical expense, the taxpayers' deduction
would be $112,750, which is less than the $136,798 they claimed on their
original return. Second, the taxpayers failed to prove that any portion of the
entrance fee was properly attributable to medical expenses. The residency
agreement stated that the proceeds of the entrance fees are not used to
provide services to the residents, and the unrebutted testimony of the
CCRC's executives was that the monthly fees were the sole source of
payment for medical expenses incurred by residents. Finally, the "entrance
fee," which was represented by a promissory note from the CCRC to the
taxpayers the obligation on which was reduced by 2 percent per year of
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residency, but which was otherwise refundable if the taxpayers left the
CCRC, was held to be a loan, not a payment.
12.
It might take a village to raise kids, but not all
the costs of village people are eligible for the dependent care credit. T.D.
9354, Expenses for Household and Dependent Care Services Necessary for
Gainful Employment, 72 F.R. 45338 (8/14/07). The Treasury has
promulgated final regulations, Reg. §§ 1.21-1 through 1.21-4, regarding the
§ 21 credit for expenses for household and dependent care services to reflect
statutory amendments since 1984 and to renumber the regulations under
§ 21, rather than under § 44A (which previously was the Code section prior
to 1984).
Reg. §§ 1.21-1(a)(1), (b)(1), and (g)
reflect the changes in the Working Families Tax Act of 2004 that incorporate
the uniform definition of child. For taxable years beginning after December
31, 2004, a qualifying individual is: (1) a dependent (who is a qualifying child
within the meaning of § 152) who has not attained age 13; (2) a dependent (as
defined in § 152, without regard to subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (d)(1)(B))
who is physically or mentally incapable of self-care and who has the same
principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable
year; or (3) the taxpayer's spouse who is physically or mentally incapable of
self-care and who has the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for
more than one-half of the taxable year.
* The requirements of § 21 and the
regulations are applied at the time the services are performed, regardless of
when the expenses are paid. Reg. § 1.21-1(a)(4). The status of an individual as
a qualifying individual is determined on a daily basis, Reg. § 1.21-1 (b)(3), only
expenses before a disqualifying event, such as a child turning 13, may be taken
into account. A taxpayer must allocate the cost of care on a daily basis if
expenses are paid for a period during only part of which the taxpayer is
employed or in active search of gainful employment. Reg. § 1.21-1(c)(2). A
safe-harbor treats an absence of no more than two consecutive calendar weeks
as a short, temporary absence from work. Reg. § 1.21-1(c)(2)(ii). Thus, for
example, costs of a day care center that charges by the month and does not
refund amounts attributable to days a child is absent, qualify in full if the child
is absent for no more than two consecutive weeks for a family vacation. Reg.
§ 1.21-1(c)(3), Ex. (4).
* Employment-related expenses must be
for the care of a qualifying individual and may not be for other services such as
education. Expenses for a child in nursery school, pre-school, or similar
programs for children below the kindergarten level are for the care of a
qualifying individual and may be employment-related expenses. Expenses for
a child in kindergarten or a higher grade are not for care and therefore, are not
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employment-related expenses. However, expenses for before- or after-school
care of a child in kindergarten or a higher grade may be for care. Reg. § 1.211(d)(5).
* The full amount paid for a day camp or
similar program may be for the care of a qualifying individual although the
camp specializes in a particular activity, such as soccer or computers. For
administrative convenience, no allocation is required in this situation between
the cost of care and amounts paid for learning a specialized skill. Expenses for
summer school and tutoring programs are not creditable. Reg. § 1.21-1 (d)(7).
* The cost of overnight camp is not an
employment-related expense. Reg. § 1.21-1(d)(6). But the cost of overnight
care (other than overnight camp) can be an employment-related expense for a
taxpayer who works at night.
* Boarding school expenses must be
allocated between expenses for the care of a qualifying individual and
expenses for other goods or services, unless the other goods or services are
incidental to and inseparably a part of the care. Reg. § 1.21-1(d)(2), (12),
Ex. 2.
* If a domestic employee cares for
qualifying children and also performs other services for the taxpayer, an
allocation is required unless the expense for the other purpose is minimal or
insignificant or if an expense is partly attributable to the care of a qualifying
individual and partly to household services. Reg. § 1.21-1(d)(1) - (3), (12),
Ex. 3.
* The additional cost of providing room
and board for a caregiver over usual household expenses (including an
increase in utilities, such as electric, water, and gas) may be an employmentrelated expense. Reg. § 1.2 1-1(d)(10) and (11).
* The regulations apply to taxable years
ending after 8/14/07.
13.
Making the world safe from the AMT, one year
at a time. The Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2007 provided another oneyear "patch" for the AMT. The 2007 exemption amounts are $44,350 for
unmarried taxpayers and $66,250 for married taxpayers filing joint returns,
and $33,125 for married taxpayers filing separately. The Act also extended
to 2007 the special rule in §26(a)(2) allowing the otherwise nonrefundable
personal credits to offset the AMT (after taking into account the foreign tax
credit).
14.
You don't have to be sick to incur deductible
medical expenses. Rev. Rul. 2007-72, 2007-50 I.R.B. 1154 (12/10/07). The
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IRS has ruled that following expenses are deductible medical expenses
under § 213: (1) Amounts paid for an annual physical examination for
diagnosis, even though the taxpayer is not experiencing any symptoms of
illness; (2) amounts paid for a full-body scan for diagnosis, and which serves
no non-medical function, even though the taxpayer is not experiencing
symptoms of illness and has not obtained a physician's recommendation
before undergoing the procedure; and (3) amounts paid for an over-thecounter pregnancy test kit, even though its purpose is to test the healthy
functioning of the body rather than to detect disease.
F.

Divorce Tax Issues

1.
Proposed regulations would identify which
divorced or separated parent can claim the dependency exemption.
REG-149856-03, Dependent Child of Divorced or Separated Parents or
Parents Who Live Apart, 72 F.R. 24192 (5/2/07). Prop. Reg. § 1.152-4
interprets § 152(e), as amended by the 2005 Act (GOZA), to provide that a
child of parents who are divorced, separated, or living apart may be claimed
as a qualifying child of the non-custodial parent if the child receives over
one-half of his/her support from the parents, the child is in the custody of
one or both parents during the calendar year, and the custodial parent signs a
written declaration that the custodial parent will not claim the exemption
(which must be attached to the non-custodial parent's return), or a pre-1985
instrument allocates the exemption and the non-custodial parent contributes
at least $600 for the support of the child during the year.
e Under the proposed regulations: (1) The
custodial parent is the parent with whom the child spends the greatest number
of nights during the taxable year. A child who is temporarily away is treated as
spending the night with the parent with whom the child would have resided. If
another person is entitled to custody for a night, then the child is treated as
spending the night with neither parent. (2) The proposed regulations
incorporate the rules of Temp. Reg. § 1.152-4T regarding the required written
declaration and they provide that the declaration must contain an unconditional
statement that the custodial parent will not claim the exemption for the
specified year or years, and a declaration is not unconditional if it conditions
the custodial parent's release of the right to claim to the exemption on the
noncustodial parent meeting a support obligation. (3) The custodial parent may
revoke a revocation by providing written notice to the non-custodial parent
specifying the years of the revocation. A revocation will be effective in the
first calendar year after the year in which the revoking parent provides notice
to the other parent. (4) Never-married parents who live apart are entitled to
agree by written declaration to transfer the exemption to the non-custodial
parent (following King v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 245 (2003)).
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a.
And don't forget to attach the form.
Chamberlain v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-178 (7/5/07). A
noncustodial parent failed to attach to his 2003 return the Form 8332, or its
equivalent, signed by the custodial parent releasing her claim to the
dependency exemption. The Tax Court held that, notwithstanding
submission at trial of a letter from the custodial parent releasing claims to
the dependency exemption, it could not retroactively cure the taxpayer's
failure to attach the required statement to his return for the year at issue.
2.
Voluntary alimony is still "alimony," as long as
you have a court order. Webb v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-91
(6/4/07). In a very persuasive nonprecedential summary opinion, the Tax
Court (Special Trial Judge Armen) held that payments made pursuant to a
court order that specified that the payments were not mandatory, but that the
payments, if made, were to be deductible by the payor and includable by the
payee, qualified as alimony. The court reasoned that although prior to the
1984 revisions to § 71 there was a requirement that payments be pursuant to
a legal enforceable obligation to be considered to be alimony, that
requirement was eliminated by the 1984 amendments. The court further
observed that although the pre-1984 "legal obligation requirement" was still
reflected in a provision of the regulations (Reg. § 1.71-1(b)(2)(i)) that has
been amended since 1984, a Temporary Regulation (Temp. Reg. § 1.71IT(a), Q&A-3) interpreting the 1984 amendments "makes very clear that
'the [requirement] that alimony or separate maintenance payments be ...
made in discharge of a legal obligation ... [has] been eliminated."'
0 This holding should be reflected in some
precedential form because it could be useful for planning purposes.
3.
Equality yes, but not alimony. Sarchett v.
Commissioner. T.C. Memo. 2007-180 (7/9/07). Fixed payments
denominated as "equalization payments" in a settlement agreement, the
stated purpose of which was to equalize the division of the parties
community property and debts, were not treated as alimony, because the
obligation did not terminate at death, but rather payments were required until
a fixed amount had been paid. Judge Cohen refused to consider the
taxpayer's argument that his obligation would terminate on death under state
law. She concluded that there was no evidence that the payments constituted
alimony, and, therefore, there was no need to resort to state law.
4.
Who says the 1984 Act made it easier to sort out
alimony from property settlements? The husband's marginal tax rate
became enormous because he continued working past the date he was
eligible for retirement. Commissioner v. Dunkin, 500 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir.
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8/31/07), rev'g 124 T.C. 180 (3/31/05). The divorced taxpayer reached
eligibility for retirement, and had he retired, his former spouse would have
been entitled to receive one-half of his pension. Because he continued
working and delayed receipt of his pension benefits, under community
property law he was required to pay his former wife an amount equal to onehalf of the pension benefits that he had earned during the marriage. The Tax
Court held that Poe v. Seaborn rather than Lucas v. Earl controlled, and thus
he was entitled to exclude from gross income the amounts paid to his former
wife. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Tax
Court's decision, and held that Poe v. Seaborn was not controlling. The
payments were made out of post-divorce wages and were not an actual
distribution of community property from the pension plan. Because under
California law, the wages paid to the former spouse were not community
property, Lucas v. Earl was the controlling precedent. Thus, the payments
made to the former spouse by the taxpayer were not excludable from his
income.
* Nor were the payments deductible as
alimony under § 71. The taxpayer was required to make payments for as long
as he was employed by the employer that provided the pension plan, even if
his former wife died before his retirement. Because the taxpayer's liability did
not terminate upon the payee's death, the payments were not "alimony" within
the meaning of § 71.
* Query whether a qualified domestic
relations order (QDRO) might have alleviated taxpayer's distress?
5.
Labeling a payment in the divorce instrument as
part of the division of marital property does not preclude the payment
from being alimony. Proctor v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 92 (10/10/07).
Pursuant to a divorce decree, upon his subsequent retirement from the Navy,
the taxpayer was required to pay his former wife 25 percent of his
disposable retirement pay pursuant to the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408. When taxpayer failed
to comply, pursuant to further proceedings, he was ordered to pay his former
wife $5,313 relating to her share of his retirement pay by the end of 2002.
The IRS argued that the payment of a share of taxpayer's retirement pay was
a division of marital property and did not qualify as alimony. Judge Foley
held that the payments in discharge of the obligation were alimony, because
(1) the divorce instrument did not designate the payment as a payment that
was not includible in gross income and not allowable as a deduction, and (2)
under USFSPA the payments were to terminate upon the death of either
party. Judge Foley rejected the IRS's argument that the payment was not
alimony because the divorce decree referred to the payments as part of a
division of the marital property. "The classification of a payment as part of
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the division of marital property does not, however, preclude the payment
from being alimony."
6.
Amarasinghe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007333 (11/6/07). Provisions in a divorce instrument requiring the husband to
withdraw funds from his pension trust to pay alimony and child support
were not a QDRO because the instrument did not give the husband's former
wife any direct interest in the pension trust. Rather, the order directed the
husband to "cash out" a particular amount and pay it over his former wife.
Hawkins v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 1996), was distinguished.
Alternatively, the purported QDRO did not qualify because an order cannot
be a QDRO unless it is delivered to the pension trustee (Karem v.
Commissioner, 100 T.C. 521 (1993)), which the instrument in this case was
not. Accordingly, husband was required to include the full distribution in
gross income and was allowed to deduct the portion paid over to the former
wife as alimony, and the wife was required to include only the portion of the
payment that was alimony.
G.

Education

1.
Up, up and away? No, the deduction goes down
in flames. Thompson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-174 (7/03/07).
Judge Haines held that an aeronautical engineer could not deduct flight
school expenses leading to a commercial pilot's license, even though the
taxpayer did not thereafter become a commercial pilot. Even though
commercial pilot training improved his engineering skills, the education
qualified him for a new trade or business as a pilot. Under Reg. § 1.1625(b)(3)(ii) Ex. (2), educational expenses incurred to qualify for a new trade
or business are nondeductible even if the individual does not engage in the
new activity. The mere capacity to engage in a new trade or business is
sufficient to disqualify the expenses for the deduction.
VI.

CORPORATIONS
A.

Entity and Formation
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
B.

Distributions and Redemptions

1.
Redemption that reduces shareholder's interest
by 0.22 percent is essentially equivalent to a dividend. Conopco, Inc. v.
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United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5296 (D. N.J. 7/18/07). Conopco
routinely redeemed shares of its voting preferred stock from its ESOP Trust
to fund distributions to employees. It claimed a deduction under § 404(k)(1)
for the amount of the redemption proceeds on the grounds that the payments
were deductible "applicable dividends," because each redemption was so
minor that it did not constitute a meaningful reduction under § 302(b)(1).
The largest single redemption was 4,746 shares of approximately 2 million
shares owned by the Trust. That redemption reduced the Trust's
proportionate interest in Conopco from 2.7884 percent to 2.7809 percent.
The court (Judge Greenaway) first held that the redemption was a dividend
because it did not qualify under § 302(b)(1). The reduction in voting,
dividend, and liquidation rights represented a reduction of only 7.5
thousandths of 1 percent. The court rejected the government's argument that
Rev. Rul. 76-385, 1976-2 C.B. 92, supported redemption treatment. That
ruling held that a redemption that reduced a shareholder's interest in a public
corporation from 0.0001118 percent of 28 million shares to 0.0001081
percent, which was only a 3.7 millionths of 1 percent reduction, was
sufficiently meaningful to warrant sale or exchange treatment under § 302.
The court reasoned that in addition to the percentage decrease in the
shareholder's stock, the percentage decrease in the corporation's outstanding
stock also was relevant. While the number of shares redeemed in Rev. Rul.
76-385 was minuscule compared to the corporation's 28 million shares, it
constituted a 3.3 percent reduction in the shareholder's already "minimal"
holding of about approximately 31.304 shares (0.0001118 percent of 28
million equals 31.304 shares). In contrast, the 4,746-share redemption
reduced the Trust's approximately 2 million-share holding by only 0.22
percent, a far less meaningful reduction as far as the Trust was concerned.
Because the 4,746-share redemption did not meaningfully reduce the Trust's
proportionate interest in Conopco, none of the hundreds of other, smaller
redemptions did so either. Therefore, Conopco's distributions in redemption
of stock from the Trust were "essentially equivalent to a dividend," and
accordingly, they were dividends for purposes of the § 404(k)(1) deduction.
However, the court went on to hold that because the distributions were made
"in connection with the reacquisition of its stock," the deduction was
disallowed under § 162(k)(1).
C.

Liquidations
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
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S Corporations

1.
T.D. 9302, Prohibited Allocations of Securities in
an S Corporation, 71 F.R. 76134 (12/20/06). These final regulations provide
guidance concerning requirements under § 409(p) for ESOPs holding stock
of S corporations. They provide that if there is a prohibited allocation during
a nonallocation year, the ESOP fails to satisfy the § 4975(e)(7) requirement
and is no longer an ESOP; as a result of this, the plan also would fail to
satisfy the § 401(a) qualification rules and the S corporation would face a
§ 4979A excise tax.
2.
Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404 (6th Cir.
3/23/07). The Circuit Court upheld a summary judgment denying taxpayer's
attempt to claim discharge of indebtedness income, which would increase
basis of Subchapter S stock and thereby allow suspended losses barred by
§ 1366(d) under a bankruptcy case that was "substantially complete."
Notwithstanding a receiver's report that indicates that the bankrupt S
corporation's assets were insufficient to pay the debts, the court required an
identifiable event that fixes the loss with certainty in order to trigger
discharge of indebtedness income. The court required that the bankruptcy
proceeding be completed to constitute the requisite identifiable event.
3.
Proposed regulations restrict the use of open
account debt to increase basis and deduct losses. REG-144859-04,
Section 1367 Regarding Open Account Debt, 72 F.R. 18417 (4/12/07). Prop.
Reg. § 1.1367-2(a), (c)(2), (d), & (e), Ex. (6), would limit open account debt
from an S corporation to a shareholder to debt not evidenced by written
instruments for which the principal amount of aggregate advances, net of
repayments, does not exceed $10,000 at the close of any day during the S
corporation's taxable year. The proposed regulations would reverse the
result in Brooks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-204 (8/25/05), which
allowed an S corporation shareholder to borrow money from a bank,
advance the funds to the shareholder's S corporation which increased basis
and allowed loss deductions, receive payment of the debt in the subsequent
taxable year, repay the bank, then at the end of the year again borrow funds
to avoid gain on release from the low basis debt and deduct further losses.
Thus the taxpayer was able to create endless deferral of gain. The preamble
to the proposed regulations indicates that the purpose of the open account
debt provisions is administrative simplicity. Whenever advances not
evidenced by written instruments exceed $10,000, the indebtedness will be
treated as a separate indebtedness for which payments and advances are
separately determined for purposes of basis and gain recognition on
repayment.
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4.
A bad day for the owner of New Day. Meeks v.
United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2493 (W.D. La. 4/2/07). The taxpayer
was the sole shareholder of an S Corporation (New Day) that had converted
from a C corporation within the 10 preceding years. He timely filed his 1999
tax return, which included gain on the sale of certain assets of New Day, on
April 15, 2000. Subsequently, the IRS audited New Day and asserted a
deficiency for built-in gains tax under § 1374. On December 29, 2003, New
Day and the IRS settled by agreeing that New Day owed $713,780.00 of
built-in gains tax for the 1999 taxable year. On January 12, 2004, less than
one month after the New Day settlement, but more than 3 years after the
taxpayer filed his individual return for 1999, the taxpayer filed an amended
return reflecting a $735,194.00 reduction in personal taxable income due to
the built-in gain tax paid by New Day (§ 1366(f)(2)) seeking a refund of
$151,236. The IRS denied the refund claim as untimely. The court sustained
the government's position and held that the doctrine of equitable recoupment
was not applicable to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction.
The court is not unsympathetic to the arguably inequitable
and harsh result in this case. However, in the field of
taxation, statutes of limitation sometimes enure to the
benefit of the Government, and at other times they work to
the taxpayer's advantage. ... The instant plaintiffs are also
not entirely free from fault. The Internal Revenue Code
contains provisions for extending the limitations period
upon mutual agreement of the parties. See, 26 U.S.C. §§
6501(c)(4) & 6511(c), yet there is no indication that the
taxpayers here availed themselves of that opportunity during
the pendency of the proceedings against New Day.
5.
ESBT allowed to deduct acquisition indebtedness
from its share of S corporation income. For tax years beginning after
12/31/06, the 2007 Act, § 8236(a), amends Code § 641(c)(2) to allow an
electing small business trust (a permitted S corporation shareholder) to
deduct interest paid on debt incurred to acquire the S corporation stock
against its share of S corporation taxable income. An ESBT is taxable at the
top corporate rate on its share of S corporation income. Thus, the interest
deduction offsets income at the highest rate.
6.
QSub stock sale treated as an asset sale. The 2007
Act, § 8234(a), amends Code § 1361(b)(3)(C)(ii), to provide that failure to
meet the 100 percent ownership requirement to qualify an S corporation
subsidiary as a QSub because of a stock sale will cause the stock sale to be
treated as a sale of QSub assets in proportion to the stock sale. The deemed
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asset sale is followed by a deemed § 351 transfer of assets and assumption of
liabilities by the former QSub. The legislative history states that where the S
corporation sells 21 percent of the stock, it will be treated as selling 21
percent of the QSub assets. Section 351 will apply to the transaction (even
though there is a loss of control), so gain is limited to 21 percent.
7.
S corporation passive investment income no
longer includes gains on sales of stocks and securities. The 2007 Act,
§ 8231(a), amends Code § 1362(d)(3)(C) to exclude gain from the sale of
stock or securities from the definition of passive investment income of an S
corporation with earnings and profits for purposes of the § 1375 tax and
termination of S status under § 1362(d)(3). The § 1375 tax is imposed on an
S corporation with earnings and profits if it has passive investment income
in excess of 25 percent of gross receipts. Section 1362(d)(3) will cause
termination of the S election if that situation occurs for three consecutive
taxable years.
8.
Pre-1983 S corporation earnings and profits
disappear. The 2007 Act, § 8235, provides that a corporation that was not
an S corporation for its first taxable year beginning after 12/31/96, may
reduce accumulated earnings and profits by an amount equal to the portion
of any E&P accumulated in pre-1983 S corporation years. The Small
Business Job Protection Act of 1996 had already eliminated pre-1983 S
corporation E&P for a corporation that was an S corporation for its first
taxable year beginning after 12/31/96.
9.
A little help for S corporation banks. The 2007
Act, § 8233, allows banks that elect S corporation status to account for § 481
adjustments incurred because of a change in the reserve method for bad
debts in the first taxable year for which the S election is in effect. Section
8232(a) of the 2007 Act amends Code § 1361(f)(2)(A) to provide that
restricted stock held by an individual in order to serve as a bank director will
not be treated as a second class of stock. Distributions on such stock are
includible in income by the holder and deductible by the S corporation.
10.
New additional simplified (and free) method to
request relief for late S corporation elections. Rev. Proc. 2007-62, 200741 I.R.B. 786 (10/9/07). This revenue procedure supplements Rev. Proc.
2003-43, 2003-1 C.B. 998, and Rev. Proc. 2004-48, 2004-2 C.B. 172, and
provides an additional simplified method for certain eligible entities to
request relief for late S corporation elections and late entity classification
elections. The procedures are in lieu of the letter ruling process ordinarily
used to obtain relief for a late S corporation election and a late corporate
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classification election filed pursuant to § 1362(b)(5), Regs. §§ 301.9100-1
and 301.9100-3. Thus, user fees do not apply to corrective actions under this
revenue procedure.
11.
Proposed regulations implementing the evereasing standards for qualifying as an S. REG-143326-05, S Corporation
Guidance Under AJCA of 2004 and GOZA of 2005, 72 F.R. 55132
(9/28/07). The Treasury has published proposed amendments to various
regulations under Subchapter S, including, among others, Prop. Regs.
§§ 1.1361-1(e) (number of shareholders); 1.1361-1(h) (special rules relating
to trusts eligible to be shareholders); 1.1361-1(m) (ESBTs); 1.1361-4
(inadvertent terminations and inadvertently invalid elections); and 1.1366-2
(limitations on deduction of passed-though losses).
* The entire state of Arkansas counts as
one shareholder. Section 403(b) of GOZA amended § 1361(c)(1)(B)(iii) to
apply the test for qualifying members of a family with a common ancestor not
more than six generations removed to the latest of (1) The date the S election
is made, (2) the earliest date an individual who is a "member of the family"
holds stock in the S corporation, or (3) October 22, 2004. Prop. Reg. § 1.1361l(e)(3) clarifies that the "six generation" test is applied only at the date
specified in § 1361(c)(1)(B)(iii) and thereafter has no continuing significance
in limiting the number of generations of a family that may hold stock and be
treated as a single shareholder.
* Section 234 of AJCA amended
§ 1361(e)(2) to provide that in determining an ESBT's potential current
beneficiaries (PCBs), powers of appointment are disregarded if not exercised
by the end of that period. Also, the period during which an ESBT may safely
dispose of S corporation stock after an ineligible shareholder becomes a PCB
was increased from 60 days to one year. Prop. Reg. § 1.1361-1(m)(2)(vi)
reflects these changes. All members of a class of unnamed charities permitted
to receive distributions under a discretionary distribution power held by a
fiduciary that is not a power of appointment, will be considered, collectively,
to be a single PCB for purposes of determining the number of permissible
shareholders, unless the power is actually exercised, in which case each charity
that actually receives distributions will also be a PCB. A power to add
beneficiaries, whether or not charitable, to a class of current permissible
beneficiaries is generally a power of appointment and thus will be disregarded
to the extent it is not exercised. Fiduciary powers to spray trust distributions to
a class of current beneficiaries or possible current beneficiaries are not
"powers of appointment," and thus every member of the class remains a PCB,
whether or not receiving a distribution.
0 Proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.13624 implement 1996 amendments to § 1362(f), which provide relief for
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corporations with inadvertently invalid S corporation elections (in addition to
the relief previously available for inadvertent terminations of valid S
corporation elections). Section 238 of AJCA amended § 1362(f) to provide
that QSubs are eligible for relief for an inadvertent invalid QSub election or
termination under the same standards applied to an inadvertent invalid S
corporation election or termination. The proposed regulations would make
conforming changes to Reg. § 1.1362-4.
.
Section 235 of AJCA amended §
1366(d)(2) to provide that if the stock of an S corporation is transferred
between spouses or incident to divorce under § 1041(a), any loss or deduction
with respect to the transferred stock that could not be taken into account by the
transferring shareholder in the year of the transfer because of the basis
limitation in § 1366(d)(1) is treated as incurred by the corporation in the
succeeding taxable year with regard to the transferee. Proposed amendments to
Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(5) would implement this exception to the general rule of
nontransferability of losses and deductions. Losses and deductions carried over
to the year of transfer that are not used by the transferor spouse in that year
will be prorated between the transferor spouse and the transferee spouse based
on their stock ownership at the beginning of the succeeding taxable year.
E.

Reorganizations

1.
All cash (D) reorganizations are now in the
regulations. T.D. 9303, Corporate Reorganizations; Distributions Under
Sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 354(b)(1)(B), 71 F.R. 75879 (12/19/06). The
Treasury has promulgated temporary regulations that provide guidance
regarding the qualification of certain transactions as reorganizations
described in § 368(a)(1)(D) where no stock and/or securities of the acquiring
corporation is issued and distributed in the transaction. This is because under
the circumstances of ownership by the same persons in the same
proportions, the issuance of stock is a "meaningless gesture." Temp. Reg.
§ 1.368-2T provides that the distribution requirement under §§ 368(a)(1)(D)
and 354(b)(1)(B) is deemed to have been satisfied despite the fact that no
stock and/or securities are actually issued in a transaction otherwise
described in § 368(a)(1)(D) if the same person or persons own, directly or
indirectly, all of the stock of the transferor and transferee corporations in
identical proportions. To a limited extent, the attribution rules in § 318 are
invoked to determine whether the same person or persons own, directly or
indirectly, all of the stock of the transferor and transferee. An individual and
all members of his family that have a relationship described in § 318(a)(1)
are treated as one individual; and stock owned by a corporation is attributed
proportionally to the corporation's shareholder without regard to the 50
percent limitation in § 318(a)(2)(C).
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0 Ownership
in absolutely identical
proportions is not required. A de minimis variation in shareholder identity or
proportionality of ownership in the transferor and transferee corporations is
disregarded. The regulations give as an example of a de minimis variation a
situation in which A, B, and C each own, respectively, 34%, 33%, and 33% of
the transferor's stock and A, B, C, and D each own, respectively, 33%, 33%,
33%, and 1% of the transferee's stock. Stock described in § 1504(a)(4) nonvoting limited preferred stock (that is not convertible) - is disregarded for
purposes of determining whether the same person or persons own all of the
stock of the transferor and transferee corporations in identical proportions.
* When a transaction qualifies as a
§ 368(a)(1)(D) reorganization under the regulations, a nominal share of stock
of the transferee corporation will be deemed to have been issued in addition to
the actual consideration. That nominal share of stock is deemed to have been
distributed by the transferor corporation to its shareholders and, in appropriate
circumstances, further transferred to the extent necessary to reflect the actual
ownership of the transferor and transferee corporations.
0 REG-125632-06, Corporate Reorganizations; Distributions Under Sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 354(b)(1)(B), 71 F.R.
75898 (12/19/06). Identical proposed regulations have been published by
cross-reference.

Guidance is amended to eliminate an
a.
unintended glitch. T.D. 9313, Corporate Reorganizations; Additional
Guidance on Distributions Under Sections 368(a)(1)(D) and 354(b)(1)(B),
72 F.R. 9262 (3/1/07). Under previous guidance, there may have been the
unintended consequence of causing related party triangular C
reorganizations to be treated as D reorganizations, with the voting stock of
the corporation in control of the acquiring corporation being treated as boot;
they also may cause forward subsidiary mergers to be disqualified by the
deemed issuance of a nominal share of stock of the acquiring corporation
(not permitted under § 368(a)(2)(D)(i)). Consequently, these transactions are
excepted under the amended regulations.
* REG-157834-06, Corporate Reorganizations; Additional Guidance on Distributions Under Sections 368(a)(1)(D) and
354(b)(1)(B), 72 F.R. 9284 (3/1/07). Proposed regulations were published by
cross-reference.
2.
Section 357(c)(1) does not apply to acquisitive
reorganizations because the transferor corporation no longer exists and
cannot be enriched by the assumption of its liabilities. Rev. Rul. 2007-8,
2007-7 I.R.B. 469 (2/12/07). Section 357(c)(1) does not apply to
transactions that qualify as reorganizations described in §§ 368(a)(1)(A),
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(C), (D) (provided the requirements of § 354(b)(1) are satisfied), or (G)
(provided the requirements of § 354(b)(1) are satisfied) and to which § 351
applies. Rev. Rul. 75-161, 1975-1 C.B. 114, and Rev. Rul. 76-188, 1976-1
C.B. 99, are obsolete. Rev. Rul. 78-330, 1978-2 C.B. 147, is modified to the
extent it holds that § 357(c)(1) is applicable to a transaction that qualifies as
a reorganization described in § 368(a)(1)(A) or (D) (that satisfies the
requirements of § 354(b)(1)).
3.
When to measure the value of consideration to
determine whether continuity of interest exists: It is the business day
before the day on which the binding contract is entered into. Continuity
of interest regulations revised. T.D. 9316, Corporate Reorganizations;
Guidance on the Measurement of Continuity of Interest, 72 F.R. 12974
(3/20/07). This Treasury decision promulgates temporary and proposed
regulations, Temp. Reg. § 1.368-IT(e)(2), amending the 2005 continuity of
interest regulations, Reg. § 1.368-1(e). Under the 2005 regulations, the value
of consideration received in a reorganization for purposes of determining
whether shareholders received a sufficient proprietary interest in the
acquiring corporation was to be determined as of the last business day before
the contract is binding. The temporary regulations apply the signing date
value only where the contract provides for a fixed consideration. The
definition of fixed consideration is modified to provide that consideration is
fixed where the contract specifies the number of shares of the issuing
corporation to be exchanged for all or each proprietary interest in the target
corporation. Definitions referring to the percentage of proprietary interests
are deleted. The temporary regulations treat transactions that allow for
shareholder elections as providing for fixed consideration regardless of
whether the agreement specifies a maximum amount of money or a
minimum amount of stock of the issuing corporation. (In any event the
shareholders are subject to the economic fortunes of the issuing corporation
as of the signing date.) The rule that modifications of the contract that
increase the number of shares to be issued does not change the signing date
is broadened to also state that a modification that decreases the amount of
cash or other property to be issued also does not change the signing date.
The temporary regulations also tighten the contingent consideration rules by
providing that a contract will not be treated as providing a fixed
consideration if provisions for contingent consideration prevent the target
shareholders from being subject to the economic benefits and burdens of
ownership of the issuing corporation as of the signing date. Finally, the
temporary regulations provide that the signing date value must be adjusted to
take into account the effect of any anti-dilution clause adjustments to reflect
changes in the issuing corporation capital structure.
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4.
Making post-reorganization intra-group restructurings even easier. T.D. 9361, Corporate Reorganizations; Transfers of
Assets or Stock Following a Reorganization, 72 F.R. 60552 (10/25/07),
making final REG-130863-04, Corporate Reorganizations; Transfers of
Assets or Stock Following a Reorganization, 69 F.R. 51209 (8/18/04). The
Treasury has finalized regulations dealing with (1) the continuity of business
enterprise requirement (Reg. § 1.368-1(d)) and (2) the definition of a "party
to a reorganization" requirement (Reg. § 1.368-2(f) to liberalize the rules
regarding permissible post-acquisition restructurings of acquiring
corporations in a controlled group of corporations. In addition to postacquisition drops of assets to lower-tier subsidiaries, certain post-acquisition
distributions by an acquisition subsidiary that is member of the acquiring
corporation's group to a corporation that controls the acquiring corporation
of either the target corporation's stock (following a § 368(a)(1)(B) or
§ 368(a)(2)(E) reorganization) or assets (following a § 368(a)(1)(A),
§ 368(a)(1)(C), or § 368(a)(2)(E) reorganization), and certain cross chain
transfers, subsequent to the acquisition, do not disqualify the acquisition
from reorganization treatment, even though there is no statutory provision
expressly providing that such distributions do not affect the validity of
reorganization treatment, provided that the distribution would not result in
the distributing corporation being treated as liquidated for income tax
purposes. The regulations thus permit the acquiring corporation to
significantly rearrange ownership of the target corporation's assets or stock,
as the case may be, among the members of its qualified group (based on
§ 368(c) control) without disqualifying the reorganization. Furthermore, the
final regulations (Reg. § 1.368-1(d)(4)(ii)), unlike the proposed regulations,
permit qualified group members to aggregate their direct stock ownership of
a corporation, in a manner similar to aggregation under § 1504(a), in
determining whether they have the requisite § 368(c) control of such
corporation (provided that the issuing corporation has § 368(c) control in at
least one other corporation).
5.
Proposed amendments to regulations governing
the marriage of accounting methods in tax-free reorganizations. REG151884-03, Update and Revision of Sections 1.381(c)(4)-1 and 1.381(c)(5)1, 72 F.R. 64545-02 (11/16/07). The Treasury Department has published
proposed amendments to Reg. §§ 1.381(c)(4)-l and 1.381(c)(5)-1, dealing
with the carryover of tax attributes, including accounting and inventory
methods, in corporate reorganizations and tax-free § 332 liquidations.
Generally, following a § 381(a) transaction, the accounting method or
combination of methods used by the parties to the transaction would
continue to be used. If the businesses of the parties to a § 381(a) transaction
are combined by the surviving party and different methods have been used,
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then the principal and special method (including the inventory method) rules
would apply. However, when the prior accounting methods cannot be
continued after the transaction, Reg. § 1.381(c)(4)-1 would identify the
accounting method to be used after the transaction; Reg. §1.381(c)(5)-1
would provide similar rules regarding inventory accounting methods. "[T]he
current regulations are inconsistent in the treatment of adjustments for
inventory methods and for other accounting methods, and that there is
confusion regarding the appropriate procedure for making accounting
method changes required by section 381." The proposed amendments
generally would continue many of the provisions of the existing regulations
regarding the accounting method or combination of methods to be used by
the corporation that acquires the assets of another corporation in a § 381(a)
transaction, but are designed to eliminate confusion and uncertainty and to
provide simplicity and uniformity. Unlike the current regulations, the
proposed regulations have a default rule to determine the principal method if
there is no principal method.
F.

Corporate Divisions

1.
TIPRA § 202 amended Code § 355(b) to simplify
the active trade or business test by looking at all corporations in the
distributing corporation's and the distributed subsidiary's affiliated groups
to determine if the active trade or business test is satisfied.
a.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of
2006, § 410, made the TIPRA modification to § 355(b) permanent.
b.
Proposed regulations to carry out the
amendment are anything but simple. REG-123365-03, Guidance
Regarding the Active Trade or Business Requirement under Section 355(b),
72 F.R. 26012 (5/8/07). For purposes of determining whether the active
business requirement of § 355(b)(1) has been met, Prop. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)
would treat all of the members of a separate affiliated group (SAG) as a
single corporation. Thus, the subsidiaries of the common parent of a SAG
are treated as divisions of the common parent for purposes of determining
whether either the distributing or controlled SAG is engaged in a qualified
trade or business.
A corporation's SAG is the affiliated
group that would be determined under § 1504(a) if the corporation were the
common parent (and § 1504(b) did not apply). Thus, the separate affiliated
group of the distributing corporation (DSAG) 7 is the affiliated group
consisting of the distributing corporation and all of its affiliated corporations.
7. This acronym has no relationship to Cooper's Droop Syndrome.
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The separate affiliated group of a controlled corporation (CSAG) is
determined in a similar manner, but by treating the controlled corporation as
the common parent. Accordingly, prior to a distribution, the DSAG includes
CSAG members if the ownership requirements are met. Prop. Reg. § 1.3553(b)(1)(iii).

The SAG rule is applied for purposes of
determining whether a corporation has conducted a trade or business
throughout the requisite five-year period preceding the distribution and
whether the distributing and controlled corporations are actively conducting a
trade or business following distribution. These proposed regulations will affect
the application of the active business requirement in a number of respects.
• First, if ownership requirements are met,
members of the distributing corporation SAG and the controlled corporation
SAG will be treated as belonging to a single SAG during the pre-distribution
period, which facilitates identifying the appropriate trades or businesses
regardless of how the assets are distributed among the SAG members. Prop.
Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(3)(i).
0 Second, the SAG rule applies for
purposes of determining whether there has been a taxable acquisition of the
trade or business within the five years preceding the distribution under
§ 355(b)(2)(C) or (D). Because, the subsidiaries of the common parent of a
SAG are treated as divisions of the common parent, a stock acquisition of a
corporation that becomes a member of a SAG is treated as an asset acquisition
(which affects the application of § 355(b)(2)(D) regarding acquisition of
control of a corporation conducting an active business). Prop. Reg. § 1.3553(b)(1)(ii).

* Third, Prop. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(iii)
would permit certain taxable acquisitions of the assets of a trade or business by
the distributing corporation without violating the restrictions of § 355(b)(2)(C)
and (D), which are interpreted as preventing the use of the assets of
distributing to acquire a trade or business in lieu of dividend distributions. The
proposed regulations disregard a taxable acquisition by the controlled SAG
from the distributing SAG, disregard the use of cash to pay off fractional
shares, and to a limited extent, disregard taxable acquisitions from members of
the same SAG. However, the proposed regulations do not disregard the
recognition of gain or loss in transactions between affiliated corporations
unless the affiliates are members of the same SAG. (Analogous to current
regulations, taxable acquisitions to expand an existing business within a SAG
are disregarded. Prop. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(3)(ii)).
• Fourth, application of § 355(b)(2)(D)(i)
(control acquired by any distributee corporation) would be limited to situations
designed to avoid the impact of the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine.
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Thus, the proposed regulations allow a taxable acquisition by a distributee
corporation of control of distributing in a transaction where the basis of the
acquired distributing stock is determined in whole or by reference to the
transferor's basis. Prop. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(iii)(C).
0 Fifth, the proposed regulations interpret
§§ 355(b)(2)(C) and (D) to have the common purpose of preventing the direct
or indirect acquisition of the trade or business (to be relied on a distribution to
which § 355 would otherwise apply) by a corporation in exchange for assets
other than its stock. Thus, if (1) a DSAG member or controlled acquires the
trade or business solely for distributing stock, (2) distributing acquires control
of controlled solely for distributing stock, or (3) controlled acquires the trade
or business from distributing solely in exchange for stock of controlled, in a
transaction in which no gain or loss was recognized, §§ 355(b)(2)(C) and (D)
are satisfied. However, if the trade or business is acquired in exchange for
assets of distributing (other than stock of a corporation in control of
distributing used in a reorganization) §§ 355(b)(2)(C) and (D) are not satisfied.
Under this rule, for example, an acquisition by a controlled corporation (while
controlled by the distributing corporation) from an unrelated party in exchange
for controlled stock has the effect of an indirect acquisition by distributing in
exchange for distributing's assets. Such an acquisition violates the purpose of
§ 355(b)(2)(C), and will be treated as one in which gain or loss is recognized.
Prop. Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(ii).
c.
Transition relief from § 355 SAG
regulations. Notice 2007-60, 2007-35 I.R.B. 466 (8/27/07). This Notice
provides transition relief to taxpayers applying §§ 355(b)(2)(C) and
355(b)(2)(D) and Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(iii) to certain transactions that would
be adversely affected by the changes to the active business requirement for
§ 355 tax-free divisions in these provisions.
0 First, Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(iii) provides
an exception to the general no gain or loss rule in § 355(b)(2)(C) and (D) by
disregarding an acquisition of a trade or business by one member of an
affiliated group from another member of the group. (Although Reg. § 1.3553(b)(4)(iii) is facially applicable to distributions on or before 12/15/87, the IRS
has applied it administratively to distributions occurring after that date). The
preamble to the proposed SAG regulations questioned whether Reg. § 1.3553(b)(4)(iii) appropriately reflects § 355(b) as amended in 2006. This Notice
announced that consistent with past administrative practice, the IRS will not
challenge the application of the rule in Reg. § 1.355-3(b)(4)(iii) to distributions
effected on or before the date of publication in the Federal Register of
temporary or final regulations modifying that rule.
* Second, the proposed regulations would
treat a stock acquisition that results in the acquired corporation becoming a
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subsidiary member of the acquiring corporation's SAG as an asset acquisition
for purposes of § 355(b). As a result, acquisitions of stock of the controlled
corporation that result in the controlled corporation becoming a member of the
distributing corporation's SAG are treated as asset acquisitions subject to
§ 355(b)(2)(C) regardless of whether the distributing corporation already
controlled the controlled corporation. Such an acquisition could violate
§ 355(b)(2)(C) notwithstanding the fact that it would not violate
§ 355(b)(2)(D) because there was no acquisition of control. This Notice
provides that the IRS will not challenge the distributing corporation's (or its
SAG's) acquisition of additional stock of the controlled corporation as a
violation of § 355(b)(2)(C) with respect to the controlled corporation in the
case of distributions effected on or before the date the temporary or final
regulations are published, provided that the transaction satisfies the
requirements of § 355(b)(2)(D) as in effect before the enactment of
§ 355(b)(3).
2.
Rev. Rul. 2007-42, 2007-28 I.R.B. 44 (6/21/07). A
distributing corporation that owns a 33-1/3 percent interest in an LLC, which
is engaged in owning and managing office buildings, is engaged in the active
conduct of a trade or business. However, a 20 percent ownership interest in
an LLC is not sufficient to enable the corporate LLC member to treat the
LLC's activities as the active conduct of a trade or business by the
corporation.
G.

Miscellaneous Corporate Issues

1.
Tax Court holds that you do not have to be a
CPA to practice "accounting." Rainbow Tax Service, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 42 (3/8/07). Tax return preparation and
bookkeeping services by a corporation that is neither a public accounting
firm nor the performer of services that require its employees to hold CPA
licenses is nevertheless a "qualified personal service corporation" as defined
under § 448(d)(2) because it performs "accounting services." Therefore, its
income is taxed at the flat 35 percent rate under § 11 (b)(2), not at the
graduated rates claimed by taxpayer. The Tax Court (Judge Swift) noted the
distinction between "public accounting" and "accounting," and noted that
tax return preparation and bookkeeping services are services in the field of
accounting.
* Note that veterinarians are considered to
perform services in the field of "health." Rev. Rul. 91-30, 1991-1 C.B. 61.
a.
And yet another 35 percent rate PSC.
W.W. Eure, M.D., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-124 (5/17/07). A
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corporation that was wholly owned by a radiation oncologist/surgeon and
which operated a radiation therapy medical practice was a professional
service business subject to the 35 percent tax rate under § 1 I(b)(2), because
95 percent or more of its employee's time was spent providing healthcare
directly to patients or performing ancillary services.
2.
Taking from the big and contributing to the
small does not produce excluded contributions to capital. United States
v. Coastal Utilities, Inc., 483 F.Supp.2d 1232 (S.D. Ga. 3/28/07). Summary
judgment was granted to the Government denying a utility's refund claim
based on its assertion that payments received from the Universal Service
Administration Company and the State of Georgia Access Funds were
contributions to capital excluded from gross income under § 118. The
payments were part of state and federally mandated programs funded by fees
collected from telecommunications carriers based on revenues. Payments are
made to carriers with high cost obligations to provide universal access to
telephone services. Based on undisputed facts, and following an in-depth
analysis of the relevant authorities distinguishing non-shareholder
contributions to capital from gross income, the District Court concluded that
the purpose of the payments was to supplement income. The court focused
on the mechanisms used to calculate the amount of universal support, which,
although largely related to investment expenditures, took into account
operation, maintenance, administrative, and other expenses that were
unrelated to capital investment.
a.
The IRS concludes the same by ruling.
Rev. Rul. 2007-31, 2007-21 I.R.B. 1275 (5/21/07). The IRS ruled that
universal service support payments received are not a non-shareholder
contribution to capital under § 118(a).
b.
And the Eleventh Circuit agrees too.
Coastal Utilities is affirmed. United States v. Coastal Utilities, 514 F.3d
1184 (11 th Cir. 1/23/2008). The Eleventh Circuit adopted in full the district
court's order.
3.
Debt treated as equity results in a constructive
dividend. Hubert Enterprises, Inc. v. Commissioner, 230 F.App'x 526 (6th
Cir. 4/27/07). Hubert Enterprises, a closely held family corporation,
advanced funds to an LLC owned by family members, which in turn was the
97 percent general partner in a real estate development partnership. The
partnership had difficulty acquiring financing for its development project.
The $2.4 million note had no fixed maturity date, was a demand note, was
not secured, and called for interest payable at the applicable federal rate. The
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borrower made only one payment of interest on the note. The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the Tax Court holding denying the taxpayer's claimed bad debt
deduction under § 166 for the worthless note. The Court affirmed the Tax
Court's conclusion that the note was equity under the factors specified in the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d
625 (6th Cir. 1986). Further, the Sixth Circuit also affirmed the Tax Court
holding that the corporation was not entitled to deduct the amount advanced
to the LLC as a loss of capital because the advance represented a
constructive dividend conferring an economic benefit on its shareholders
(the owners of the LLC). The corporation retained no ownership interest in
the LLC.
4.
Tightening the belt (noose?) on § 382 limitations.
T.D. 9330, Built-in Gains and Losses Under Section 382(h), 72 F.R. 32792
(6/14/07). Temp. Reg. § 1.382-7T(a) provides that prepaid income received
before a change date that is attributable to services performed after the
change date is not recognized built-in gain for purposes of computing the
§ 382 limitations on NOL carryovers following an ownership change. The
term prepaid income means any amount received prior to the change date
that is attributable to performance occurring on or after the change date.
Examples to which the temporary regulation applies include, but are not
limited to, income received prior to the change date that is deferred under
§ 455, Reg. § 1.451-5, or Rev. Proc. 2004-34 (or any successor revenue
procedure). According to the preamble:
The IRS and Treasury Department believe that prepaid
income is distinguishable from the income items described
in the committee report examples. In each of the committee
report examples, the item of income is attributable to the
pre-change period because that is the period in which
performance occurred and expenses were incurred to earn
the income. By contrast, prepaid income is attributable to
the post-change period because that is the period in which
performance occurred and expenses were incurred to earn
the income. Therefore, because prepaid income is
attributable to the post-change period rather than the prechange period ... such prepaid income should not be treated
as [recognized built-in gain] under section 382(h).
* Identical regulations have been published
in proposed form. REG-144540-06, Built-in Gains and Losses Under Section
382(h), 72 F.R. 32828 (6/14/07).
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5.
Corporate estimated tax regulations. T.D. 9347,
Corporate Estimated Tax, 72 F.R. 44338 (8/7/07). The Treasury has
promulgated final regulations regarding corporate estimated tax payments to
reflect numerous statutory changes since 1984. Reg. §§ 1.6425-2; 1.6425-3;
1.6655-1; 1.6655-2; 1.6655-3; 1.6655-4; 1.6655-5; 1.6655-6; 1.6655-7. The
regulations address a variety of annualization issues, e.g., items that are
generally incurred once or infrequently during tax year are not annualized,
allow taxpayers to make reasonable allocations of certain items, the adjusted
seasonal installment method, "large corporation" status, short taxable years,
accounting method changes, and additions to tax. These regulations apply to
taxable years beginning after 9/6/07.
H.

Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns

1.
What hath Rite-Aid wrought? REG-157711-02,
Proposed Rules, Unified Rule for Loss on Subsidiary Stock, 72 F.R. 2964
(1/23/07). Proposed regulations would completely replace the current basis
adjustment and loss suspension rules in Reg. §§ 1.337(d)-2 and 1.1502-35.
Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-36 would provide "unified rules for loss on subsidiary
stock" transferred by a member of an affiliated group filing a consolidated
return. A transfer of stock includes any event in which (1) gain or loss would
be recognized (apart from the rules in the proposed regulations), (2) the
holder of a share and the subsidiary cease to be members of the same group,
(3) a nonmember acquires an outstanding share from a member, or (4) the
share is treated as worthless. The purpose of these rules is twofold, to
prevent the consolidated return provisions from creating non-economic
losses on the sale of subsidiary stock and to prevent members of the
affiliated group filing the consolidate return from claiming more than one
tax benefit from a single economic loss. Under the proposed regulations, any
transfer of a loss share (defined as a share of stock of an affiliate having a
basis in excess of fair market value) requires the application in sequence of
three basis rules.
0 First, a basis redetermination rule, under
Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-36(b) is applied to deal with tax losses attributable to
investment adjustment account allocations among different shares of stock
under Reg. § 1.1502-32 that result in disproportionate reflection of gain or loss
in shares. Second, if any share is a loss share after application of the basis
redetermination rule, a basis reduction rule is applied under Prop. Reg.
§ 1.1502-36(c) to deal with loss duplication attributable to investment
adjustment account adjustments, but this reduction does not exceed the share's
"disconformity amount." Third, if any duplicated losses remain after
application of the basis reduction rule, under Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-36(d) an
attribute reduction rule is applied to the corporation the stock of which was
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sold to prevent the duplication of a loss recognized on the transfer or preserved
in the basis of the stock. If a chain of subsidiaries is transferred (rather than a
single subsidiary) the order in which the rules are applied is modified. In this
case, the basis redetermination rule and basis reduction rule are applied
sequentially working down the chain, and the attribute reduction rule is then
applied starting with the lowest tier subsidiary and working up the chain.
0

The Basis Redetermination rule. Under

the basis redetermination rule in Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-36(b), investment
adjustments (exclusive of distributions) that were previously applied to
members' bases in subsidiary stock are reallocated in a manner that, to the
greatest extent possible, first eliminates loss on preferred shares and then
eliminates basis disparity on all shares. This rule affects both positive and
negative adjustments, and thus addresses both noneconomic and duplicated
losses. First, positive investment adjustments (up to the amount of the loss) are
eliminated from the bases of transferred loss shares. Second, to the extent of
any remaining loss on the transferred shares, negative investment adjustments
are removed from shares that are not transferred loss shares and are applied to
reduce the loss on transferred loss shares. Third, the positive adjustments
removed from the transferred loss shares are allocated to increase basis of
other shares only after the negative adjustments have been reallocated. Note
that this rules does not affect the aggregate basis of the shares, and thus has no
impact, and thus does not apply, if all of the shares of a subsidiary are sold; it
is important only when some, but not all, shares are sold. A number of special
limitations on basis reallocation also must be considered in various specific
circumstances.
*

The Basis Reduction Rule. If, after

applying the basis redetermination rule in step one, any transferred share is a
loss share (even if the share only became a loss share as a result of the
application of the basis redetermination rule), the basis of that share is subject
to reduction. The basis reduction rule in Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-36(c) eliminates
noneconomic losses that arise from the operation of the investment adjustment
account rules. Under this rule, the basis of each transferred loss share is
reduced (but not below its value) by the lesser of (1) the share's disconformity
amount, or (2) the share's net positive adjustment.
* The "disconformity amount" with
respect to a subsidiary's share is the excess of its basis over the share's
allocable portion of the subsidiary's inside tax attributes (determined at the
time of the transfer). Every share within a single class of stock has an identical
allocable portion. Between shares of different classes of stock, allocable
portions are determined by taking into account the economic arrangements
represented by the terms of the stock. "Net inside attributes" is the sum of the
subsidiary's loss carryovers, deferred deductions, cash, and asset basis, minus
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the subsidiary's liabilities. The disconformity amount identifies the net amount
of unrealized appreciation reflected in the basis of the share.
* A share's net positive adjustment is
computed as the greater of (1) zero, or (2) the sum of all investment
adjustments (excluding distributions) applied to the basis of the transferred
loss share, including investment adjustments attributable to prior basis
reallocations under the basis reallocation rule. The net positive adjustment
identifies the extent to which a share's basis has been increased by the
investment adjustment provisions for items of income, gain, deduction, and
loss (whether taxable or not) that have been taken into account by the group.
Special rules apply when the subsidiary, the stock of which is transferred
itself, holds stock of a lower-tier subsidiary.
I
* The Attribute Reduction Rule. If any
transferred share remains a loss share after application of the basis reallocation
and basis reduction rules, the loss on the transferred share is allowed.
However, in this instance, the subsidiary's tax attributes (including the
consolidated attributes, e.g., loss carryovers, attributable to the subsidiary) are
reduced pursuant to Prop. Reg. § 1.1502-36(c). The attribute reduction rule
addresses the duplication of loss by members of consolidated groups, and is
designed to prevent the group from recognizing more than one tax loss with
respect to a single economic loss, regardless of whether the group disposes of
the subsidiary stock before or after the subsidiary recognizes the loss with
respect to its assets or operations.
* Under the attribute reduction rule, the
subsidiary's attributes are reduced by the "attribute reduction amount," which
equals the lesser of (1) the net stock loss, or (2) the aggregate inside loss. The
"attribute reduction amount" reflects the total amount of unrecognized loss
that is reflected in both the basis of the subsidiary stock and the subsidiary's
attributes. "Net stock loss" is the amount by which the sum of the bases (after
application of the basis reduction rule) of all of the shares in the subsidiary
transferred by members of the group in the same transaction exceeds the value
of those shares. The subsidiary's "aggregate inside loss" is the excess of its net
inside attributes over the value of all of the shares in the subsidiary. (Net inside
attributes generally has the same meaning as in the basis reduction rule,
subject to special rules for lower-tier subsidiaries.)
* The attribute reduction amount is first
applied to reduce or eliminate items that represent actual realized losses, such
as operating loss carryovers, capital loss carryovers, and deferred deductions.
Any excess attribute reduction amount is then applied to reduce the basis of
any publicly traded property (other than lower-tier subsidiary stock, which is
subject to special rules) held by the subsidiary. Last, any remaining attribute
reduction amount is applied to proportionately reduce the basis in assets, other
than publicly traded property and cash and equivalents neither of which can

2008]1

Recent Developments in FederalIncome Taxation

reflect loss). If the attribute reduction amount exceeds all of the attributes
available for reduction, that excess amount generally has no effect. If,
however, cash or other liquid assets are held to fund payment of a liability that
has not yet been deducted but will be deductible in the future, e.g., a liability
the deduction for which is subject to the economic performance rules of
§ 451(h), loss could be duplicated later, when the liability is taken into
account. To prevent such loss duplication, the excess attribute reduction
amount will be held in suspense and applied to prevent the deduction or
capitalization of later payments with respect to the liability. Additional special
rules apply to prevent excessive reduction of attributes when the subsidiary
itself holds stock of a lower-tier subsidiary.
0 Finally, if the subsidiary ceases to be a
member of the consolidated group as a result of the transfer, the common
parent of the group can elect to reduce stock basis (thereby reducing an
otherwise allowable loss on the sale of the stock), reattribute attributes, or
apply some combination of basis reduction and attribute reattribution alter the
otherwise required attribute reduction.
* Worthlessness. The proposed regulations
would not remove Reg. § 1.502-80(c), dealing with worthlessness of
subsidiary stock.
2.
T.D. 9341, Treatment of Excess Loss Accounts, 72
F.R. 39313 (7/18/07). Two final consolidated return regulations have been
promulgated.
* Reg. § 1.1502-19(d) (replacing Temp.
Reg. § 1.1502-19T(d)) provides that, if a member of a consolidated group
acquires new shares of a subsidiary that would have an excess loss account and
the member owns one or more other shares of the same class of subsidiary
stock, the basis of the other shares is allocated to the new shares to eliminate
or to equalize any excess loss account that would otherwise be attributable to
the new shares.
* Reg. § 1.1502-80(c) (replacing Temp.
Reg. § 1.1502-80T(c)) provides that subsidiary stock is not treated as
worthless before the earlier of (1) the time that the subsidiary ceases to be a
member of the group, or (2) the time that the stock of the subsidiary is
worthless within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-19(c)(1)(iii). Under Reg.
§ 1.1502-19(c)(1)(iii) a share of subsidiary stock is treated as worthless when
the subsidiary disposes of substantially all of its assets, and the deferral of any
worthless securities deduction until that time implements single-entity
principles, or certain debt cancellations occur.
3.
Are "new and more precise mechanics" a
synonym for "ever-more complicated"? REG-107592-00, Consolidated
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Returns; Intercompany Obligations, 72 F.R. 55139 (9/28/07). The IRS has
proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.1502-13(g) with respect to the treatment
of obligations between members of a consolidated group. Reg. § 1.150213(g) applies to three types of transactions: (1) transactions in which an
obligation between a group member and a nonmember becomes an
intercompany obligation, for example, the purchase by a consolidated group
member of another member's debt from a nonmember creditor or the
acquisition by a consolidated group member of stock of a nonmember
creditor or debtor (inbound transactions); (2) transactions in which an
intercompany obligation ceases to be an intercompany obligation, for
example, the sale by a creditor member of another member's debt to a
nonmember or the deconsolidation of either the debtor or creditor member
(outbound transactions); and (3) transactions in which an intercompany
obligation is assigned or extinguished within the consolidated group
(intragroup transactions). The proposed regulations "adopt new and more
precise mechanics" for the application of the deemed satisfaction-reissuance
model to intragroup and outbound transactions. The following sequence of
events is deemed to occur immediately before, and independently of, the
actual transaction: (1) the debtor is deemed to satisfy the obligation for a
cash amount equal to the obligation's fair market value, and (2) the debtor is
deemed to immediately reissue the obligation to the original creditor for that
same cash amount. The parties are then treated as engaging in the actual
transaction but with the new obligation. With respect to inbound
transactions, the IRS and the Treasury Department have concluded that the
mechanics of the deemed satisfaction-reissuance model and its application
produce appropriate results and, therefore, no change has been proposed.
VII.

PARTNERSHIPS

A.

Formation and Taxable Years

The 2007 Act, § 8215(a) added Code § 761(f),
1.
which provides that a husband and wife who operate a qualified joint
venture may elect not to treat the joint venture as a partnership. A qualified
joint venture is one conducted by a husband and wife both of whom are
material participants and who file a joint return. Each spouse is required to
report the spouse's share of income and expense items on a separate
schedule C. Each spouse is individually assessed self-employment tax.
I.R.C. § 1402(a)(17), as amended by the 2007 Act. Note that Rev. Proc
2002-69, 2002-2 C.B. 831, permitted a husband and wife to treat a wholly
owned LLC held as community property as a disregarded entity.
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2.
LMSB-04-1007-069, 2007 TNT 202-16 (10/18/07),
reaffirming LMSB-04-1106-016 (10/28/06). The § 118 exclusion from
income for nonshareholder contributions to the capital of a corporation does
not apply to partnerships. The directive contains the following admonition,
"This Directive is not an official pronouncement of law, and cannot be used,
cited, or relied upon as such."
B.
Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and
Outside Basis
1.
Partnership deductions are in the proof, and that
was lacking when taxpayer fired employees during Chinese New Year.
Chong v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-12 (1/17/07). Yung Chong, a
full-time Federal Express driver, formed a partnership with his brother, Lok
Chong, an Australian citizen. At first the partnership successfully exported
chicken parts from the United States to China, but when suppliers began
exporting directly the chicken parts business dried up so the Chong brothers
began exporting Australian dairy products, Western beef, and Mexican food
to China. When they discovered that some of their Chinese employees were
competing with them by importing yogurt from France, the Chong brothers
made the mistake of firing employees during the Chinese New Year, a
cultural taboo. In retaliation the fired employees ransacked the business,
destroying business records in the process. The Tax Court found that a
partnership existed between Yung Cong and Lok Chong, but disallowed the
taxpayer's claimed $40,000 of partnership loss because the taxpayer was
unable to substantiate the loss with adequate records, nor was the taxpayer
able to reconstruct the claimed losses, due in large part to his brother's
informal record keeping. In addition, the taxpayer was unable to establish his
basis in his partnership interest for purposes of § 704(d).
.
Note that this case has a moral: Don't
fire employees during the Chinese New Year lest bad things happen to your
tax benefits.
2.
Burke v. Commissioner, 485 F.3d 171 (1st Cir.
5/4/07). The First Circuit affirmed a summary judgment in the Tax Court,
Burke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-297 (12/27/05), holding that a
partner is taxable on the partner's distributive share of partnership income
notwithstanding the fact that the partnership income is held in an escrow,
and is not available for distribution, pending resolution of a dispute between
the two individual partners. Partners must report their share of partnership
earnings in the year the partnership receives them, regardless of when or
whether the partners actually receive them.
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It is well settled that partners' distributions are taxed in the
year the partnership receives its earnings, regardless of
whether the partners actually receive their share of
partnership earnings: "Few principles of partnership
taxation are more firmly established than that no matter the
reason for nondistribution each partner must pay taxes on
his distributive share." ... Reg. § 1.702-1 (providing that a
partner must separately account for his distributive share of
partnership income "whether or not distributed"). Consistent
with this long-standing principle, courts have uniformly held
that partners must currently recognize in their individual
incomes their proportionate shares of partnership income,
even if the partnership income was not actually distributed
to them for any reason, including disputes, consensual
arrangements, ignorance, concealment, or force of law.
(citations omitted).
3.
Rev. Proc. 2007-59, 2007-40 I.R.B. 745 (10/1/07).
This Revenue Procedure grants permission to a ."qualified partnership" to
aggregate built-in gains and losses from "qualified financial assets" for
purposes of making reverse allocations of recognized gains and losses under
§ 704(c) principles. A management or investment partnership is permitted by
Reg. § 1.704-3(e)(3) to aggregate built-in gains and losses from qualified
financial assets, rather than follow the normal property-by-property
approach required by regulations. The automatic permission to aggregate
built-in gains and losses is granted to a qualified partnership, which is a
partnership that allocates gains and losses in proportion to the partners'
capital accounts, which reasonably expects to revalue its assets at least four
times a year, holds publicly traded property of at least 90 percent of its noncash assets, has at least 10 unrelated partners, and will make at least 200
trades of financial assets during the year.
4.
IRS publishes a safe-harbor for allocation of
alternative energy tax credits. Rev. Proc. 2007-65, 2007-45 I.R.B. 967
(11/5/07). Section 45 provides a 1.5 cent credit for each kilowatt of energy
from qualified energy sources. Partnership allocations of tax credits that do
not adjust partners' capital accounts can not have substantial economic
effect. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(5), Ex. (11) and 1.704-1(b)(4)(ii) provide that
credits are allocated in proportion to the allocation of expenditures or
receipts related to the credit. The revenue procedure indicates that the IRS
will respect allocations of § 45 wind energy production credits under the
principles of Reg. § 1.704-4(b)(4)(ii) if certain conditions are satisfied: (1)
the developer must have a minimum one percent interest in the partnership
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and the investors must each have a minimum five percent interest in each
partnership material item, (2) the investor must maintain a minimum
investment throughout the project equal to 20 percent of fixed capital
contributions that is not protected from loss, (3) 75 percent of the investor's
capital contribution must be fixed and determinable, (4) the developer or
related parties may not have a right to purchase project property for less than
fair market value, and (5) the company cannot have a fixed right to cause
any party to purchase project property (except electricity).
Announcement 2007-112, 2007-50 I.R.B.
a.
1175 (12/10/07). Rev. Proc. 2007-65 was revised to clarify that the
requirements that must be met to qualify for the safe-harbor are neither
intended to provide substantive rules nor to be used as audit guidelines.
Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership
C.
and Partners
A distribution of appreciated property to a
1.
partner is a nonrecognition event, but a § 707(c) payment to a partner
of appreciated property is a festival of taxation. Rev. Rul. 2007-40, 200725 I.R.B. 1426 (6/18/07). The IRS has ruled that the transfer of appreciated
property by a partnership to a partner in satisfaction of a guaranteed payment
owed to the partner is a sale or exchange of the property by the partnership
and not a distribution under § 731. Thus the partnership is required to
recognize gain on the transfer. The ruling does not deal with whether the
partnership is entitled to deduct the value of the property or whether it must
capitalize that amount, as the case may be.
D.

Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers

1.
Proposed regulations track built-in gain
following an assets-over partnership merger. REG-143397-05, Partner's
Distributive Share, 72 F.R. 46932 (8/22/07). These proposed regulations
adopt the approach of Rev. Rul. 2004-43, 2004-1 C.B. 842, revoked by Rev.
Rul. 2005-10, 2005-1 C.B. 492. See also Notice 2005-15, 2005-1 C.B. 527.
In an assets-over partnership merger, the merged partnership is treated as
transferring its assets to the continuing partnership in exchange for an
interest in the continuing partnership, which is then distributed to the
partners of the merged partnership in liquidation of the merged partnership.
The continuing partnership is the partnership whose members hold more
than 50 percent interests in the resulting partnership. Section 704(c)(1)(B)
requires recognition of gain or loss by the contributing partner on the
distribution of property contributed to a partnership within seven years of
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the date of contribution. The recognized gain is the amount of built-in gain
or loss existing at the time of contribution that would be required by
§ 704(c)(1)(A) to be allocated to the contributing partner on a sale of the
property for fair market value. Section 737 requires recognition of gain on a
distribution to a partner who contributed built-in gain property within seven
years of a contribution of built-in gain property. Under the proposed
regulations, following an assets-over merger, with respect to the initial precontribution gain of contributed property, the seven year period continues to
run from the date of the initial contribution. In addition, the proposed
regulations provide that in the assets-over merger, built-in gain with respect
to built-in gain property transferred by the merged partnership to the
continuing partnership is subject to the recognition rules of §§ 704(c)(1)(B)
and 737 beginning on the date of the merger. The proposed regulations also
provide that a merger of two partnerships whose ownership interests in
profits and capital are identical will not trigger a new counting period under
the seven year rules. (This appears to be a technical error, because under
Reg. § 1.708-1(c)(1), neither of the merged partnerships is the continuing
partnership; both original partnerships have terminated and the resulting
partnership is a new partnership. Expect this to be changed in the final
regulations). The proposed regulations do not address built-in losses, which
are the subject of another regulations project. The proposed regulations are
applicable to distributions after January 19, 2005.
0 The proposed regulations follow the
holding of Rev. Rul. 2004-43, 2004-1 C.B. 842 (5/3/04), which was revoked
by Rev. Rul. 2005-10, 2005-1 C.B. 492, after commentators asserted that the
ruling was inconsistent with existing regulations. Notice 2005-15, 2005-1 C.B.
527, indicated that the IRS would promulgate regulations adopting the position
of Rev. Rul. 2004-13, applicable to distributions after 1/ 19/05.
E.

Inside Basis Adjustments
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
F.

Partnership Audit Rules

1.
Is this the period that never seems to end? AD
Global Fund, LLC v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 657 (9/16/05), motion to
certify appealgranted,68 Fed. Cl. 663 (11/8/05), affd, 481 F.3d 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 3/2/07). The court held that § 6629(a) does not provide an independent
statute of limitations for assessing partnership items; instead, it creates a
minimum period that may extend the regular § 6501 statute of limitations for
assessing tax with respect to partnership items. Therefore, the issuance of a
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Final Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) more than three years
after the partnership return is filed, but less than three years after the
partners filed their returns, suspends the period of limitations under
§ 650 1(a) for the partners.
2.
Closed year partnership items from Son of BOSS
tax shelter can be reassessed to determine an open year's tax liability. I
& J Fernandez Ventures, L.P. v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2661
(Fed. Cl. 4/3/07). The government is not barred from recalculating items in a
closed year in order to determine the basis of stock sold in an open year. The
taxpayers' 2000-2003 tax liability for gain on the sale of stock was
determined from basis adjustments claimed to result from Son of BOSS
transactions in 1999, a closed year.
* The court follows the holding of AD
Global Fund, LLC v. United States to hold that § 6229 creates a minimum
period for assessing taxes attributable to partnership items that may extend the
§ 6501 3-year statute of limitations.
0 The § 6501(a) limitation prohibits
assessment of taxes for closed years, but it does not bar the use of information
from closed years. Re-assessing basis determinations from closed years is not
an assessment of taxes.
* Under Barenholtz v. United States, 784
F.2d 375, 380-381 (Fed.Cir. 1986), the government may recompute taxable
income in a closed year in order to determine tax liability in an open year. The
court in Fernandez held that the Barenholtz principle applies in the TEFRA
context.
3.
The Tax Court follows. G-5 Investment
Partnership v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 186 (5/30/07). The Tax Court (Judge
Haines) held that § 6229(a) establishes the minimum period for the
assessment of tax attributable to partnership items notwithstanding the
period provided in § 6501. Section 6229 can extend the § 6501 period of
limitations with respect to the tax attributable to a partnership item. Thus,
§§ 6229(a) and 6501 "provide alternative periods within which to assess tax
with respect to partnership items, with the later expiring period governing in
a particular case."
* Under the facts of the case, the
partnership filed its 2000 return on October 4, 2001. The partners reported
capital loss carryovers attributable to the partnership 2000 tax year on their tax
returns for 2002-2004. On April 12, 2006, the IRS issued an FPAA notice to
the partnership for 2000, more than three years after the partnership return for
2000 was filed. However, the notice was within three years of the dates the
partners filed their individual returns for the years 2002-2004. The IRS could
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assess deficiencies against the partners attributable to the partnership's 2000
items for the partners' open 2002-2004 years.
4.
And extended by Jenkens & Gilchrist's response
to the IRS summons in Son of BOSS transactions. Kligfeld Holdings v.
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 192 (5/30/07). An FPAA that was issued after
§ 6229(a) barred adjustments to partnership items, but before § 6501 barred
assessment of tax against the partner, permitted assessment of deficiencies
against the partner in the open year. The § 6501 statute of limitations was
tolled under § 7609(e)(2) for the period during which Jenkens & Gilchrist
provided information in response to the IRS summons for customers' names
in the Son of BOSS shelter.
5.
A criminal fraud investigation of the tax matters
partner helped another partner. In re Martinez, 366 B.R. 604 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 4/13/07). A consent to extend the statute of limitations for partnership
level audit executed by tax matters partner was invalid with respect to the
taxpayer-partner, because the tax matters partner was under criminal
investigation with respect to the partnership and thus had a disabling conflict
of interest with the other partners of which the IRS was aware.
6.
River City Ranches #1 Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-171 (7/2/07). On remand from the Ninth Circuit, 401 F.3d 1136
(9th Cir. 2005), the Tax Court held that an asserted conflict of interest
between the tax matters partner and the other partners did not invalidate
waiver of the statute of limitations by the tax matters partner. In addition, the
Tax Court found that the six-year statute of limitations for fraud was
applicable and that the sheep breeding partnerships at issue were sham
partnerships lacking economic substance, which justified increased interest
penalties under § 6621 (c).
7.
A closing agreement is not necessary for a
settlement agreement prerequisite to starting the statute of limitations
running. Gingerich v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 231 (6/22/07), on remand
from 82 F.App'x 35 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In a partnership level audit, pursuant
to § 6229(f)(1) the IRS has one year to assess a deficiency against the
partners with respect to items that pursuant to § 6231(b)(1)(C) became
nonpartnership items as a result of a settlement agreement. In this case,
while the partnership issue was before the Tax Court, the IRS district
counsel and the partners' lawyers reached a settlement, which was reduced
to a writing signed by the partners (the "Acceptance Forms"), but not by any
representative of the IRS, which was delivered to the IRS, but which did not
exactly follow the precise wording of the IRS's settlement offer. Both the
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IRS and the taxpayer's lawyers expected that closing agreements would be
signed expeditiously, but there was a delay. In the refund suit, the Court of
Federal Claims (Judge Lettow) held that settlement agreement had been
reached when the partners had signed and delivered the "Acceptance Forms"
to the IRS, not on the later date on which the Closing Agreements had been
signed. Accordingly, the deficiency, which was assessed more than one year
after the Acceptance Forms, but within one year from the closing
agreements, was not timely.
Fear penalties determined in a TEFRA audit.
8.
Fears v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 8 (8/2/07). Section 6221 provides that the
applicability of any penalty, including an accuracy-related penalty that
relates to an adjustment of a partnership item must be determined at the
partnership level if the TEFRA partnership audit rules apply. Accordingly,
the Tax Court (Judge Foley) held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider an
asserted partner-level defense relating to § 6662 penalties determined in the
partnership level proceeding.
9.
"The [Subchapter B] deficiency procedures no
longer apply to the assessment of any partnership-item penalty
determined at the partnership level, regardless of whether further
partner-level determinations are required." So, is the IRS supposed to
assess penalties before the deficiency is determined? Domulewicz v.
Commissioner, 129 T.C. 11 (8/8/07). In a Son of BOSS transaction, the
taxpayer claimed a $5,858,801 capital loss. The loss was created by a series
of transactions in which the taxpayer entered into a short sale of U.S.
Treasury notes and contributed the proceeds and the related obligation to a
partnership (DIP). After DIP satisfied the obligation and received from its
partners contributions of publicly traded stock purchased for a relatively
nominal amount, the partners transferred their interests in DIP to DII, an S
corporation of which they were shareholders. DIP then liquidated and
distributed the stock to DII, following which DII sold the stock and passed
through to the taxpayer a capital loss of $29,306,024 resulting from the
claimed high basis of the stock. Following a TEFRA audit that recomputed
the partnership's basis in the stock as zero (rather than the claimed
$30,447,106), when no petition was filed as to the FPAA, the IRS did not
assess any tax or accuracy-related penalty relating to DI's sale of the stock,
but instead issued an affected items notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer filed a Tax Court petition and moved to dismiss this case for lack
of jurisdiction, asserting that the normal deficiency procedures did not apply
to the disallowance of the pass-through loss or the determination of the
accuracy-related penalties. The Tax Court (Judge Laro) held that under
§ 6230(a)(2)(A)(i), the deficiency procedures were applicable to the
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disallowance of the loss because partner-level factual determinations were
necessary to determine deficiency. Among other things that had to be
determined were DI's basis in its partnership interests at the time of the
liquidating distribution, whether the stock that was sold by DII was the same
stock distributed by DIP, the portion of the stock actually sold, the holding
period for the stock, and the character of any gain or loss. "The fact that
these partner-level determinations, once made, may not have changed
respondent's partnership determinations as to DIP is of no concern. Neither
the Code nor the regulations thereunder require that partner-level
determinations actually result in a substantive change to a determination
made at the partnership level."
. However, the IRS's determination of the
accuracy-related penalties was not subject to the deficiency procedures by
virtue of the parenthetical text added to § 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-34, § 1238(b)(2), 111 Stat. 1026 - "(other
than penalties, additions to tax, and additional amounts that relate to
adjustments to partnership items)." Judge Laro finished his opinion with the
following observation:
We note in closing that we are not unmindful that a plain
reading of section 6230(a)(2)(A)(i) ... may sometimes permit
(as it apparently does here) the Commissioner to assess a
partnership-item penalty before the deficiency to which the
penalty relates is adjudicated. We doubt that the drafters of
the statute and the regulations, in excluding partnership item
penalties from the deficiency procedures, contemplated a
situation like this where the deficiency underlying the
partnership-item penalty is incorporated in an affected items
notice and itself made subject to review under the deficiency
procedures before it can be assessed. All the same, we apply
the statute as written in accordance with its plain reading
and leave to the legislators the job of rewriting the statute,
should they decide to do so, to take into account the
situation at hand.
10.
Son of BOSS Tax Court petition dismissed,
because all items in the deficiency notice are TEFRA partnership audit
items and that proceeding was still pending. Nussdorf v. Commissioner,
129 T.C. 30 (8/16/07). The IRS issued an FPAA on 9/26/05 for 1999 and
2000 to Evergreen Trading, LLC with respect to offsetting currency options,
and on the same date issued notices of deficiency to the individuals to whom
Evergreen's losses flowed. Taxpayers contested the FPAA in the Court of
Federal Claims and filed petitions in the Tax Court with respect to the

2008]

Recent Developments in FederalIncome Taxation

individual notices of deficiency. The Tax Court (Judge Chiechi) denied the
taxpayer's motion to dismiss and granted the IRS's motion to dismiss the
taxpayer's petition. The deficiency notices related only to partnership items,
and the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over any of the items,
because it was not a partnership proceeding under § 6226.
0 After the Tax Court petition had been
filed, the taxpayer's pass-thru entity that was a partner, but not the tax matters
partner, filed a complaint in the Court of Claims alleging errors in the FPAA
and that suit was still pending. Judge Chiechi concluded that all of the
following items were partnership items: (1) the character of the transfer in
which the partnership received property from each partner, e.g., whether it was
a contribution or a loan; (2) whether any such property should be aggregated
with other property received from partner; and (3) and the basis to the
partnership of any property contributed to it by partner, including necessary
preliminary determinations, such as the partner's basis in the contributed
property. She held that the basis of the property transferred to Evergreen is a
partnership item under § 6231(a) and it is to be determined in the partnership
proceeding.
11.
Murphy v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 82 (9/26/07).
The taxpayer was the sole beneficiary of a trust that was partner in a Son of
BOSS partnership. The IRS sent a notice of a final partnership
administrative adjustment (FPAA) to the taxpayer, rather than to the trust,
for the purpose of meeting the notice requirement of § 6223(a). Pursuant to
§ 6223(c)(3) and Reg. § 301.6223(c)-lT(f), mailing the FPAA to the
taxpayer as an "indirect partner" met the notice requirement of § 6223(a).
12.
Epsolon Limited v. United States, 78 Fed. Cl. 738
(10/10/07). The FPAA issued in a Son of BOSS case was timely because the
issuance of a summons to Sidley Austin Brown & Wood seeking the
identities of individual investors suspended the running of the statute of
limitations.
G.

Miscellaneous

1.
The Sixth Circuit upholds the existing check-thebox rules, and further holds that subsequent proposed regulations
making the LLC liable for employment taxes may be disregarded.
Ironically, the rule in the proposed regulations calls for employment
taxation at the entity level. Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th
Cir. 4/13/07). The Sixth Circuit held that provisions in Reg. § 301.77013(b)(1)(ii) treating a sole-owner LLC as a disregarded entity are a valid
exercise of Treasury's authority to issue interpretative regulations. The
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taxpayer was the sole owner of several LLCs and claimed that the LLCs, not
the taxpayer, were individually liable for unpaid employment taxes.
Affirming the District Court, the Sixth Circuit held that the taxpayer was
individually liable for the employment taxes. After the notice of appeal had
been filed in the case, the Internal Revenue Service published proposed
regulations that would treat single-owner disregarded entities as separate
entities for employment tax purposes. See Prop. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv),
REG-1 14371-05, Disregarded Entities; Employment and Excise Taxes, 70
F.R. 60475 (10/18/05). The Sixth Circuit opined that an agency is entitled to
consider alternative interpretations of a statute in proposing regulations
before settling its view (citing Commodity Futures Trading Commission v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)). The court stated that the proposed regulations
do not undermine the District Court's determination that the current
regulations are reasonable and valid.
a.
The Second Circuit reaches the same
result for the same reasons. McNamee v. Department of the Treasury, 488
F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 5/23/07). Judge Kearse ruled that the owner of a single
member LLC was personally liable for the employment tax liabilities of his
LLC that was properly formed under state law because he did not elect to
have the LLC treated as a corporation. Judge Kearse stated:
In light of the emergence of limited liability companies and
their hybrid nature, and the continuing silence of the Code
on the proper tax treatment of such companies in the decade
since the present regulations became effective, we cannot
conclude that the above Treasury Regulations, providing a
flexible response to a novel business form, are arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable.
0 The court's summary of the interaction
of the various Supreme Court decisions with respect to the weight to be
accorded Treasury regulations promulgated under the "express" general
delegation in § 7805 "to adopt regulations to fill in gaps in the Code" is
especially worthy of note with respect to all cases in which a regulation might
be challenged.
In reviewing a challenge to an agency regulation interpreting
a federal statute that the agency is charged with
administering, the first duty of the courts is to determine
"whether the statute's plain terms 'directly addres[s] the
precise question at issue."' National Cable &
TelecommunicationsAss 'n v. BrandXInternetServices, 545
U.S. 967, 986 ... (2005) (" National Cable ") (quoting
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Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 ... (1984)). "If the statute is
ambiguous on the point, we defer ... to the agency's

interpretation so long as the construction is 'a reasonable
policy choice for the agency to make."' National Cable, 545
U.S. at 986 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845). As stated in
Chevron itself,
[f]irst, always, is the question whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be
necessary
in the
absence of an
administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect
to the specific issue, the question for the
court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the
statute.(467 U.S. at 842-43)
"If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill,
there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation [,
and s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." [Chevron ] at 843-44... . See also
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 ...
(2001) ("administrative implementation of a particular
statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that
the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority").
b.
But the Treasury issues final regulations
disagreeing with its own victories. T.D. 9356, Disregarded Entities;
Employment and Excise Taxes, 72 F.R. 45891 (8/16/07). These final
regulations promulgate Reg. §§ 1.34-1, 1.1361-4 and 301.7701-2, which
treat disregarded entities as separate corporations for purposes of
employment taxes. The regulations apply to disregarded single owner
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entities and to qualified Subchapter S corporations. The IRS rejected
comments that the regulations will complicate reporting requirements for
disregarded entities whose owners assumed responsibility for excise taxes
claiming that the regulations will avoid administrative inconvenience for the
IRS in assessing employment taxes. The final regulations are effective
8/16/07. However, there is a more complex deferral arrangement:
The employment tax provisions of these regulations
apply to wages paid on or after January 1, 2009. The notice
of proposed rulemaking provided that these regulations
would become effective with respect to wages paid on
January 1 following the year of publication of these final
regulations in the Federal Register, which would have been
January 1, 2008. However, in order to ensure that taxpayers
have sufficient time to make any necessary changes to their
systems in response to these regulations, the IRS and the
Treasury Department have determined that it is appropriate
to delay the effective date of these regulations until January
1, 2009.
The IRS and the Treasury Department believe that
the considerations that support a January 1, 2009, effective
date for the employment tax provisions do not apply to the
excise tax provisions. Thus, the excise tax provisions of
these regulations apply to liabilities imposed and actions
required or permitted in periods beginning on or after
January 1, 2008. For periods beginning before that date, the
IRS will treat payments made by a disregarded entity, or
other actions taken by a disregarded entity, with respect to
the excise taxes affected by these regulations as having been
made or taken by the sole owner of that entity. Thus, for
such periods, the owner of a disregarded entity will be
treated as satisfying the owner's obligations with respect to
the excise taxes affected by these regulations, provided that
those obligations are satisfied either (1) by the owner itself
or (2) by the disregarded entity on behalf of the owner.
2.
Treasury promulgates final regulations on
qualified small business stock held by partnerships. T.D. 9353, Section
1045 Application to Partnerships, 72 F.R. 45346 (8/14/07). Under § 1045 an
individual holder of qualified small business stock (QSB stock), who has
held the stock for more than 6 months, can defer recognition of gain on the
sale if the individual acquires replacement QSB stock within 60 days. The
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proposed regulations allowed a partner in a partnership to elect to defer gain
on sales of QSB stock by a partnership that acquired replacement stock
within the 60 day period. The proposed regulations did not treat a sale of an
interest in a partnership that holds QSB stock as a sale of the QSB stock
subject to § 1045. However, the final regulations (Reg. § 1.1045-1) provide
that gain on sale of QSB stock may be deferred if the partner holds an
interest in another partnership that acquires QSB stock during the statutory
period The final regulations require basis adjustments under the principles of
§ 743(b) with respect to replacement QSB stock when a partner elects to
defer gain under § 1045. The electing partner's basis in the partnership
interest is also reduced by deferred gain. The final regulations also require
an electing partner to recognize deferred gain if replacement QSB stock is
distributed to another partner. An election under § 1045 may be made by the
partnership affecting all partners. If a partnership elects to defer gain under
§ 1045, an individual partner is permitted to opt out of the election. An
individual partner is also permitted to elect to defer gain on sale of QSB
stock if the partnership does not make the election.
3.
Purchase of fancy life insurance products in the
guise of an employee benefit plan fails to produce claimed deductions.
V.R. DeAngelis M.D.P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-360
(12/5/07). The taxpayer doctors each owned a Subchapter S corporation that
was a partner in a partnership through which they practiced medicine. Each
individual doctor was an employee of the doctor's S corporation. The S
corporations made contributions to the partnership which in turn contributed
to the Severance Trust Executive Program Multiple Employer Supplemental
Benefit Plan and Trust (STEP), a plan promoted to wealthy professionals as
a qualified welfare benefits fund that was part of a 10 or more employer plan
under § 419A(f)(6). The plan purchased cash-laden whole life insurance
policies on behalf of each doctor. Judge Laro described the case as "arising
from a plan designed aggressively to bolster the sale of insurance products
through a claim of permissible tax savings." The court disallowed
deductions as ordinary business expenses for contributions to the "welfare
benefit plan" finding that "the facts of these cases establish that the plan was
nothing more than a subterfuge through which the participating doctors,
through VRD/RTD, used surplus cash of the PCs to purchase cash-laden
whole life insurance policies primarily for the benefit of the participating
doctors personally." The court rejected the IRS's additional assertion that
contributions by the S corporations were included in the doctors' gross
income, finding instead that the contributions represented distributions to the
doctors as shareholders of their respective S corporations.
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TAX SHELTERS
A.

Tax Shelter Cases

1.
District Court upholds BLIPS tax shelter on
taxpayer's partial summary judgment motion. Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex.
7/20/06). The court (Judge Ward) held that the premium portion of the loans
received from the bank in connection with the funding of the instruments
contributed to the partnership was a contingent obligation, and not a fixed
and determined liability for purposes of § 752. The transaction was entered
into prior to the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which related
to Son of BOSS transactions. Judge Ward held that a regulation to the
contrary, Reg. § 1.752-6 (See T.D. 9062), was not effective retroactively,
and was therefore invalid as applied to these transactions. Judge Ward held
that there was clear authority existing at the time of the transaction that the
premium portion of the loan did not reduce taxpayer's basis in the
partnership.
a.
Fighting duplication and acceleration of
losses through partnerships before June 24, 2003. T.D. 9062, Assumption
of Partner Liabilities, 68 F.R. 37414 (6/24/03). Temp. Reg. § 1.752-6T
provides rules, similar to the rules applicable to corporations in § 358(h), to
prevent the duplication and acceleration of loss through the assumption by a
partnership of a liability of a partner in a nonrecognition transaction. Under
the temporary regulations, if a partnership assumes a liability, as defined in
§ 358(h)(3), of a partner (other than a liability to which § 752(a) and (b)
apply) in a § 721 transaction, after application of §§ 752(a) and (b), the
partner's basis in the partnership is reduced (but not below the adjusted
value of such interest) by the amount of the liability. For this purpose, the
term "liability" includes any fixed or contingent obligation to make
payment, without regard to whether the obligation is otherwise taken into
account for Federal tax purposes. Reduction of a partner's basis generally is
not required if: (1) the trade or business with which the liability is associated
is transferred to the partnership, or (2) substantially all of the assets with
which the liability is associated are contributed to the partnership. However,
the exception for contributions of substantially all of the assets does not
apply to a transaction described in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (or a
substantially similar transaction).
* The temporary regulations purport to be
effective for transactions occurring after 10/18/99 and before 6/24/03.
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b.
Klamath on the merits: It does not work
because it lacks economic substance, but no penalties. The authorities
discussed in the Holland & Hart and Olson Lemons opinions provide
"substantial authority." Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v.
United States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 1/31/07), on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit (9/19/07). The transactions lacked economic substance because
the loans would not be used to provide leverage for foreign currency
transactions, but no penalties were applicable because taxpayers passed on a
1999 investment and they thought they were investing in foreign currencies
and the tax opinions they received that relied on relevant authorities set forth
in the court's earlier opinion provided "substantial authority" for the
taxpayers' treatment of their basis in their partnerships.
c.
On government motions, Judge Ward
refuses to vacate partial summary judgment decision on the
retroactivity of the regulations under § 752, and he permits the
deduction of operational expenses, despite his earlier finding that the
transactions lacked economic substance, because the taxpayer had
profit motives. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States,
99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2001 (E.D. Tex. 4/3/07). First, Judge Ward held that
even though the loans lacked economic substance, they still existed, and thus
the partial summary judgment on the non-retroactivity of the regulations
under § 752 was not premised on invalid factual assumptions. Second, he
held that the existence of profit motive for deduction of operational expenses
was based on the purposes of Nix and Patterson - and not on the motives of
Presidio, the managing partner of the partnership.
2.
This decision might have a "colming" effect on
the IRS. COLM Producer, Inc. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D.
Tex. 10/16/06). The court (Judge Godbey) upheld the disallowance of a loss
of about $102.7 million on the sale of a limited partnership interest in
December 1999. The partnership interest was funded by the Ettman Family
Trust with $2 million plus the contribution of the $102.5 million proceeds of
the short sale of $100 million (face value) of U.S. Treasury Notes subject to
the obligation to replace the borrowed T-notes. The partnership interest was
then sold to an unrelated third party for $1.8 million. Held, the obligation to
replace the borrowed T-notes (on the closing of the short sale) should have
been treated as a liability under § 752. Judge Godbey held that - although
contingent liabilities were not included as liabilities under § 752 - the
obligation to close the short sale was a "liability" based upon his reading of
the Black's Law Dictionary definition ("the quality or state of being legally
obligated or accountable" or, "a financial or pecuniary obligation"). He
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reinforced his conclusion by citing Rev. Rul. 95-26, 1995-1 C.B. 131, and
Salina PartnershipLP v. Commissioner,T.C. Memo. 2000-352.
3.
Hi-Lili, Hi-Lili, LILO! District court grants
summary judgment to the government in a LILO transaction. BB&T
Corp. v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-376 (M.D. N.C. 1/4/07).
Taxpayer, a financial services corporation, leased equipment from a wood
pulp manufacturer (a head lease) and re-leased it back to the wood pulp
manufacturer in a "lease-in-lease-out" (LILO) transaction and claimed
substantial rent and other deductions. The court held that the form of the
transaction should not be respected for tax purposes because taxpayer did
not acquire a current leasehold interest in the equipment and incurred no risk
of loss. The reciprocal offsetting obligations were disregarded because, in
substance, the taxpayer acquired only a future interest in the right to use and
possess the equipment - and acquired that interest only if the ownersublessee did not exercise its option to buy-out taxpayer's interest in the
head lease. The transaction did not substantially affect the wood pulp
manufacturer's rights to use and possess the property.
4.
There is partnership liability in a short sale:
Another shelter falls on summary judgment for the IRS, with penalties,
and a FPAA to one is as good as an FPAA to the other. This case differs
from Klamath because the transaction was entered into following the
8/11/00 release of Notice 2000-44 (which made it a listed transaction).
Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1882 (N.D. I11.
3/27/07). In this tax shelter scheme, Cemco Investment Trust (CIT), a
grantor trust, entered into two foreign exchange digital option transactions
on December 4, 2000, with Deutsche Bank. CIT simultaneously purchased a
$3.6 million digital foreign currency option (the long position) and sold a
digital foreign currency option for $3.564 million (the short position). On
the following day, CIT assigned the options to Cemco Investment Partners
(CIP), a general partnership. A few days later, CIP purchased £55,947 for
$50,000. CIP then entered into a termination agreement with respect to both
of the option contracts. On December 21, CIP was liquidated with a transfer
of the E55,947 and $45,847 to CIT. The transfer occurred by moving assets
from CIP's account at Deutsche Bank to CIT's account. On December 26,
CIT transferred the euros to Cemco, LLC. On December 29, Cemco sold the
majority of the euros for $51,324 (a non-functional currency treated as
property). Cemco and CIP consisted of two partners, Steven Kaplan and
Forest Chartered Holdings, Ltd. Forest was a shell company to orchestrate
the transactions. Forest's sole shareholder and president, Paul Daugerdas,
was the trustee of CIT. Kaplan and Forest were the CIT beneficiaries.
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* Cemco claimed a $3.563 million loss on
the sale of the Euros. CIP claimed a $3.6 million basis in the long currency
position, and that the contingent obligation of the short position is not treated
as a liability for § 752 purposes, which would otherwise have reduced basis on
termination of the contracts. (See Helmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1975160). Cemco asserted that while CIP had a total tax basis of $3.6 million, its
only assets were the Euros and cash in its possession. Thus, the basis of the
Euros distributed in liquidation would be $3.6 million less the $45,847 cash,
producing a loss on the sale of Euros. The Tax Court held that Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 C.B. 255, which was issued on 9/5/00 (predating the transaction), and
Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(4)(ii), issued in June 2003, established that the contingent
obligation represented by the short sale would be treated as a liability to
prevent the creation of artificial basis in transactions designed to create
artificial tax losses by overstating basis. Thus, Cemco's losses are disallowed.
* Cemco's major claim was that that the
FPAA should have been issued to CIP, which was the partnership that
executed the transactions and thereby generated the basis figure with respect to
property distributed to Cemco. Agreeing with the Government, the District
Court held that, although the basis of the Euros was a partnership item of CIP,
Cemco was also required to correctly determine the basis of the Euros
contributed to it and could not merely carry over the basis as determined by
either CIT or CIP. Thus, the FPAA issued to Cemco was not premised on
CIP's errors.
* The summary judgment also affirmed
imposition of the § 6662(a) accuracy related penalty, increased to 40 percent
under § 6662(e) for a gross valuation misstatement.
There's red ketchup all over. Six million dollars
5.
of financial profit and a $124 million tax loss. A redemption is treated as
a dividend disregarded for lack of business purpose. H.J. Heinz Co. v.
United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 570 (5/25/07). Heinz Credit Company (HCC, a
Delaware lending subsidiary formed to minimize state taxes on
intercompany loans) purchased on the open market 3,500,000 shares of its
parent's (H.J. Heinz) stock with cash acquired from commercial lenders.
H.J. Heinz redeemed 3,325,000 of these shares giving HHC a subordinated
zero coupon convertible note. H.J. Heinz and HHC treated the transaction as
a dividend from H.J. Heinz to HCC under §§ 301 and 302(d). HCC thus
asserted that its basis in the full 3,500,000 shares shifted to its remaining
175,000 H.J. Heinz shares. Thereafter, HHC sold the 175,000 shares to an
unrelated party claiming a $124 million capital loss, which was reported on
the H.J. Heinz consolidated return. At the end of three years, HHC converted
the note into H.J. Heinz stock. Between the times it acquired the note and
the conversion date, the price of H.J. Heinz stock increased from about $39
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to $83 per share. The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Allegra) found that
HCC possessed the benefits and burdens of ownership of the H.J. Heinz
stock and that its transfer of the stock to H.J. Heinz met the definition of a
redemption under § 317(b). Nonetheless, the court concluded that the
transaction was a sham because the only purpose of the transaction was to
produce a capital loss to wipe out capital gains realized on another
transaction, and the transaction had no business purpose. The court also
applied the step transaction doctrine to disregard the HCC purchase and
redemption of shares. The court concluded:
A Heinz promotion from the late 1950s and early 1960s
touted its tomato ketchup by stating - "It's Red Magic
Time!" But no amount of magic, red or otherwise, can hide
the meat of the transactions in question, the connective
tissues and gristle of which have been revealed by the multitined substance-over-form doctrine. Sans sa sauce, it
becomes plain that plaintiffs' transaction simply was not
"the thing which the statute intended." Gregory, 293 U.S. at
469.
6.
Interest is suspended under § 6404(g) because of
the absence of fraud. Sala v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2551 (D.
Colo. 5/1/07). If an individual files a timely return (including extensions)
and the IRS has not sent the taxpayer a notice of additional liability (e.g., a
math error notice of deficiency), including an explanation of the basis for the
liability, within one year following the later of (1) the due date of the return
(without regard to extension), or (2) the date on which the taxpayer filed the
return, § 6404(g)(1) suspends the accrual of interest for the period beginning
one year after the due date (or filing, if applicable) of the return. Interest
resumes running twenty-one days after the IRS sends a notice to the
taxpayer. Section 6404(g) does not apply at all if an underpayment is due to
fraud. In this case, the district court held that the fraud exception to
§ 6404(g) does not apply to a deficiency from a tax shelter transaction
("Baby BOSS") that lacked economic substance, unless the government
shows that the taxpayer engaged in some act of concealment or
misrepresentation. Even though the taxpayer entered into the transaction
knowing that it was a listed transaction (Notice 2000-44), and knowing that
it would not be registered with the IRS in order to conceal his participation,
because taxpayer relied on a "more likely than not opinion" by R.J. Ruble
that the tax results of the transaction would be upheld, the taxpayer acted in
good faith and the government could not prove that the taxpayer had
fraudulent intent. Summary judgment was entered for the taxpayer.
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a.
Was it a "qualified amended return"?
Sala v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1709 (D. Colo. 5/30/07). On
plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, Judge Babcock held that
the amended 2000 return filed by Sala on 11/18/03 was possibly not a
"qualified amended return" because the date that the IRS notified KPMG
that it was under a § 6700 examination was 10/17/03. The resolution of this
issue depends upon the scope of the § 6700 examination at the time the
amended return was filed, and an issue of fact exists that would preclude
summary judgment. The court refused to stay the case pending the
availability of testimony from Sala's KPMG accountant, Tracie Henderson,
and from R.J. Ruble, both of whom indicated they would invoke their Fifth
Amendment rights, because the delay would be substantial and would
prejudice Sala.
b.
Sala v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 20075097 (D. Colo. 7/3/07). Judge Babcock reiterated his holding that there is an
issue of fact as to whether the 11/18/03 amended return was a qualified
amended return.
7.
The Court of Federal Claims follows Coltec on
the economic substance issue. Jade Trading LLC v. United States, 80 Fed.
C1. 11 (12/21/07). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Williams) held that,
although they literally complied with the Code, digital options spread
transactions lacked economic substance. She relied upon Coltec Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006), to reach that
conclusion. Judge Williams stated,
In sum, this transaction's fictional loss, inability to realize a
profit, lack of investment character, meaningless inclusion
in a partnership, and disproportionate tax advantage as
compared to the amount invested and potential return,
compel a conclusion that the spread transaction objectively
lacked economic substance.
0 The 20 percent and 40 percent penalties
were applied although the § 6664 reasonable cause exception issue was
postponed to possible partner-level proceedings.
B.

Identified "Tax Avoidance Transactions."

Loss importation
1.
avoidance transactions. Notice 2007-57,
Listed transactions include loss importation
that acquires a foreign entity classified as a

transactions are listed tax
2007-29 I.R.B. 87 (7/16/07).
by a Subchapter S corporation
corporation. The foreign entity
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engages in offsetting positions in foreign currency. After the gain is
recognized, the foreign entity elects to be treated as a disregarded entity
preserving the loss side of the transactions for the S corporation.
2.
Disclosure and list maintenance regulations. T.D.
9295, AJCA Modifications to the Section 6011, 6111, and 6112 Regulations,
71 F.R. 64458 (11/2/06). These final and temporary regulations are part of a
package of four regulations and proposed regulations that modify the rules
for disclosing reportable transactions and list maintenance requirements
following the enactment of the Jobs Act of 2004.
a.
"Transactions of Interest" REG-10303805, AJCA Modifications to the Section 6011 Regulations, 71 F.R. 64488
(11/2/06). These proposed regulations modify the rules on the disclosure of
reportable transactions. They also eliminate the special rule for lease
transactions, making those transactions subject to the same disclosure rules
as other transactions. These proposed regulations would create a new
category, "transaction of interest," as a reportable transaction category.
(1)
The regulations are now final.
T.D. 9350, AJCA Modifications to the Section 6011 Regulations, 72 F.R.
43146 (8/3/07). This Treasury Decision adopts the proposed regulations as
Treas. Reg. § 1.6111-4, without change.
b.
REG-103039-05, AJCA Modifications to
the Section 6111 Regulations, 71 F.R. 64496 (11/2/06). These proposed
regulations provide rules for the disclosure of reportable transactions under
§ 6111 by material advisors.
(1)
The regulations are now final.
T.D. 9351, AJCA Modifications to the Section 6111 Regulations, 72 F.R.
43157 (8/3/07). This Treasury Decision adopts the proposed regulations as
Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3.
C.
REG-103043-05, AJCA Modifications to
the Section 6112 Regulations, 71 F.R. 64501 (11/2/06). These proposed
regulations would provide rules for material advisors who must prepare and
maintain investor lists under § 6112. The list must identify each person who
was advised with respect to any reportable transaction. The proposed
regulations would also require the material advisor to include the names of
other material advisors to the transaction and any designation agreement to
which the material advisor is a party. They also clarify that the list must
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include an itemized statement of information, a detailed description of the
transaction, and copies of documents related to the transaction.
(1)
The regulations are now final.
T.D. 9352, AJCA Modifications to the Section 6112 Regulations, 72 F.R.
43154 (8/3/07). This Treasury Decision adopts the proposed regulations as
Treas. Reg. § 301.6112-1.
3.
Now the IRS doesn't want to be "TOI-ed" with.
Notice 2007-72, 2007-36 I.R.B. 544 (9/4/07). The transaction described as a
"transaction of interest" is one in which a taxpayer purchases the successor
member interest in an LLC holding real estate from his Advisor (who
continues to own the membership interests in the LLC for a term of years).
The taxpayer then transfers the successor member interest more than one
year after he acquired it to a charity, and claims a deduction significantly
higher than the amount paid by the taxpayer. The IRS designated this and
similar transactions as "transactions of interest" for purposes of Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(6) and §§ 6111 and 6112.
a.
Notice 2007-73, 2007-36 I.R.B. 545
(9/4/07). In this Notice, the IRS expressed concern over transactions
involving turning grantor status on and off in a short time period for the
purpose of allowing the grantor to claim a tax loss greater than any actual
economic loss sustained or to avoid inappropriately the recognition of gain,
and designated such transactions as "transactions of interest."
0 In IR-2007-143 (8/14/07), Treasury and
IRS explained that it believes "transactions of interest" have the potential for
abuse, but that they lack sufficient information to determine whether the
transactions should be identified specifically as tax avoidance transactions.
Treasury and the IRS further explained that they may take one or more future
actions, including designating the transactions as listed transactions, or
providing a new category of reportable transaction.
* Speaking to the Tax Executives Institute
on 10/23/07, 2007 TNT 206-2, Chief Counsel Donald Korb's explanation of
the significance of the classification "transaction of interest" was reported as
follows:
Korb said the creation of the new transactions of interest
designation is the direct result of the penalties Congress
added for listed transactions in the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004.
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"They piled on," he said. "So once the penalties become so
draconian, it really takes away from us the ability to use this
tool. It's that simple."
Korb said the IRS has only listed
he joined the agency because it
listing brings with it so many
called transactions of interest
transaction."
C.

two new transactions since
has to be so careful when
penalty implications. He
the new "junior listed

Disclosure and Settlement

1.
First was Merrill Lynch. IR-2001-74, (8/29/01).
The IRS announced that Merrill Lynch agreed to settle a penalty case that
the IRS had brought against it for promotion of the contingent installment
sale shelter involved in ACM Partnershipv. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231
(3d Cir. 1998), and other cases. The amount of the penalty settlement was
described as "substantial."
a.
The Big Four settle with the IRS on tax
shelters. Deloitte cooperated with the IRS and settled for a de minimis
penalty, which was decided upon after the IRS settled with the other three
large accounting firms.
b.
The PwC deal. IR-2002-82 (6/27/02). The
IRS announced in a news release that it cut a deal with
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) "to resolve issues relating to tax shelter
registration and list maintenance under the Internal Revenue Code." The IRS
news release, which is similar to one issued last August regarding Merrill
Lynch, says that without admitting or denying liability, PwC has agreed to
make a 'substantial payment' to the IRS to resolve issues in connection with
advice rendered to clients dating back to 1995. Under the agreement, PwC
will provide to the IRS certain client information in response to summonses.
It will also work with the IRS to develop processes to ensure ongoing
compliance with the shelter registration and investor list maintenance
requirements, according to the release.
c.
The EY deal. IR-2003-84 (7/2/03). The IRS
announced that it settled Ernst & Young's potential liability under the tax
shelter registration and list maintenance penalty provisions for a
nondeductible payment of $15 million. See 2003 TNT 128-1.
2.
The KPMG deal: the price of settling goes up
dramatically. IR-2005-83 (8/29/05). The IRS and the Justice Department
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announced that KPMG LLP has admitted to criminal wrongdoing and agreed
to pay $456 million in fines, restitution, and penalties as part of an
agreement to defer prosecution of the firm. Nineteen individuals, chiefly
former KPMG partners including the former deputy chairman of the firm
(Jeffrey Stein), as well as a New York lawyer (R.J. Ruble) were indicted in
the Southern District of New York in relation to the "multi-billion dollar
criminal tax fraud conspiracy;" several of those indicted were partners in
KPMG's Washington National Tax group.
to
find
a.
Judge
Kaplan
refuses
prosecutorial misconduct in the deferred prosecution agreement. United
States v. Stein, 428 F. Supp. 2d 138 (S.D.N.Y. 4/4/06). Judge Kaplan
denied a motion to dismiss based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct by
reason of the alleged manipulation of KPMG in the deferred prosecution
agreement. This DPA required the firm "upon pain of corporate death, [to]
espouse a government-approved version of [the] facts." Judge Kaplan based
his decision on the ethical provision applicable to all attorneys that prohibits
them from coercing witnesses to give false testimony. He further held that
nothing in the DPA pressures individual KPMG employees to testify in any
particular way, but that the DPA merely requires the firm to disavow any
assertion by an affiliated individual that is inconsistent with the DPA's
Statement of Facts.
b.
In its post-Enron war against white collar
crime, the Justice Department's notion that what is fair against
organized crime is also fair against white collar crime receives a
(temporary?) setback. Judge Kaplan finds prosecutorial misconduct in
the use of the Thompson Memorandum to prevent KPMG from
continuing its customary practice of paying attorney's fees for
individuals caught up in controversy by reason of their affiliation with
the firm. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 6/26/06), as
amended, 7/14/06. The court held that the Justice Department's Thompson
Memorandum policy (continued from the Holder Memorandum) of basing a
determination of whether a firm is "cooperating" with the government on its
refusal (unless compelled by law) to advance legal fees for affiliated
individuals unless they in turn fully cooperated with the government, as it
was applied by the prosecutors in this case, was an unconstitutional
interference with defendants' ability to use resources that - absent the
government's misconduct - would be otherwise available to them for
payment of attorneys' fees. The resources in question were funds that would
have customarily been received by these defendants from KPMG to pay
their attorneys.
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* Judge Kaplan suggested that the
constitutional violation could be rendered harmless if the defendants could
successfully force KPMG to pay their legal expenses, and sua sponte
instructed the clerk of the district court to open a civil docket number for an
expected contract claim by the defendants against KPMG for payment of their
defense costs. Judge Kaplan stated that the court would "entertain the claims
pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction over this case." The defendants
subsequently filed the anticipated complaints against KPMG.
* Judge Kaplan subsequently refused to
eliminate from his opinion a statement that prosecutors in the case were
"economical with the truth." He also refused to eliminate from his opinion the
names of the prosecutors involved. 2006 TNT 130-10.
* The Thompson Memorandum was
replaced on 12/12/06 by the McNulty Memorandum which requires threats to
prosecute entities "unless" they do something (e.g., waive attorney client
privilege) or "if' they do something (e.g., advance legal fees) to emanate from
a higher level of the Justice Department.
c.
Judge Kaplan indefinitely postpones the
federal criminal trial against 16 former KPMG employees, an outside
investment adviser, and a lawyer. United States v. Stein, 461 F. Supp. 2d
201 (S.D.N.Y. 11/13/06). Judge Kaplan reaffirmed his earlier holding that
ancillary jurisdiction existed over the contractual fee dispute between the
defendants and KPMG. He rejected KPMG's argument that the defendant's
claims were foreclosed by written agreements, and found that enforcement
of any applicable arbitration clause would be contrary to public policy,
because it might interfere with the ability to ensure a speedy trial, could lead
to a dismissal of meritorious criminal charges, would endanger the
defendants' rights to a fair trial, and might impose unnecessary costs on
taxpayers if the defendants became indigent. Judge Kaplan cited fears that
defendants may be unable to pay their lawyers in further postponing the trial,
which was scheduled to begin in January 2007.
d.
A trial becomes less likely. Stein v.
KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 5/23/07). The Second Circuit vacated
the district court orders in United States v. Stein to the extent that they found
jurisdiction over the complaint against KPMG and dismissed the defendants'
complaint against KPMG.
The prejudice to KPMG in having these claims resolved in a
proceeding ancillary to a criminal prosecution in the
Southern District of New York is clear. At stake are garden
variety state law claims, albeit for large sums. KPMG
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believed that contractual disputes between it and the
appellees would be resolved by arbitration. Instead, KPMG
is faced with a federal trial of more than a dozen
individuals' multi-million dollar "implied-in-fact" contract
claims. Moreover, because such a proceeding is governed by
no express statutory authority, the district court has
indicated its intention to apply to this expedited undertaking
an ad hoc mix of the criminal and civil rules of procedure
determined on the fly, as it were....
First, "the interrelationship of the factual issues underlying
the finding of constitutional violations and the asserted
contract claims is marginal ...
Second, while the ancillary proceeding is a major
undertaking, its contribution to the efficient conclusion of
the criminal proceeding is entirely speculative ...
Third, even if there were constitutional violations and even
if KMPG is contractually obligated to advance [defendants']
attorneys' fees and costs, creating an ancillary proceeding to
enforce that obligation was not the proper remedy....
Finally, on the present record, a proceeding
ancillary to a criminal prosecution was not necessary either
to avoid perceived deficiencies in ordinary civil contract
actions to enforce the alleged advancement contracts or to
remove some barrier to the [defendant's] bringing of such
actions.
e.
Indictment against 13 KPMG defendants
dismissed because the government interfered with their Sixth
Amendment right to secure counsel which would have been available to
them absent government interference. United States v. Stein, 495 F. Supp.
2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 7/16/07). Judge Kaplan dismissed the indictment as to 13
of the 16 defendants who had been affiliated with KPMG at the time of their
alleged conduct because the U.S. Attorney's Office interfered with their
ability to receive payment of their attorneys' fees from KPMG. The
government announced its intention to appeal the dismissal of the 13
defendants, and Judge Kaplan indicated his intention to proceed with the
trial of the remaining five defendants in October 2007.
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3.
Taps for Jenkens & Gilchrist. The Justice
Department announced it would defer the prosecution of the Jenkens &
Gilchrist law firm and that the firm would shut down on 3/31/07 and also be
liable for a $76 million promoter penalty on account of the tax shelter
practice of Paul Daugerdas in its Chicago office. 2007 TNT 62-2, 3/30/07.
4.
POPS goes the COBRA; the IRS FLIPs off
Sidley Austin. IR-2007-103 (5/23/07). The IRS announced that Sidley
Austin LLP reached a settlement in which it agreed to pay $39.4 million in
penalties for promotion of abusive tax shelters and failure to comply with
tax shelter registration requirements. The firm issued tax shelter opinions
marketing BOSS, COBRA, BLIPS, COINS, FLIP, OPIS, and POPS.
5.
These "value ideas" did produce extraordinary
results for E&Y tax partners, but not the results they expected. United
States v. Coplan. Two current and two former partners of Ernst & Young all members of its VIPER8 group - were indicted on 5/30/07 in the Southern
District of New York for crimes relating to tax shelters promoted by E&Y.
The shelters included CDS ("Contingent Deferred Swap"); COBRA
("Currency Options Bring Reward Alternatives"); CDS Add-On; and PICO
("Personal Investment Corporation"). 2007 TNT 105-1.
a.
More Defendants. 2008 TNT 35-23
(2/21/2008). The indictment was expanded to add David L. Smith, Private
Capital Management, and Charles Bolton to the list of alleged coconspirators. Smith is alleged to have introduced the CDS strategy to E&Y
and to have licensed the CDS transactions to Bolton and a group of Bolton
companies who implemented the transactions.
D.

Tax Shelter Penalties, Etc.

1.
Tax-exempt organizations will be subject to tax
shelter penalties. TIPRA § 516(a) adds new § 4965 to impose an excise tax
on tax-exempt entities entering into prohibited tax shelter transactions. The
tax will be 35 percent of the greater of (a) the entity's net income or (b) 75
percent of the proceeds received by the entity that are attributable to the
transaction.

8. Value Ideas Produce Extraordinary Results.
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a.
TIPRA § 516(b) also amends § 6033(a) to
provide disclosure requirements and amends § 6652(c) to provide penalties
for nondisclosure.
b.
TIPRA § 516(b) also adds new Code
§ 6011(g), which requires a taxable party to a prohibited tax shelter
transaction to provide a disclosure statement to any tax-exempt entity which
is also a party to the transaction, indicating that the transaction is a
prohibited tax shelter transaction. A failure to make a disclosure required
under § 601 l(g) is subject to penalty under § 6707A, the penalty amounts
being equal to those imposed for other violations of § 6011 that are
penalized by § 6707A.
c.
And now the regulations. T.D. 9334,
Requirement of Return and Time for Filing, 72 F.R. 36871 (7/6/07).
Proposed and temporary regulations require the filing of Form 4720, "Return
of Certain Excise Taxes Under Chapters 41 and 42 of the Internal Revenue
Code," by exempt entities and entity managers who are liable for the § 4965
excise tax on certain tax-exempt entities and entity managers who are parties
to tax shelter transactions. The return is due on the 15th day of the 5th
month following the end of the entity's accounting period. Managers of
retirement plan entities who are subject to the excise tax are required to file
Form 5330, "Return of Excise Taxes Related to Employee Benefit Plans."
2.
Rev. Proc. 2007-21, 2007-9 I.R.B. 613 (2/26/07).
This revenue procedure provides procedures for requesting rescission of a
§ 6707A penalty and a nonexclusive list of factors that weigh in favor and
against granting rescission. Rescission must be requested in writing within
30 days after the IRS sends notice and demand for payment, or, if the
penalty (not including interest) has been paid in full prior to notice and
demand, within 30 days from the date of payment.
IX.

EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING

A.

Exempt Organizations

1.
Pension Protection Act §§ 1231-1235 amended
Code §§ 170, 508, 2055, 2522, 4943, 4958, and 6033, and added Code
§§ 4966 and 4967 to provide new rules and greater accountability for donor
advised funds and sponsoring organizations (e.g., community foundations),
which are defined in these provisions. The new provisions also provide new
requirements for supporting organizations, which are excluded from private
foundation status under Code § 509(a)(3); private foundation grants to Type
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HI supporting organizations that are not functionally integrated supporting
organizations are not "qualifying distributions" and may give rise to excise
taxes.
a.
Announcement 2006-93, 2006-48 I.R.B.
1017 (11/27/06). This announcement provides procedures that § 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt supporting organizations, described in § 509(a)(3), may use to
request a change in their public charity classification in light of the effect of
the Pension Protection Act. These changes would permit middle-aged
geriatrics to use new Code § 408(d)(8) to make tax-free distributions from
their IRAs (owned by individuals over 70 years of age) up to $100,000
directly to charities that are publicly supported under § 509(a)(1) and (2),
but not § 509(a)(3).
b.
Notice 2006-109, 2006-51 I.R.B. 1121
(12/18/06). This Notice provides interim guidance regarding the application
of requirements in the Pension Protection Act with regard to the criteria for
private foundations considering distributions to supporting organizations
that can be used to determine whether the supporting organization is a Type
I, Type II, or functionally-integrated Type III supporting organization. The
Notice also provides for relief for payments that were made pursuant to an
agreement that was binding on the organization on the 8/17/06 date of
enactment - even though the amended statute became effective for
transactions occurring after 7/25/06.
2.
This is a real sleeper! All tax-exempt
organizations will be required to file annual electronic notices. Pension
Protection Act § 1223 adds new Code § 6033(i) to require electronic filing
of an annual informational notice by all exempt organizations not currently
required to file (specifically, organizations with gross receipts under $25,000
and churches) on pain of losing tax-exempt status. This provision is effective
for years beginning in 2007.
a.
Calendar year organizations must do this
by May 15, 2008. IR-2008-25 (2/25/08). Tax-exempt organizations not
required to file Forms 990 or 990-EZ are required to file Form 990-N,
"Electronic Notice (e-Postcard) for Tax-Exempt Organizations not Required
to File Form 990- or 990-EZ" for tax years beginning in 2007. Section
6033(i) provides that organizations that do not file Form 990-N for three
consecutive years will lose their tax-exempt status.
3.
Charitable remainder trusts no longer lose
exempt status with one dollar of unrelated business taxable income. The
Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 § 424 amends Code § 664(c) to
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replace the rule that removes the tax exemption of a charitable remainder
trust for any year in which the trust has any unrelated business taxable
income. Instead, there will be a 100 percent excise tax on the UBTI of a
charitable remainder trust.
4.
Let there be light on charities' UBIT.
Organizations exempt from tax under § 501(a) are required by § 6104(d) to
make certain returns and other materials available for public inspection.
Section 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii), added by the Pension Protection Act of 2006,
requires public disclosure of returns filed relating to the unrelated business
income tax of § 511, Form 990-T.
a.
The IRS issues guidance regarding public
inspection of unrelated business income tax returns. Notice 2007-45,
2007-22 I.R.B. 1320 (5/29/07). This Notice provides interim guidance under
§ 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii). All organizations exempt under § 501(a) and described
in § 501(c)(3) are now required to make available for public inspection a
copy of their Form 990-T filed with the IRS. The Notice specifically points
out that churches and state schools and universities that are not otherwise
required to disclose returns, are required to disclose Form 990-T where they
are subject to tax under § 511. There is an exception for Form 990-T filed
solely to claim a refund of the telephone excise tax. The Notice indicates
that Treasury will propose regulations under § 6104(d) to comply with
§ 6104(d)(1)(A)(ii).
5.
CRSO v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 153 (4/30/07).
Taxpayer was denied tax exemption as a feeder organization because under
§ 502 its holding of debt financed commercial real estate subject to a triple
net lease is the conduct of a trade or business rather than the receipt of rental
income excluded from unrelated business taxable income under § 512(b)(3).
Rental income from the properties is not excluded from UBIT under
§ 512(b)(3) because the rental income is derived from debt financed property
subject to the exception of § 512(b)(4).
6.
Charities jump into the 2008 Presidential race at
their peril. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1421 (6/18/07). While a
§ 501(c)(3) exempt charity can conduct educational activities regarding
political campaigns, a § 501(c)(3) organization may not participate or
intervene directly or indirectly in a political campaign for or against a
candidate for elected office. This ruling contains 21 situations providing
guidance to locate the line between political education and campaigning.
The ruling indicates that while officials of organizations are not constrained
to speak for themselves, leaders of exempt organizations cannot make
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partisan comments in official organization publications or at official
functions of the organization.
7.
Just like the seventeen-year cicada. Rev. Proc.
2007-52, 2007-30 I.R.B. 222 (7/23/07), superseding Rev. Proc. 90-27, 19901 C.B. 514. The IRS published an update of procedures for requesting
recognition of tax-exempt status.
8.
REG-155929-06; Payout Requirements for Type IlI
Supporting Organizations That Are Not Functionally Integralgd, 72 F.R.
42335 (8/2/07). This document provides advance notice of rules that the
Treasury Department and the IRS anticipate proposing in a notice of
proposed rulemaking regarding the payout requirements for Type III
supporting organizations that are not functionally integrated, the criteria for
determining whether a Type III supporting organization is functionally
integrated, the modified requirements for Type I supporting organizations
that are organized as trusts, and the requirements regarding the type of
information a Type III supporting organization must provide to its supported
organization(s) to demonstrate that it is responsive to its supported
organization(s).
B.

Charitable Giving

1.
Being a tree-hugger is good for your tax health.
Glass v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 12/21/06), aff'g 124 T.C. 258
(5/25/05), The Tax Court held that the contribution of a perpetual
conservation easement that restricted development of certain portions of the
taxpayers' lakefront residential lot, but which did not otherwise affect the
taxpayers' use or enjoyment of the property, was a qualified conservation
contribution under § 170(h) because it protected a relatively natural habitat
of specifically identified wildlife, including bald eagles, and plants.
0 The Sixth Circuit held that the easements
prohibited any activity or use of the encumbered property that would
undermine their stated conservation purpose, and the reserved rights were
carefully limited so as to ensure that the identified plant and wildlife habitats
on the encumbered property continued to be protected.
2.
The Pension Protection Act makes the following
changes to rules governing charitable contributions:
a.
Those $20 bills placed in the collection
plate each week will no longer be deductible without a receipt. Pension
Protection Act § 1217 adds new Code § 170(f)(17) to deny deductions for
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monetary gifts unless the donor has a bank record or a receipt showing the
name of the donee organization, the date of the contribution, and the amount
of the contribution. This provision is effective in 2007.
(1)
Notice 2006-110, 2006-51 I.R.B.
1127 (12/18/06). A contribution made by payroll deduction can be
substantiated by: (1) a pay stub, Form W-2, or other document furnished by
the employer that sets forth the amount withheld during a taxable year by the
employer for the purpose of payment to a donee organization, together with
(2) a pledge card or other document prepared by or at the direction of the
donee organization that shows the name of the donee organization.
b.
Pension Protection Act § 1219 adds new
Code §§ 170(f)(l 1)(E) and 6695A and amends Code §§ 6662, 6664 and
6696 to provide more oversight of appraisers, as well as impose stricter
penalties on both appraisers and taxpayers.
(1)
Notice 2006-96, 2006-46 I.R.B. 902
(11/13/06). This Notice provides transitional guidance relating to the new
definitions of "qualified appraisal" and "qualified appraiser" in
§§ 170(f)(l 1)(E) and 6695A regarding substantial or gross valuation
misstatements, as added by § 1219 of the Pension Protection Act of 2006.
C.
Section 170(b)(1)(E), enacted in the
Pension Protection Act, expands the limitations for contributions of
qualified conservation easements.
(1)
Greener got better. Questions
answered regarding contributions of conservation easements. Notice
2007-50, 2007-25 I.R.B. 1430 (6/18/07). Normally the value of contributions
of capital gain property is limited to 30 percent of the taxpayer's adjusted
gross income. After 2005 and before 2008, charitable contribution
deductions of the value of contributed qualified conservation easements are
available to the extent of the excess of 50 percent of adjusted gross income
over otherwise allowable charitable contribution deductions. The excess
contribution may be carried forward fifteen years. With respect to qualified
farmers, the contribution limit is 100 percent of AGI. The Notice explains
the application of these limitations.
3.
Charitable contributions for donated clothing
were reduced from the claimed $49,000 to $9,000 because she
overestimated the value of the gently-worn designer clothing she
contributed. Stamoulis v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2007-38
(3/8/07). A Goldman Sachs investment banker with an AGI under $115,000
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claimed a $55,764 charitable contribution deduction on her 2002 federal
income tax return. The Tax Court (Special Trial Judge Carluzzo) reduced the
amount claimed for contributions of designer clothing from $49,000 to
$9,000 but did not impose the negligence penalty for her overstatement of
the fair market values of the donated property, because the determination of
the fair market value of personal items is "less than an exact science."
.
In relation to the values claimed by Bill
Clinton for his used underwear, Ms. Stamoulis was conservative. Compare the
size of the deduction Monica might have received had she donated her blue
dress with white polka dots.
4.
One of Timothy McVeigh's lawyers loses again,
but the consequences are not as severe this time. Jones v. Commissioner,
129 T.C. 1466 (11/1/07). Sherrel Jones, one of Timothy McVeigh's lawyers
in the criminal proceeding stemming from the Oklahoma City Federal
Building bombing, donated to the University of Texas copies of documents
received by him from the government in the course of his representation of
Timothy McVeigh and claimed a charitable contribution deduction for the
appraised value. Judge Cohen upheld the IRS's disallowance of any
deduction on the ground that under the relevant state law (Oklahoma), the
materials were not attorney work product and not being attorney work
product, the client, not the lawyer, was the owner of the materials in the case
file. Because the taxpayer "was not the legal owner of the materials, he was
not legally capable of divesting himself of the burdens and benefits of
ownership or effecting a valid gift of the materials." Alternatively, even if
the material in the file was attorney work product, by virtue of § 1221(a)(3)
it was an ordinary income asset, and thus under § 170(e)(1)(A) the deduction
was limited to basis, which was zero.
X.

TAX PROCEDURE

A.

Interest, Penalties and Prosecutions

1.
"Too good to be true?" Common frivolous
positions that can result in frivolous return penalties, § 6662 penalties,
or civil fraud penalties. Rev. Rul. 2007-19, 2007-14 I.R.B. 843 (4/2/07)
(claiming that wages are not taxable income); Rev. Rul. 2007-20, 2007-14
I.R.B. 863 (4/2/07) (claiming that complying with the internal revenue laws
is voluntary and that taxpayers are not legally required to file federal tax
returns or pay federal tax because the filing of a tax return or the payment of
tax is a matter of choice); Rev. Rul. 2007-21, 2007-14 I.R.B 865 (4/2/07)
(claiming that before the IRS may collect overdue taxes, it must provide
taxpayer with a summary record of assessment made on a Form 23C,
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Assessment Certificate-Summary Record of Assessments, or on another
particular form); Rev. Rul. 2007-22, 2007-14 I.R.B 866 (4/2/07) (claims by
taxpayers that they are not subject to federal income tax, or that their income
is excluded from taxation, because either (1) they claim to have rejected or
renounced United States citizenship and are citizens exclusively of a state
(sometimes characterized as a "natural-born citizen" of a "sovereign state"),
or (2) they are not persons as identified by the Internal Revenue Code).
a.
Notice 2007-30, 2007-14
(4/2/07) (updating list of frivolous return positions).

I.R.B.
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2.
What is a qualified amended return, and what
can it do for the taxpayer submitting it? T.D. 9309, Qualified Amended
Returns, 72 F.R. 902 (1/9/07). Reg. § 1.6664-2(c) provides that the amount
reported on a "qualified amended return" will be treated as an amount shown
as tax on the taxpayer's return for purposes of determining whether there is
an underpayment of tax subject to an accuracy-related penalty. Generally
speaking, a return is not a "qualified amended return" if it is filed (1) after
the IRS has served a John Doe summons on a third-party with respect to the
taxpayer's tax liability; (2) for a taxpayer who has claimed tax benefits from
undisclosed listed transactions, after the IRS requests information related to
the transaction that is required to be included on a list under § 6112 from
any person who made a tax statement to or for the benefit of the taxpayer, or
any person who gave material aid, assistance, or advice to the taxpayer; or
(3) after the date on which published guidance is issued announcing a
settlement initiative for a listed transaction in which penalties, in whole or in
part, are compromised or waived.
3.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006
§ 407 modifies the Code § 6702 penalty for frivolous tax submissions by
increasing the amount of the penalty from $500 to $5,000 and by applying it
to all taxpayers and to all types of federal taxes. The submissions to which
the provision applies are requests for a collection due process hearing,
installment agreements, offers-in-compromise, and taxpayer assistance
orders. The provision permits the IRS to disregard such requests, and to
impose a penalty of up to $5,000 for such requests, unless the taxpayer
withdraws the request after being given an opportunity to do so.
4.
The continuing troubles of Marion Barry. United
States v. Barry, 477 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D. D.C. 3/12/07). A magistrate denied
the Government's motion to revoke the probation of Marion Barry on the
grounds that Mr. Barry failed to file Federal and District of Columbia tax
returns while on probation pursuant to a plea agreement to two counts of
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failure to file returns. The magistrate ruled that under the rules of the court,
the court would entertain a motion to revoke probation only on the request of
the Probation Office, which was not involved in the proceeding. Mr. Barry
also represented through counsel that the returns had been filed.
a.
But the District Court Chief Judge
disagrees. He reverses and remands, so go to jail--maybe. United States
v. Barry, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2484 (D. D.C. 4/26/07). Notwithstanding that
the "long standing practice" of the court is to schedule probation revocation
hearings only on motion of the probation office, Chief Judge I6gan ruled
that neither the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Local Criminal
Rules indicate who is empowered to move for probation revocation
proceedings. He reversed the magistrate's dismissal of the revocation motion
and remanded the case for a decision on the merits.
5.
Death and taxes are a certainty. Abusive shelter
penalties survive the death of the promoter! Reiserer v. United States,
479 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 3/20/07). A tax shelter promoter and his law firm
promoted an abusive tax arrangement known as offshore employee leasing.
The promoter died after the IRS had issued a summons to the promoter's and
law firm's bank as part of an investigation into whether penalties should be
imposed on the promoter. The Ninth Circuit held that liability for a § 6700
penalty for promoting abusive tax shelters and for a § 6701 penalty for
aiding and abetting the understatement of tax liability would survive the
death of the attorney against whom the penalties are sought to be imposed
because those penalties are civil, not criminal. On another issue, the
attorney-client privilege did not protect the identity of clients of the attorney
under investigation for promoting abusive tax shelters and aiding and
abetting understatement of tax liability because revealing the clients'
identities would not disclose communications between the attorney and
clients. In addition, a subpoena on a bank to produce all checks deposited
and drawn on the attorney's trust account was enforced. The tax shelters
involved were offshore employee leasing arrangements.
6.
Criminal conviction reversed and remanded:
The trial court should have let the defendant testify about consulting tax
experts. United States v. Moran, 493 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 7/6/07), amending
and superseding 482 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 4/2/07). Pamela and James Moran
were convicted, among other things, of conspiracy to defraud the United
States, as well as aiding and assisting - don't you love legal redundancies?
- in the preparation and filing of false federal income tax returns. The
Morans were the "Executive Education Officers" who trained the sales force
of Anderson's Ark and Associates. The company offered several forms of
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tax reduction plans that generally involved shifting funds through Costa Rica
entities and not paying taxes. The trial court sustained the government's
hearsay objection to Mrs. Moran's testimony regarding advice she had
received from a CPA and testimony regarding legal opinions she received
about the tax program. The testimony was offered not for the truth of what
was told to Mrs. Moran, but as evidence of her good faith reliance on the
advice of experts as a defense against the willfulness of her actions, and was,
therefore, not hearsay. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the error was not
harmless error. The court rejected defendants' claims that the trial court
erred in alidwing expert testimony that the marketed transactions were
shams, by giving an improper Pinkerton instruction to the jury, i.e., each
member of a conspiracy may be convicted of a crime committed by another
member, and by admitting computer records of a co-conspirator as
statements.
7.
A unanimous Supreme Court resolves another
pressing tax issue because the Circuits disagreed over who has authority
to abate interest. Hinck v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2011 (5/21/07). Section
6404(e)(1) permits the Commissioner to abate interest on a deficiency
attributable to unreasonable error by the IRS. Section 6404(h) provides that
the Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine whether failure to abate interest
was an abuse of discretion. (Relief is not available to taxpayers whose net
worth exceeds $2 million or who own a business worth in excess of $7
million. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii).) The Supreme Court held that § 6404(h) grants
exclusive jurisdiction over interest abatement to the Tax Court. The District
Courts and Court of Federal Claims do not have jurisdiction to review
interest abatement claims under their general jurisdiction over refund claims.
The decision affirms the Federal Circuit's holding in the case, which
conflicted with the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Beall v. United States, 336 F.3d
419 (2003).
8.
The standard for preparer penalties is
broadened to include preparers of all tax returns, and is heightened
from "realistic possibility of success" to "more likely than not." The
2007 Act, § 8246, amends Code §§ 6694 and 7701 to expand the
applicability of the § 6694 return preparer penalties from "income tax return
preparers" to all tax return preparers. It also heightens the standards of
conduct to avoid the imposition of the return preparer penalty for
undisclosed positions with a requirement that there be a reasonable belief
that the tax treatment of the position was "more likely than not" the proper
treatment. For disclosed positions, the standard is increased from "nonfrivolous" to "reasonable basis." Penalty amounts are increased from $250 to
the greater of $1,000 or 50 percent of the income to be derived by the
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preparer under § 6694(a), and from $1,000 to the greater of $5,000 or 50
percent of the income to be derived by the preparer under § 6694(b). These
changes are effective for tax returns prepared after 5/25/07.
a.
But practitioners will be given a pass
under the new rules for the rest of 2007. IR-2007-115 and Notice 2007-54,
2007-27 I.R.B. 12 (7/2/07). This Notice provides transitional relief for all
returns, amended returns and refund claims due on or before 12/31/07, to
estimated tax returns due on or before 1/15/08, and to employment and
excise tax returns due on or before 1/31/08. The transitional relief is that the
standards set forth under previous law and current regulations will be
applied in determining whether the IRS will impose penalties under
§ 6694(a), but the transitional relief is not available for penalties under
§ 6694(b), which applies to return preparers who exhibit "willful or reckless
conduct."
b.
Placeholder proposed Circular 230
regulations. REG-138637-07, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
Internal Revenue Service, 72 F.R. 54621 (9/26/07). The Treasury
Department has published proposed amendments to the Circular 230
standards of practice, § 10.34, to conform with the § 6694 provisions in the
2007 Act. Deborah Butler, IRS Associate Chief Counsel (Procedure and
Administration), has stated that the proposed regulation contains merely
"placeholder language," and that the government will first get out § 6694
guidance before considering whether the historical linkage between § 6694
and Circular 230 remains appropriate.
c.
Three
12/31/07 clarified Notice 2007-54.

subsequent

notices

released

on

(1)
Notice 2008-11, 2008-3 I.R.B. 279
(1/22/08). This Notice provides that advice given before 1/1/08 by
nonsigning preparers will be governed by standards under former § 6694.
(2)
Notice 2008-12, 2008-3 I.R.B. 280
(1/22/08). This Notice specifies which returns require a preparer signature
and which returns do not.
(3)
A notice temporarily relaxes the
requirements on practitioners, but it is puzzling in places and is not a
free pass. Notice 2008-13, 2008-3 I.R.B. 282 (1/22/08). This Notice
provides interim guidance on the application of the tax return preparer
penalties as amended by the 2007 Act. These amendments did not modify
the exception to liability under § 6694 that is applicable when it is shown,
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considering all the facts and circumstances, that the tax return preparer has
acted in good faith and there is reasonable cause for the understatement.
* The Notice provides that a tax return
preparer is considered reasonably to believe that the tax treatment of an item is
more likely than not the proper tax treatment (without taking into account the
possibility that the tax return will not be audited, that an issue will not be
raised on audit, or that an issue will be settled) if the tax return preparer
analyzes the pertinent facts and authorities in the manner described in Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) and, in reliance upon that analysis, reasonably concludes
in good faith that there is a greater than 50 percent likelihood that the tax
treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS.
0 It further provides that a tax return
preparer may rely in good faith without verification upon information
furnished by the taxpayer, as provided in Reg. § 1.6694-1(e). In addition, a tax
return preparer may rely in good faith and without verification upon
information furnished by another advisor, tax return preparer, or other third
party. A tax return preparer will be found to have acted in good faith when the
tax return preparer relied on the advice of a third party who is not in the same
firm as the tax return preparer and who the tax return preparer had reason to
believe was competent to render the advice.
0 A signing tax return preparer shall be
deemed to meet the requirements of § 6694 with respect to a position for
which there is a reasonable basis but for which the tax return preparer does not
have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely than not be
sustained on the merits, if the tax return preparer meets any of the following
requirements:
1. The position is disclosed in accordance with § 1.6662-4(f)
(which permits disclosure on a properly completed and filed
Form 8275, Disclosure Statement, or Form 8275-R,
Regulation Disclosure Statement, as appropriate, or on the
tax return in accordance with the annual revenue procedure
described in § 1.6662-4(f)(2));
2. If the position would not meet the standard for the
taxpayer to avoid a penalty under section 6662(d)(2)(B)
without disclosure, the tax return preparer provides the
taxpayer with the prepared tax return that includes the
disclosure in accordance with § 1.6662-4(f);
3. If the position would otherwise meet the requirement for
nondisclosure under section 6662(d)(2)(B)(i), the tax return
preparer advises the taxpayer of the difference between the
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penalty standards applicable to the taxpayer under section
6662 and the penalty standards applicable to the tax return
preparer under section 6694, and contemporaneously
documents in the tax return preparer's files that this advice
was provided; or
4. If section 6662(d)(2)(B) does not apply because the
position may be described in section 6662(d)(2)(C), the tax
return preparer advises the taxpayer of the penalty standards
applicable to the taxpayer under section 6662(d)(2)(C) and
the difference, if any, between these standards and the
standards under section 6694, and contemporaneously
documents in the tax return preparer's files that this advice
was provided.
0 A nonsigning tax return preparer shall
be deemed to meet the requirements of § 6694 with respect to a position for
which there is a reasonable basis but for which the nonsigning tax return
preparer does not have a reasonable belief that the position would more likely
than not be sustained on the merits, if the advice to the taxpayer includes a
statement informing the taxpayer of any opportunity to avoid penalties under
§ 6662 that could apply to the position as a result of disclosure, if relevant, and
of the requirements for disclosure
* One of the examples has raised a good
bit of interest.
Example 10. A corporate taxpayer hires Accountant J to
prepare its tax return. Accountant J encounters an issue
regarding various small asset expenditures. Accountant J
researches the issue and concludes that there is a reasonable
basis for a particular treatment of the issue. Accountant J
cannot, however, reach a reasonable belief whether the
position would more likely than not be sustained on the
merits because it was impossible to make a precise
quantification regarding whether the position would more
likely than not be sustained on the merits. The position is
not disclosed on the tax return. Accountant J signs the tax
return as the tax return preparer. The IRS later disagrees
with this position taken on the tax return. Accountant J is
not subject to a penalty under section 6694.
* Anita Soucy, spokesperson for the
Treasury Office of Tax Policy explained at a New York State Bar Association
meeting that Example 10 should not be relied on because it is a sympathetic
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case with mitigating circumstances. Deborah Butler echoed that statement at
the same meeting, saying: "The rules aren't in the examples," and "Don't
overdiagnose the examples. They're not going to be there in a year." 2008
TNT 24-8.
It is important to note that the regulations
expected to be finalized in 2008 may be substantially different from the rules
described in this Notice, and in some cases more stringent.
9.
A new penalty is imposed upon refund claims
made without a "reasonable basis." The 2007 Act, § 8247(a), adds new
Code § 6676 to impose a penalty of 20 percent of the "excessive amount" on
the person making an erroneous claim for refund or credit unless it is shown
that "the claim for such excessive amount has a reasonable basis." The
penalty does not apply to claims relating to the § 32 earned income credit.
The penalty applies to claims made after the 5/25/07 effective date of the
2007 Act.
10.
In this case, the result of any amount multiplied
by zero is greater than 400 percent of zero. McDonough v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-101 (4/25/07). If the taxpayer claims cost recovery
allowances with respect to property to which he never received the benefits
and burdens of ownership or with respect to property that never existed, the
correct basis is zero. Pursuant to Reg. § 1.6662-5(g), the basis claimed on
his return is considered to be 400 percent or more of the correct amount, and
the enhanced accuracy related penalty (40 percent of the tax deficiency) for
gross valuation misstatements under § 6662(h) applies.
When valuation storms became threatening, the
11.
estate sought an Anchorage "in a remote location." Should it be
penalized for doing so? Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 499 F.3d
129 (2d Cir. 8/23/07), vacating and remanding T.C. Memo. 2004-174. At
her death in 1998, decedent owned about 20 percent of a closely held
company that produced business-to-business industrial and manufacturing
directories and publications. However, the advent of the internet caused the
profitability of the business to decline sharply from 2000 to barely breakeven in 2002. The IRS valued decedent's interest in the company at $32
million, the estate valued it at $1.75 million, and the Tax Court (Judge
Swift) valued it at $13.5 million. However, even though the claimed
valuation was less than 150 percent of the value determined by the Tax
Court, it declined to impose the § 6662(a) substantial undervaluation penalty
of 40 percent of the underpayment because the valuation "was particularly
difficult and unique" and the Court's own valuation was "closer to the
estate's valuation than to [the Commissioner's] valuation."
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The Second Circuit held that this did not
constitute a sufficient finding to support a determination that the § 6664(c)
reasonable cause and good faith exception to the penalty applied. Chief Judge
Jacobs questioned the estate's decision to hire a lawyer and accountant to
perform the appraisal from the "remote location" of Anchorage, Alaska in
order to achieve a more favorable valuation from the IRS office in Alaska than
would be available from the IRS office in New York. The lawyer was
experienced but conflicted because he was also appointed to act as
administrator of the estate to handle the anticipated IRS audit, and the
accountant who helped the lawyer with the appraisal "belong[ed] to no
professional organizations or associations relating to his appraisal or valuation
work."
.

12.
You do the crime, you do time! One year in a
half-way house, five years probation, and a $10,000 fine is too lenient.
United States v. Taylor, 499 F.3d 94 (1st Cir. 8/17/07). In an opinion by
Judge Torruella, the First Circuit vacated a tax return preparer's sentence of
one year in a half-way house, five years probation and a $10,000 fine as
unreasonably lenient, and remanded the case for resentencing. The tax return
preparer, who was a full time school teacher and part time return preparer,
was convicted on sixteen counts of aiding and abetting the filing of false
returns, resulting from false claims of charitable contributions in amounts
ranging from $9,000 to $16,000, about which he advised his clients to lie to
IRS agents. The court noted, that the "offense ... is a serious crime ... at it's
heart, it is theft, specifically theft of money to which the public is entitled,"
and that "the tax fraud committed here was not part of an indigent's effort to
avoid personal tax liability, but rather, the supplemental business of a
moderately successful man who misled his clients."
a.
Then again, maybe you don't have to do
time for a tax crime. Taylor v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 878 (1/7/2008).
The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the First
Circuit Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), which held that there is no rule that requires
"extraordinary" circumstances to justify sentence outside Guidelines range.
13.
Dkjk vu. United States v. Carlson, 498 F.3d 761
(8th Cir. 8/20/07). A non-prison sentence for a conviction (pursuant to a
guilty plea) under § 7202 for willful failure to pay over trust fund taxes was
vacated as too unreasonably lenient under the sentencing guidelines. The
case was remanded for resentencing.
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Is it a menage A trois?. United States v. Tomko,
14.
8/20/07). A sentence of one year of home
Cir.
(3d
157
498 F.3d
confinement, "the very mansion built through the fraudulent tax evasion
scheme at issue," a $250,000 fine, three years probation, and 250 hours of
community service for evading taxes of $228,557, was vacated as
unreasonably lenient. The case was remanded for resentencing.
But the court has second thoughts about
a.
and opinion vacated, 513 F.3d 360 (3d
granted
Rehearing
jailing tax cheats.
Cir. 1/17/08).
Even if Yaweh might oppose war and taxes that
15.
fund it, it's still criminal tax fraud to fail to render unto Caesar. United
States v. McKee, 506 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 10/29/07). The Third Circuit
(ironically, Judge McKee) upheld the conviction under § 7201 for tax
evasion by two partners who failed to withhold and pay over income taxes
and employment taxes with respect to employees, who like the partners,
were members of the Reformed Israel of Yaweh (RIY), a small religious sect
that opposes payment of taxes based upon the members' religious opposition
to war and the taxes that fund it. One partner (Donato) and his wife (Inge
Donato), who was the partnership's bookkeeper, signed the fraudulent
Forms 941, and one or both partners distributed the "untaxed" paychecks to
employees who were RIY members and "taxed" paychecks to employees
who were not RIY members. When providing the partnership's payroll
records to accountants for preparation of Forms 941, Inge Donato omitted
payroll information for the employees who were members of RIY. For
purposes of § 7201, the overt acts of the Donatos on behalf of the
partnership were imputed to McKee because he shared the obligation of
filing and paying employment taxes on behalf of the partnership.
Furthermore, "even if [the defendants'] failure to accurately report the total
wages subject to employment taxes was motivated by their desire to respect
their employees' religious convictions, that 'innocent' motive does not
exempt Defendants from their obligation to deduct federal taxes and
accurately report the wages subject to that tax, particularly since the
cornerstone of the tax system is voluntary self-reporting."
B.

Discovery: Summonses and FOIA

Honi soit qui mal y pense. United States v. BDO
1.
Seidman, LLP, 95 A.F.T.R.2d 2005-1725 (N.D. Ill. 3/30/05). The district
court ruled that only one of 267 documents withheld from IRS scrutiny by
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the intervenors was not protected by privilege or work product, or both. 9 In
ruling that the crime-fraud exception did not apply, Judge Holderman found
that neither the existence of cookie-cutter tax opinions nor the IRS listing of
substantially similar transactions as abusive tax shelters was determinative
because "the tax code and underlying regulations is [sic] full of complexities
and uncertainties." He further stated that "just because one of BDO's
consulting agreements has been found to have [been] fraudulent does not
mean that all consulting agreements entered into by BDO were fraudulent."
* Judge Holderman found the test for the
§ 7525(b) tax shelter exception to be the same as for the crime-fraud
exception.
* Footnote 2 of the opinion sets forth the
categories of information contained in the privilege log. Inasmuch as the
adequacy of another privilege log in this litigation was questioned, the
categories in this privilege log might be a useful guide.
a.
The attorney-client privilege does not
attach to communications relating to planning to commit tax fraud. 95
A.F.T.R.2d 2005-2835 (N.D. I11. 5/17/05). Subsequently, Judge Holderman
found that there was a prima facie case for the remaining document
examined in camera not being privileged by reason of the crime-fraud
exception, and the intervenors failed to present sufficient explanation to
rebut that presumption. The document involved an investment in distressed
debt with the sole motive of obtaining a loss for tax purposes.
0 The government had argued that
"document A-40 is not part of legitimate year-end tax planning, but instead is
part of the overall abusive sham tax shelter transaction perpetrated by BDO
and invested in by Intervenor Cullio and others."
* Judge Holderman refused to quash the
summons seeking production of document A-40, which he held related to an
"abusive sham tax shelter investment," because the IRS made a primafacie
case that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege applied and
taxpayer failed to provide a satisfactory explanation of why the document
should not be disclosed under the crime-fraud exception; there were eight
indicators of potential fraud: (1) the marketing of pre-packaged transactions by
BDO; (2) the communication by the taxpayer to BDO with the purpose of
engaging in a pre-arranged transaction developed by BDO or a third party with
the sole purpose of reducing taxable income; (3) BDO and/or the taxpayer
attempting to conceal the true nature of the transaction; (4) actual or
constructive knowledge by BDO that the taxpayers lacked a legitimate
business purpose for entering into the transaction; (5) vaguely worded
9. The unprotected document was an e-mail sent by a BDO employee.
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consulting agreements; (6) failure by BDO to provide services under the
consulting agreement despite receipt of payment; (7) mention of a particular
tax shelter that had been identified by the IRS as a "listed transaction;" and (8)
use of boiler-plate documents.
On appeal of Judge Holderman's
b.
decisions to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Ripple did not make waves but
simply decided in favor of the government. He affirmed in part and
vacated and remanded in part. United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492
F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 7/2/07). The Seventh Circuit (Judge Ripple) affirmed that
document A-40 was unprotected by privilege because it fell within the fraudcrime exception. Judge Ripple rejected the IRS's position that the party
asserting the § 7525 privilege must establish that the communication was not
made in connection with the promotion of a tax shelter, and has held that the
opponent of the IRS bears the burden of establishing that the communication
falls within the § 7525(b) exception.
0 He vacated the decision that 266
documents fell within a valid claim of privilege and remanded with respect to
these documents so that the IRS could have the opportunity to show that the
§ 7525(b) tax shelter exception to the tax practitioner privilege applied.
If the valuation is fraudulent, the crime-fraud
2.
exception to the attorney-client privilege will sting! Shahinian v. Tankian,
242 F.R.D. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 5/7/07). In a civil suit involving an estate
regarding the ownership, transfer by gift or sale, and valuation of paintings
by an artist, the court (Judge Castel) applied the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege to allow discovery of communications between the
legatees and executors of two estates (and a friend of the legatees /
executors) and Weil, Gotshal & Manges, the law firm for the estates. The
exception applied because the communications related to the fraudulent
valuation and omission of art works on income tax and estate tax returns,
and other statements made to the IRS. The record contained a relevant estate
tax return, written statements made to the IRS in the course of an audit of
that return, relevant income tax returns, and applications for extensions of
time to pay certain taxes, as well as excerpts from the depositions of several
witnesses and "documentary evidence demonstrating material variances
between the statements made to the IRS and the actual facts." The court
concluded that "comparing the estate and income tax returns and other
communications with the IRS with the information collaterally developed in
discovery ... cast significant doubt on the truthfulness of the statements made
to the IRS, and the circumstances are sufficient to support the conclusion
that communications ... were intended to facilitate the crime or fraud."
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3.
Warm up the photocopier for those tax accrual
workpapers. Announcement 2002-63, 2002-27 I.R.B. 72 (7/8/02). In
auditing returns filed after 7/1/02 that claim any tax benefits from a "listed
transaction," see Notice 2001-51, 2001-34 I.R.B. 190, the IRS may request
tax accrual workpapers. Listed transactions will be determined "at the time
of the request." Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the § 7525 tax
practitioner privilege protects the confidentiality of the workpapers.
a.
Specific procedures regarding requests
for tax accrual workpapers. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-012 (4/9/03).
This Notice provides procedures to be used regarding requests for tax
accrual and other financial audit workpapers.
b.
The
definition
of
"tax
accrual
workpapers" is clarified. Chief Counsel Notice CC-2004-010 (1/22/04),
supplementing CC-2003-012. The general definition is as follows:
Tax accrual workpapers are those audit workpapers, whether
prepared by the taxpayer or by an independent accountant,
relating to the tax reserve for current, deferred and potential
or contingent tax liabilities, however classified or reported
on audited financial statements, and to footnotes disclosing
those tax liabilities on audited financial statements. They
reflect an estimate of a company's tax liabilities and may
also be referred to as the tax pool analysis, tax liability
contingency analysis, tax cushion analysis, or tax
contingency reserve analysis.
* Documents created prior to or outside
of the consideration of whether reserves should be created are not within the
definition of tax accrual workpapers nor are workpapers reconciling book
and tax income, but they both "likely fall within the scope of the general
IDRs issued at the beginning of an examination and should be produced ...
even though no request for the tax accrual workpapers has been made."
c.
The
government
seeks
summons
enforcement for Textron's tax accrual workpapers. United States v.
Textron, Inc., 2006 TNT 84-19 (D. R.I. 4/28/06). In its supporting brief,
2006 TNT 84-4, the government argued that all tax accrual workpapers
should be disclosed because Textron engaged in several listed transactions,
specifically, six separate sale-in, lease-out ("SILO") transactions in 2001,
which were designated as listed transactions in Notice 2005-13, 2005-9
I.R.B. 630.
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United States v. Arthur Young & Co.,
465 U.S. 805 (1984), which held that tax accrual workpapers to be available to
the government because they were relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry, is
strongly supportive of the government's position. Taxpayer may rely upon the
work product doctrine for protection because the tax accrual workpapers
clearly are not covered by the attorney-client privilege.
0

d.
The work product doctrine works in the
Sixth Circuit. United States v. Roxworthy (Yum! Brands, Inc.), 457 F.3d
590 (6th Cir. 8/10/06). In response to an IRS informal document request,
Yum claimed that seven documents were protected by the work product
doctrine. It turned over five of the documents under a limitation of waiver
agreement but refused to turn over the remaining two documents, which
were memoranda both dated 3/29/00 prepared by KPMG that analyzed the
tax consequences of stock transfers made in connection with the creation of
a captive insurance company, which involved a loss of $112 million for tax
purposes, but not book purposes. On summons enforcement (against Yum's
vice president, tax] the magistrate and district court ordered the documents
produced, but the Sixth Circuit (Judge Cole) held that the two memoranda
were protected work product because they were prepared in anticipation of
litigation and included "possible arguments that the IRS could mount against
Yum's chosen tax treatment of the transactions and possible counterarguments."
* The court stated:
[I]n United States v. Adiman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1496 (2d Cir.
1995) (Adiman 1), an accounting firm prepared documents
evaluating the tax consequences and likely IRS challenges to
a company's proposed reorganization in which the company
would claim a capital loss of $ 290 million. The Second
Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding that
the prospect of litigation was too remote for work-product
privilege to apply, observing that "[i]n many instances, the
expected litigation is quite concrete, notwithstanding that
the events giving rise to it have not yet occurred." Id. at
1501. The court remanded the matter for the district court to
apply the proper standard.
* The standard test to be used to establish
whether documents were prepared "in anticipation of litigation" is the question
of whether the "documents can be said to have been created because of the
prospect of litigation" (the "because of' test) - as opposed to whether they
would have been prepared in substantially the same form in the absence of
prospective litigation. In applying the test, the court is to ask: "(1) whether a
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document was created because of a party's subjective anticipation of litigation,
as contrasted with an ordinary business purpose, and (2) whether that
subjective anticipation of litigation was objectively reasonable."
* The court noted that the reason for the
requesting party to seek such documents is usually to see the "[tax
professionals'] assessment of the [transaction's] legal vulnerabilities in order
to make sure it does not miss anything in crafting its legal case," which it
noted was precisely the type of discovery protected by the work product
doctrine.
* The court rejected the IRS argument that
the memoranda were not prepared in anticipation of litigation, but "were more
likely prepared to assist Yum in the preparation of its taxes and the avoidance
of understatement penalties if the IRS disagreed with Yum's tax treatment...."
* The court finally held that the fact that
the memoranda bore an attorney-client privilege designation, not a work
product designation, should not alone settle the inquiry as to whether they
were prepared in anticipation of litigation.
(1)
AOD 2007-04 (10/1/07). The IRS
announced its nonacquiescence in United States v. Roxworthy, 457 F.3d 590
(6th Cir. 2006). The IRS took the position that a document prepared in
anticipation of its annual audit by a CPA firm is not "prepared in
anticipation of litigation," and that, afortiorari,tax opinion letters prepared
by KPMG to provide advice "with respect to the tax implications of forming
a captive insurance company" prior to the formation of that company and
provided by Yum! Brands to its CPA during its annual audit were not
protected by the work product doctrine. The IRS further announced that it
will challenge "unjustified assertions of the work product doctrine (and
other privileges) in all appropriate cases, including those that would be
appealable to the Sixth Circuit."
e.
District Court finds tax accrual
workpapers protected by the "work product privilege" and denies the
IRS petition for summons enforcement. United States v. Textron Inc., 507
F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. R.I. 8/28/07). Textron engaged in six SILO transactions
in 2001 before these became listed transactions in 2005. Under IRS
procedures, engaging in more than one listed transaction means that the IRS
will request the entire tax accrual workpapers file. Textron produced
documents with respect to the SILO transactions but refused to turn over its
entire workpaper file. Judge Torres held that the tax accrual workpapers
were prepared "because of" anticipated litigation with the IRS. He refused to
follow contrary authority from the Fifth Circuit in United States v. The El
Paso Company, 682 F.2d 530 (1982), which used the more stringent primary
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purpose test for determining whether documents are prepared "in
anticipation of litigation." He also held that work product protection was not
lost when the tax accrual workpapers were provided to Ernst & Young for its
audit of the company because the AICPA Code § 301 on confidential client
information made it very unlikely that the accounting firm would provide
them to the IRS.
4.
The government also has privileges. Deseret
Management Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 88 (3/29/07). After the
court's in camera review, taxpayer's motion to discover certain documents
was denied on the basis of the attorney-client privilege applicable to
communication among Justice Department lawyers, IRS lawyers, and IRS
employees. Also, documents prepared in anticipation of litigation were
protected from disclosure as work product.
a.
Work product privilege applies to IRS
Chief Counsel's work too! Ratke v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 45 (9/05/07).
After the taxpayer substantially prevailed of the merits of an asserted
deficiency, the taxpayer sought attorney's fees. In the attorney's fees
proceeding, the taxpayer sought discovery of a memorandum sent by the IRS
Chief Counsel's trial counsel to the national office at the time the
Commissioner's answer was filed in the case, and an unredacted version of
the responding memorandum sent a few months later by IRS Chief
Counsel's national office were protected by the work product doctrine from
discovery by taxpayer's counsel. A redacted version of the latter
memorandum, which contained fact-based work product, but not opinion
based work product, had been provided to taxpayer's counsel. The Tax
Court (Judge Chabot) held that the memoranda were protected from
discovery under the opinion work product doctrine. The IRS's reference, in
its brief in opposition to the taxpayer's motion for attorney's fees, to a
pretrial exchange of memoranda between the IRS trial counsel and the IRS
national office, did waive the work product privilege, because the reference
in the brief was in the course of reciting the sequence of events leading to
disclosure of redacted versions of memoranda, and was not testimonial in
nature, i.e. it was not intended to show that IRS's position in case was
substantially justified. Neither of the memoranda, both of which were
examined in camera, contained information sufficiently important to
outweigh the privacy and other concerns underlying the work product
doctrine. The redacted version of the response memorandum and the IRS's
summary of the unredacted version, which was provided to the taxpayer,
together provided a fair representation of the legal strategies and opinions in
the unredacted version memorandum. Because the taxpayer was given a fair
representation of the unredacted legal strategies and opinions, and the
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redacted portions would not impact the outcome of the motion for attorney's
fees, the taxpayer did not have a compelling need to discover the opinion
work product.
5.
Snider v. United States, 468 F.3d 500 (8th Cir.
11/8/06). The court held that a CID agent's disclosures to third-party
witnesses that included taxpayers' identities and a statement that the
taxpayers were the subjects of grand jury investigation, were unauthorized
disclosures under § 6103, and that the disclosures were neither necessary nor
the result of good faith interpretation of § 6013 under § 7431. Each
disclosure of each item of information to each person who heard disclosure
counted as an "act" in calculating the $1,000 per act.
a.
AOD 2007-03 (7/23/07). The IRS has
nonacquiesced in Snider v. United States. The IRS considers it necessary to
disclose the name of the taxpayer being investigated to efficiently interview
third-party witnesses. The IRS will continue to litigate the position that
neither the number of return items nor the number of people witnessing
disclosure is a "legally significant factor."
6.
Tax Analysts continues successfully to be
"respectfully disagreeable" with the IRS on disclosure issues. Tax
Analysts v. Internal Revenue Service, 495 F.3d 676 (D.C. Cir. 7/24/07). The
court (Judge Henderson) affirmed a district court order, 416 F. Supp. 2d 119
(D. D.C. 2/27/06), granting summary judgment for Tax Analysts in its suit
under § 6110 seeking disclosure of e-mails from lawyers in the IRS Chief
Counsel's Office to field personnel containing legal advice. The request
dealt with "all written legal advice documents, whether or not styled CCA,
prepared by National Office components of OCC for the field, and which
have been withheld from public disclosure on the ground that such written
advice 'can be rendered in less than two hours,' or that such documents 'can
be prepared in less than two hours."' Judge Henderson held that e-mails
clearly fell under the § 611 0(i)(1)(A) definition of Chief Counsel Advice
(CCA), as "written advice or instruction, under whatever name or
designation, prepared by any national office component of the Office of
Chief Counsel ... issued to field or service center employees of the Service
or regional or district employees of the Office of Chief Counsel [which]
conveys ... any legal interpretation of a revenue provision." She rejected the
IRS's arguments that "informal advice" or advice rendered in a short timeframe was exempt from disclosure: "It requires no particular form or
formality. Nor does it distinguish between advice a lawyer renders in less
than two hours and advice that takes longer than two hours to prepare."
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7.
The work product privilege claim didn't work,
but the § 7525 privilege claim did. Valero Energy Corp. v. United States,
100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6473 (N.D. Ill. 8/23/07). Valero sought to quash
summonses issued by the IRS to Valero's tax advisor, Arthur Andersen,
relating to certain branch transactions, foreign currency transactions, dual
consolidated losses, overall foreign losses, and hedge positions in
connection with fluctuation risks. The court (Judge Kennelly) rejected
Valero's claim that the documents were protected by the work product
doctrine. He found that the documents were "best categorized as having been
prepared during the ordinary course of business, with the possibility of
future litigation being secondary at most." He concluded that "Valero
confuse[d] the possibility of litigation with the requirement that to be
protected, a document must have been prepared because of anticipated
litigation. The fact that Valero hired Arthur Andersen with an eye toward the
complex nature of the transaction, and the possibility that the IRS might
investigate, does not support a contention that Arthur Andersen prepared its
materials because Valero or Andersen anticipated actual litigation." Under
Seventh Circuit precedent, the work product doctrine applies only when "the
document can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of
the prospect of litigation." Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d
971, 976-77 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original). However, the documents
were protected under the § 7525 tax practitioner's privilege as "confidential
tax advice." Even though it had the effect of avoiding federal income taxes,
the tax shelter exception in § 7525(b) did not apply for two reasons. First, as
the taxpayer asserted, "the transactions in question did not involve the
promotion of tax shelters"; nothing in the record indicated that Arthur
Andersen had anything to do with "promotion" of participation in a tax
shelter. Second, the tax shelter exception only applies to a transaction in
which tax avoidance is a "significant purpose," and not where tax avoidance
is merely "one of the purposes of the transaction." Nothing in the record
indicated the purpose of the transactions. (Under Seventh Circuit precedent,
United States v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806 (7th Cir. 6/2/07), "the
burden rests on the opponent of the privilege to prove preliminary facts that
would support a finding that the claimed privilege falls within an
exception.")
C.

Litigation Costs

1.
The Russians are coming! The Russians are
coming! Pacific Fisheries, Inc. v. United States, 484 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.
4/17/07). The government's position was not "not substantially justified"
where in taxpayer's suit to quash a subpoena, the IRS withdrew the
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subpoena, which it had issued at the behest of the Russian government,
before an answer was due. Attorney's fees were not awarded to the taxpayer.
2.
This fees assessment was against taxpayer's
lawyer because he knew the case had no merit. Davis v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2007-201 (7/24/07). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) imposed a
$25,800 sanction under § 6673(a)(2) on taxpayers' lawyer for excess
attorney's fees the IRS incurred as result of his "abuse of the judicial
process" by "unreasonable and vexatious multiplication" of taxpayer's CDP
proceedings, including signing pleadings and other papers knowing
taxpayer's claims to be meritless.
a.
Different taxpayer, same lawyer, same
merits and arguments, same judge, substantially similar result. Gillespie
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-202 (7/24/07). This time the lawyer's
sanction was only $12,798. Only a $5,000 sanction was imposed on the
taxpayer himself.
D.

Statutory Notice of Deficiency
There were no significant developments regarding this topic

during 2007.
E.

Statute of Limitations

1.
The taxpayer's conduct was not fraudulent, but
maybe he wasn't an innocent babe in the woods either. The return was
fraudulent even though the taxpayer did not know it. Allen v.
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (3/5/07). Judge Kroupa held that the statute of
limitations for a fraudulent return is extended under § 6501(c)(1), even
though it was solely the return preparer, rather than the taxpayer, who had
the intent to evade tax. The taxpayer was a truck driver who filed timely
returns for the years at issue. He gave his Form W-2, 401(k) statement,
mortgage interest statement, and other relevant documents to his return
preparer (Goosby) who prepared the returns and filed them. As prepared by
Goosby, the returns claimed false and fraudulent itemized deductions for
charitable contributions, meals and entertainment, and pager and computer
expenses, as well as various other expenses. The taxpayer received complete
copies of the returns for the years at issue after they had been filed, but he
did not file any amended tax returns. Judge Kroupa reasoned as follows:
We do not find it unduly burdensome for taxpayers to
review their returns for items that are obviously false or
incorrect. It is every taxpayer's obligation. Petitioner cannot
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hide behind an agent's fraudulent preparation of his returns
and escape paying tax if the Government is unable to
investigate fully the fraud within the limitations period.
0 She further noted that the IRS was
seeking to collect only the deficiency (and interest) from the taxpayer.
2.
Deposit or payment affects limitation on suit for
refund. Huskins v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 659 (3/16/07). The taxpayer
estate's tax counsel submitted a payment of $165,000 to the IRS that was
described in counsel's cover letter as a "payment" of estate taxes. More than
three years later the estate filed a return showing zero tax due and requested
a refund of the prior payment. The government claimed that refund was
barred by the three year limitation period of § 6511. The court concluded
that the payment was an "undesignated remittance" treated as a deposit
under Rev. Proc. 84-58, 1984-2 C.B. 501, and therefore refundable.
3.
This is indeed a taxing opinion. Electrolux
Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 491 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 6/20/07). In what
the court describes as a "taxing case" the Federal Circuit interpreted
§ 651 l(d)(2)(A), which provides that the 3-year statute of limitations to
claim a refund for a year to which a capital loss carryback is allowed is
determined from the year in which the loss providing the carryback was
recognized rather than the carryback year. The taxpayer incurred a
consolidated loss in 1994 that was ultimately allowed when the loss
disallowance rules of Reg. § 1.1502-20 were declared invalid in Rite-Aid
Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The taxpayer had
agreed with the IRS to an extension of the statute of limitations for its 1994
year to 12/31/99. The IRS allowed the taxpayer's claim for refund for its
1994 year, a refund for its 1993 year to which part of the 1994 loss was
carried back, and refunds for 1996, 1997, and 1998, which were open years
when the taxpayer filed its claim for refund on 12/31/99. However, the
Federal Circuit agreed with the Commissioner and the Federal Claims Court
that § 6511 (d)(2)(A) did not permit the taxpayer to claim a refund for 1995.
The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that § 651 1(d)(2)(A) applied to
its 1995 year because the amount of the loss carryforward to that year could
not be determined until the loss was carried back to 1993. The court held
that the taxpayer's 1995 overpayment was not due to the 1993 carryback and
was thus not attributable to the capital loss carryback.
0 Cutting to the chase, the essential
holding of the case is that § 6511 (d)(2)(A) extends the period of limitations for
carrying back a loss, but not for carrying forward such loss, where the amount
of the allowable loss is finally determined in a year later than it was incurred,
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not all of the loss is absorbed in carryback years, and the carryforward year is
closed.
4.
Overstating basis is not the same as gross
income. Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207
(6/14/07). Overstated basis resulted in an understatement of § 1231 gain.
Looking to precedent under the statutory predecessor of § 6501(e) in the
1939 Code (Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)), from which
the 6-year statute of limitations in § 6229(c)(2) is derived and to which it is
analogous, the Tax Court concluded that this understated gain was not an
omission of "gross income" that would invoke the 6-year statute of
limitations under § 6229(c)(2) applicable to partnership audits.
a.
And the Court of Federal Claims agrees.
Grapevine Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505 (7/17/07). In a
TEFRA partnership tax shelter case, the Court of Federal Claims (Judge
Allegra) held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of limitations does not apply
to basis overstatements under Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28
(1958). Section 6501(e), rather than § 6229(c)(2) as in Bakersfield Energy
Partners,LP, because in earlier proceedings in the instant case, 71 Fed. Cl.
324 (2006), the court had held that § 6229 did not create an independent
statute of limitations, but instead only provides a minimum period for
assessment for partnership items that could extend the § 6501 statute of
limitations, and because the FPAA was sent within this 6-year statute of
limitations under § 6229(d) the statute of limitations with respect to the
partners was suspended.
0 However, citing Barenholtz v. United
States, 784 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that because the statute of limitations on 1999 had run, the IRS was
barred from adjusting the amount of the NOL carryover from 1999 to 2000,
which remained an open year.
b.
But a District Court in Florida disagrees.
Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5347 (M.D.
Fla. 7/30/07). The court refused to follow Bakersfield Energy Partnersand
Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of limitations
does apply to basis overstatements. The court reasoned that as a result of
subsequent amendments to the relevant Code sections, the application of
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) is limited to situations
described in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of
goods or services. ("In the case of a trade or business, the term 'gross
income' means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of
goods or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return)
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prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services."]. The court
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)
superfluous. Because the transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of
stock, which was not a business sale of goods or services, the gross receipts
test did not apply. On the facts, the partners and partnership returns (and
statements attached thereto), taken together "failed to adequately apprise the
IRS of the true amount of gain on the sale of the ...
stock." Thus, the
partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was
inapplicable.
C.
And this time the Court of Federal
Claims agrees with the District Court in Florida and disagrees with its
own prior opinion (by a different judge) in Grapevine Imports. Salman
Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189 (11/9/07), amended, 100
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6893 (12/6/07). The court (Judge Miller) refused to follow
Bakersfield Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports and held that the
§ 6501(e) 6-year statute of limitations does apply to basis overstatements.
Judge Miller reasoned that an understatement of "gain" is an omission of
gross income, and that omission can result from a basis overstatement as
well as from an understatement of the amount realized. Like the Brandon
Ridge Partnerscourt, Judge Miller concluded that the application of Colony,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), is limited to situations described
in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of goods or
services. ("In the case of a trade or business, the term "gross income" means
the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or
services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to
diminution by the cost of such sales or services."). Because the transaction at
issue was the partnership's sale of a ranch, which was not a business sale of
goods or services, the gross receipts test did not apply. On the facts, the
partners' and partnership returns failed to adequately apprise the IRS of the
amount of gain (in a variant of the Son of BOSS tax shelter). Accordingly,
the partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was
inapplicable. The amended order certified and interlocutory appeal and
stayed the case pending further court order, because of the split of opinion
between Salman Ranch, on the one hand, and Bakersfield Energy Partners
and Brandon Ridge Partners,on the other hand.
F.

Liens and Collections

1.
Pension Protection Act § 855 amends Code
§ 6330(d) to provide that all appeals of collection due process
determinations are to be made to the Tax Court. The provision is effective
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for determinations made more than 60 days after the 8/17/06 date of
enactment.
a.
CC-2007-001 (10/13/06). 2006 TNT 201-7.
The IRS has provided guidance regarding the amendment to § 6330(d)
providing the Tax Court with exclusive jurisdiction over review of all CDP
determinations issued on or after 10/17/06.
T.D. 9290, Miscellaneous Changes to Collection
2.
Due Process Procedures Relating to Notice and Opportunity for Hearing
Upon Filing of Notice of Federal Tax Lien, 71 F.R. 60835 (10/17/06). These
final regulations amend the regulations relating to a taxpayer's right to a
hearing under § 6320 after the filing of a notice of Federal tax lien (NFTL).
They make certain clarifying changes in the way collection due process
hearings are held and specify the period during which a taxpayer may
request an equivalent hearing. The final regulations affect taxpayers against
whose property or right to property the IRS files a NFTL. These regulations
are effective 11/16/06.
a.
T.D. 9291, Miscellaneous Changes to
Procedures
Relating to Notice and Opportunity for
Collection Due Process
Hearing Prior to Levy, 71 F.R. 60827 (10/17/06). These final regulations
amend Reg. § 301.6330-1, relating to a taxpayer's right to a hearing before
or, in limited cases, after levy under § 6330. They make certain clarifying
changes in the way CDP hearings are held and specify the period during
which a taxpayer may request an equivalent hearing. The final regulations
affect taxpayers against whose property or rights to property the IRS intends
to levy. These regulations are applicable to requests for CDP hearings after
11/16/06.
v.
is big.
Schwartz
small
3.
Sometimes
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 6 (2/14/07). Judge Ruwe held that a small case
proceeding was not available to review a § 6330 collection due process
determination regarding the collection of $153,721 of unpaid tax attributable
to seven taxable years, even though the unpaid tax attributable anyone
taxable year did not exceed $37,315. In contrast to the annual $50,000
jurisdictional limit for a small case proceeding in deficiency cases, pursuant
to § 7463(f)(2), the jurisdictional limit on small case procedures with respect
to Tax Court review of a § 6330 due process hearing regarding collection of
unpaid taxes is $50,000 in the aggregate for all of the years to which the
determination relates, regardless of the number of years involved.
4.
It's not the government's fault it doesn't know
your address. Bullard v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 2d 512 (D. Md.
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2/26/07). Notice to the taxpayer of his right to a collection due process
hearing, addressed to the taxpayer at the address shown on his last filed
return, was returned to the IRS as undeliverable. The IRS's responsibility is
to serve notice on the taxpayer at the taxpayer's last known address. The
onus is on the taxpayer to notify the IRS of any change of address.
5.
Hansen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-56
(3/8/07). Another investor in a Hoyt tax shelter partnership was found to be
able to pay more than is offered in compromise. As the court notes, this is
just one of a long line of similar cases brought by investors in Hoyt
partnerships involving levies to collect taxes attributable to participation in
the partnerships.
6.
United States v. Ryals, 480 F.3d 1101 (lth Cir.
3/12/07). The § 6331(k)(1) prohibition on making a levy while an offer in
compromise is pending does not extend to a continuous levy on the
taxpayer's wages that was in place before the offer in compromise was
submitted.
7.
Deutsch v. Commissioner, 478 F.3d 450 (2d Cir.
3/2/07). Even though taxpayer was never sent a deficiency notice, he had an
opportunity to dispute the deficiency because the taxpayer's representative,
who had a power of attorney, had signed a Form 4549 "Income Tax
Examination Changes," consenting to assessment and waiving the right to
contest the liability in the Tax Court.
8.
Your accountant is in the hospital with cancer,
tough luck. File on time or pay the penalty. And, you only get one bite at
the abatement apple. Lewis v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 48 (3/28/07). The
taxpayer, a plumber, filed his 2002 tax return in January 2004, a little late
because, the taxpayer claimed, his accountant who had the taxpayer's
documents was hospitalized with stomach cancer. The taxpayer sought to
abate the interest and late filing fees on appeal to the IRS, which was denied
by the Appeals Officer. Subsequently the taxpayer received a notice of intent
to levy, which prompted the taxpayer to request a Collection Due Process
Hearing. Under § 6330(c)(4), a person cannot raise an issue in a collection
review proceeding that has been considered at a previous administrative or
judicial review. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A-E2, provides that where the
taxpayer has a conference with the Appeals Office the amount of the
underlying tax liability cannot be challenged in a collection review
proceeding or in the Tax Court. The Tax Court upheld the regulation as
valid, and determined that because the taxpayer had an opportunity to
dispute the underlying tax liability in the prior procedure, there in the
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Appeals Office, he was precluded from raising the issue in the collection
action.
9.
It has to hurt a little more. Smith v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-73 (3/29/07). The Commissioner did not
abuse his discretion by refusing to accept the taxpayer's offer of $11,552 to
compromise an estimated $265,000 tax liability attributable to a Hoyt tax
shelter. The appeals officer determined that the taxpayer had the financial
wherewithal to pay a higher amount. The taxpayer's claims of having been
defrauded, potential financial hardship, and potential future medical claims
were not persuasive.
10.
The Justices of the Supreme Court can agree on
important tax issues. EC Term of Years Trust v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
1763 (4/30/07). A unanimous Supreme Court (Justice Souter) held that
§ 7426(a) is the exclusive remedy for third party wrongful levy claims. A
third party who files a claim after the 9-month limitations period has expired
is not entitled to pursue a refund action under § 1346(a)(1). The IRS
collected over $3 million from trusts established by Elmer and Dorothy
Cullers representing tax liabilities against the Cullerses for tax deductions
claimed in the 1980s. Almost a year from the date amounts were paid
pursuant to the levies, the trusts filed a district court action under § 7426(a)
claiming wrongful levies. The district court dismissed the action because it
was filed after the 9-month limitation period of § 6532(c)(1) had expired.
The trusts then filed a claim for refund with the IRS, which was denied,
followed by a suit for refund in the district court. The district court, affirmed
by the Fifth Circuit, held that an action under § 7426(a) was the sole remedy
available to the trusts, and dismissed the action. The Ninth Circuit had
reached a contrary result in WWSM Investors v. United States, 64 F.3d 456
(1995). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. The
Court concluded that the precisely drawn provisions of § 7426(a)(1) preempt
the more general refund provision of § 1346(a)(1).
* The Court distinguished United States v.
Williams, 514 U.S. 527 (1995), which held that a property owner who paid
taxes of another to remove a lien could recover the payment through a refund
suit, as involving a lien that was not subject to challenge under § 7426(a)(1),
not a levy, and limited the holding of Williams to cases in which, wholly apart
from statute of limitations issues, no remedy other than a refund suit under
§ 1346(a)(1) is open to the plaintiff. With the post-Williams enactment of
§§ 6325(b)(4) and 7426(a)(4), providing exclusive remedies to remove a lien
in a Williams-type situation, there is little left of the Williams doctrine.
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11.
T.D. 9344, Change to Office to Which Notices of
Nonjudicial Sale and Requests for Return of Wrongfully Levied Property
Must Be Sent, 72 F.R. 39737 (7/20/07). Reg. § 301.7425-3T provides
revised procedures to obtain discharge of a junior federal tax lien by a
nonjudicial sale pursuant to § 7425(b) by providing proper notice to the IRS.
12.
The IRS can't whipsaw a taxpayer out of the
right to contest liability in a CDP hearing if no statutory notice was
issued. However, "no harm, no foul" so IRS wins. Perkins v.
Commissioner, 129 T.C. 58 (9/13/07). On his tax return, the taxpayer
claimed ordinary losses from "day trading" stock. The IRS disallowed the
losses in excess of $3,000 (as allowed by § 1211) as a math adjustment
pursuant to § 6213(b)(1), and assessed the increased taxes without issuing a
deficiency notice. After expiration of the § 6213(b)(2) period to request
abatement, the taxpayer appealed the adjustment. While consideration by
Appeals was pending, the IRS issued a notice of intent to levy, and the
taxpayer timely requested a CDP hearing pursuant to § 6330(a)(3)(B).
Before a CDP hearing was scheduled, Appeals responded to the taxpayer's
appeal of the adjustment by denying it. At the CDP hearing, the taxpayer
was not allowed to challenge the underlying tax liability, on the grounds that
the previous submission to Appeals constituted a prior opportunity to dispute
the liability under § 6330(c)(2)(B). Upon review, the Tax Court (Judge
Gale) held that the taxpayer did not have an "opportunity to dispute" his
underlying tax liability within the meaning of § 6330(c)(2)(B), and the
taxpayer was entitled to challenge the underlying tax liability in the Tax
Court. An "Appeals conference opportunity... [is] not a prior opportunity
where, as in this case, the requested conference opportunity is not resolved
by Appeals until after the taxpayer has requested, but not received, a section
6330 hearing," because otherwise the IRS "could cut off judicial review in
these circumstances by the simple expedient of processing the Appeals
consideration of the liability outside section 6330 before offering the section
6330 hearing." On the merits, however, the taxpayer was found not to be
eligible for ordinary loss treatment under § 475(f), because he never even
attempted an election, so the § 121 l(b) limitation applied.
13.
Even a properly addressed deficiency notice does
not necessarily preclude challenging the deficiency at a CDP hearing.
Kuykendall v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 77 (9/25/07). The taxpayer had
moved and did not receive a deficiency notice sent to his last known address
until only 12 days remained in the 90-day period within which to petition the
Tax Court. The taxpayer did not file a Tax Court petition in response to the
deficiency notice, which was based on inadequately documented claimed
business expenses. After receiving notice of intent to levy, the taxpayer

Florida Tax Review

[Vol 8:SI

requested a CDP hearing and attempted to provide documentation to support
the claimed deductions. When the taxpayer was denied the opportunity to
contest the deficiency at a CDP hearing, the taxpayer petitioned the Tax
Court for review. Judge Haines held that the taxpayer was not afforded
adequate time to file a petition, and accordingly was not barred from
contesting the underlying tax liability at a CDP hearing.
14.
The Tax Court's jurisdiction under § 6330(d) to
review CDP determinations is more limited that its jurisdiction under
§ 6213(a) to review deficiency determinations. Giamelli v. Commissioner,
129 T.C. 107 (10/30/07) (reviewed opinion, 9-2-8). The majority of the Tax
Court, in an opinion by Judge Goeke, held that the Tax Court's jurisdiction
under § 6330(d) to review CDP determinations is more limited than its
jurisdiction under § 6213(a) to review deficiency determinations. In contrast
to deficiency cases, where "taxpayers may raise any issue regarding their tax
liability for the period in question regardless of their prior communication of
such issues to the Commissioner" because the Tax Court's "role in such
cases is for a redetermination of [a] deficiency" and "to determine the
amount of [an] overpayment," §§ 6213(a), 6512(b), review in appeals from
CDP determinations is limited to issues that "have been raised properly
when the Appeals officer made her determination." Applying this rule, the
majority applied an earlier version of Reg. § 301.6330-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3 to
preclude taxpayer from challenging on appeal to the Tax Court a previously
self-assessed liability that was not properly contested in the administrative
hearing before the Appeals Division.
0 Judge Swift's dissenting opinion (joined
by four other judges) raised three arguments against the majority opinion.
First, he argued that § 6330(d)(1)(A) confers on the Tax Court "'de novo'
review over the 'matter' ... (namely, the underlying tax liability)," and not
merely the IRS's determination. "Although titled 'Judicial review of
determination' the statutory language in subparagraph (A) that grants our
jurisdiction uses the word 'matter,' not 'determination."' Second, he reasoned
that by its reading of Reg. § 301.6320-1(f)(2), Q&A-F3, the majority opinion
effectively adopted a jurisdictional restriction that did not harmonize with "the
plain language of the statute, its origins, and its purpose." Third, he argued that
Magana v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 488 (2002), "prudently left open the
possibility that we might consider issues not raised at Appeals because unusual
situations may arise where it would make little sense not to consider such
issues."
0 Judge Vasquez separately dissented on
the grounds that "[t]he legislative history establishes that in section 6330 cases
Congress intended there to be a trial de novo in the Tax Court, that we can
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receive evidence beyond the administrative record, and we may consider
issues not raised at the section 6330 hearing."
0 Judge Marvel, in a dissent joined by four
judges (some of whom also joined in Judge Swift's dissent), argued that
because the taxpayer before the court was the estate of the taxpayer, and the
estate did not come into existence until after the decedent taxpayer's death
following the CDP hearing, that the estate should not be foreclosed from
raising issues on appeal not raised by the decedent in the administrative CDP
hearing.
15.
"Abrupt" issuance of CDP determination letter
is evidence of abuse of discretion. Blosser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2007-323 (10/29/07). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the IRS abused
its discretion by failing to consider issues regarding changed financial
circumstances that might support consideration of collection alternatives
raised by the taxpayer during a CDP hearing. In light of lack of transcript,
the "abbreviated" nature of the entry in the Appeals officer's log regarding
the telephonic hearing, and the "abrupt decision" by the settlement officer,
the Tax Court was "forced to make ... inferences" that "the settlement officer
indicates she did not consider the issues petitioner raised during the hearing
as required by section 6330(c)(3)(B) before deciding to issue the notice of
determination."
16.
Nuanced differences in the statutory subsections
result in different periods for suspending the statute of limitations on
collections. Severo v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 160 (11/15/07). Section
6503(h) suspends the running of the period of limitations on collection from
the date of the taxpayer's bankruptcy petition was filed to the date six
months after the bankruptcy court issues a discharge order. The more
limited suspension of the period of limitations in § 6503(b), which applies to
judicial proceedings generally when the taxpayer's assets are under control
of a court, does not apply in bankruptcy situations.
The Tax Court tries to minimize game-playing
17.
by the Baltics in Nevada's answer to Monte Carlo on the
Mediterranean. Baltic v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 178 (12/27/07). The Tax
Court (Judge Holmes) held on summary judgment that taxpayers who
received a notice of deficiency but did not file a Tax Court petition could not
challenge their underlying tax liability by making an offer-in-compromise
based on doubt as to liability ("OIC-DATL") and asking for audit
reconsideration because that is a challenge to the "underlying tax liability"
that is precluded by § 6330(c)(2)(B) ("The person may also raise at the
hearing challenges to the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability
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for any tax period if the person did not receive any statutory notice of
deficiency for such tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to
dispute such tax liability"). Judge Holmes held that the settlement officer
who conducted the CDP hearing did not abuse her discretion when she
referred the OIC-DATL and audit reconsideration request to the proper
offices in the IRS, postponed collection by levy until the IRS had considered
the OIC-DATL, but sustained the lien in order to give the IRS priority over
other creditors.
.
The taxpayers were residents of Ohio
when they filed their petition, their lawyer is from Bellaire, Texas, and they
chose Las Vegas, Nevada as their place of trial.
G.

Innocent Spouse

1.
Sometimes it really is just too darn late to raise
an innocent spouse claim. United States v. Boynton, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007920 (S.D. Cal. 2/1/07). A claim for innocent spouse relief cannot be raised in
a suit by the government to reduce to judgment a tax assessment.
2.
Innocent even though she knew the taxes weren't
being paid. Farmer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-74 (3/29/07). The
IRS abused its discretion in denying innocent spouse relief to petitioner even
though she worked in the ex-husband's business and was aware that taxes
reflected on the joint return that she signed were not being paid. Factors
favoring the petitioner included the fact that she was divorced from her exhusband when she sought relief, the petitioner received no significant benefit
from the money derived in the husband's business, the petitioner would
suffer significant hardship even though she had remarried (her liabilities
would prevent the petitioner from paying basic living expenses from her
own resources), even though the petitioner knew the taxes were not being
paid, the ex-husband had complete control over the business receipts and the
petitioner had no direct access, and the tax underpayment was attributable to
the ex-husband, not the petitioner.
3.
The bankruptcy petition of an ex-spouse does not
bar the Tax Court from considering whether the other spouse is
innocent. Kovitch v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 108 (4/4/07). The petitioner
filed for relief from joint liability for a deficiency arising out of the 2002 tax
year. She and her husband divorced after 2002. The ex-husband filed a
petition to intervene in the action to eliminate the petitioner's joint liability.
Shortly after filing the petition to intervene, the ex-husband filed for
bankruptcy. The Tax Court held that the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(a), which operates to bar "actions against or concerning the debtor or
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property of the debtor," does not preclude consideration of the other
spouse's petition for innocent spouse relief. The innocent spouse petition
does not affect the ex-husband's joint and several tax liability. The Tax
Court recognized, however, that granting innocent spouse relief could have a
financial impact on the ex-husband.
4.
The IRS and the spouse agree that she's
innocent, but the abusive ex complains. Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-127 (5/21/07). The petitioner and the IRS agreed that innocent
spouse relief should be granted even though she was involved in her
husband's business. The petitioner provided designs that were etched into
engraved stones sold to customers. Intervenor husband maintained all of the
business records and handled all of the money, although petitioner had
signature authority over the business checking accounts. The Tax Court
(Judge Haines) found that the intervenor maintained control of the business,
that the intervenor was abusive, and demanded to have absolute authority
over all financial aspects of the marriage and the business. The petitioner
was not allowed to review business records or tax returns. The intervenor
conceded that deficiencies arising from disallowed business expenses and
increased employment taxes were attributable to him. The court concluded
that innocent spouse relief was appropriate even if the petitioner had actual
knowledge because of the abuse present in her relationship with intervenor.
5.
Small case status is determined differently for
stand-alone innocent spouse petitions than it is for deficiency cases.
Petrane v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 1 (7/24/07). Judge Ruwe held that for
purposes of qualifying a § 6015(e) petition for review of the IRS's denial of
innocent spouse relief as a small case under § 7463, the $50,000 threshold is
determined by including the total amount of taxes, interest, and penalties
(including accrued but unassessed interest and penalties) for all years as of
the date the petition was filed. When the petition was filed, the amount for
which the taxpayer sought relief did not exceed $50,000 for any single year,
but the total of the amounts for all years did exceed $50,000. Because the
total amount of relief the taxpayer sought for the years in issue exceeded
$50,000, she was not eligible to proceed as a small case.
a.
Schwartz v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 6
(2/14/07). Judge Ruwe reached a similar conclusion in this case, which held
that a small case proceeding was not available to review a § 6330 collection
due process determination regarding the collection of more than $50,000 of
unpaid tax attributable to multiple taxable years, no one of which had more
than $50,000 in controversy.
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6.
A trusting, but skeptical, wife earns innocent
spouse relief from her husband's Hoyt hell. Juell v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2007-219 (8/8/07). The Tax Court (Judge Swift) held that the
taxpayer was entitled to complete innocent spouse relief under § 6015(b),
not merely apportioned relief under § 6015(c), with respect to a deficiency
attributable to her husband's investment in a Hoyt cattle tax shelter. The
taxpayer (1) was not involved in the preparation of the joint returns, (2) her
husband told her, and she believed that because they were married they had
to file joint tax returns, (3) her husband told her that because he was
involved in the Hoyt partnerships, she was required to sign the documents
attached to the returns relating to the Hoyt partnerships, relying on her
husband, she signed the returns and attached materials, despite having not
read them, because she felt she did not know enough to understand them.
The taxpayer objected to signing the tax returns and asked her husband to
get out of the Hoyt partnership investments. She reluctantly signed the tax
returns only after her husband reassured her that tax professionals had
prepared them and that she was required to sign. The taxpayer's standard of
living remained constant, there were no lavish expenditures that benefited
her, and she did not receive any benefit from the tax refunds and the tax
reductions based on the Hoyt partnerships.
7.
It's what you know when you sign the original
return, not when you sign the amended return, that determines what
you know. Billings v Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-234 (8/16/07). Judge
Holmes held that the IRS abused its discretion in denying equitable relief to
the petitioner with respect to taxes on his spouse's embezzlement income.
The petitioner had no knowledge of the embezzlement income at the time
the original joint return was filed, but knew of it, and knew the taxes would
not be paid, when on the advice of an attorney, he and his wife filed an
amended return reporting the embezzlement income. Knowledge of income
at the time the amended return was filed was not a negative factor because
petitioner could have been accorded relief under § 6015(b) if, instead of an
amended return having been filed, the IRS had audited the original return
and asserted a deficiency. Petitioner received no benefit from the
embezzlement income. The sole factor against granting relief - that
petitioner would not suffer economic hardship - standing alone was not a
sufficient ground for denying relief.
8.
Even a dead not-so-innocent spouse has standing
to intervene, because "the Internal Revenue Code makes sure that taxes
survive even death." Fain v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 89 (10/2/07).
Suzanne Fain petitioned the Tax Court when the Commissioner refused to
grant her innocent spouse relief from an unpaid tax liability. "Her case was
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already on a trial calendar when Commissioner's counsel realized that the
IRS had not notified her husband of his right to intervene. That turned out to
be impossible - he was dead." Judge Holmes held that the nonrequesting
spouse's right to intervene in proceedings on request for innocent spouse
relief survives death; executors and administrators should be afforded an
opportunity to intervene to oppose relief. "The survival of a decedent's tax
liability means that as a practical matter his heirs or beneficiaries may be
affected by the outcome of an innocent-spouse case. The opportunity to
intervene is an opportunity to protect those interests, because granting
innocent-spouse relief will make the estate of the nonrequesting spouse the
only source of payment for any unpaid tax the deceased has left behind."
When neither the IRS "nor the requesting spouse has any idea whether there
it is appropriate ...
is an estate and whether it has a personal representative ...
to file an order requiring both parties to furnish the Tax Court, insofar as
ascertainable and to the best of their abilities, the names and addresses of the
heirs at law of the decedent, under the law of the jurisdiction wherein the
decedent was a resident when his death occurred and for the court to then
notify the heirs."
The statute might not have correctly articulated
9.
the statutory cross reference, but the Tax Court got the drift of
congressional intent anyway. Adkison v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 97
(10/16/07). The Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to review a claim for
apportioned liability relief under § 6015(c) when the tax liability in question
relates to partnership income and the deficiency notice on which the
jurisdiction was asserted to be based is invalid because the partnership items
are subject to determination in a TEFRA partnership level proceeding that
has not yet been resolved. Section 6230(a)(3)(A), which still refers to former
§ 6013(e), the statutory predecessor of § 6015, evidences congressional
intent that the spouse of a partner can initiate a claim for innocent spouse
relief with respect to a deficiency attributable to an adjustment of a
partnership item only after the IRS issues a notice of computational
adjustment following the completion of the partnership-level proceeding.
Judge Cohen concluded that Congress simply overlooked the need to correct
the cross references in § 6230 when it replaced § 6013(e) with § 6015.
H.

Miscellaneous

Tax Court grants taxpayer's motion for leave to
1.
file a motion to vacate an order dismissing his case for lack of
jurisdiction, and holds that the motion should be deemed filed on the
date it was mailed, rather than on the date it was received. Stewart v.
Commissioner, 127 T.C. 109 (10/3/06) (reviewed, 18-0). The Tax Court
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(Judge Ruwe) determined that the timely-mailing/timely-filing provisions of
§ 7502 would apply to a motion for leave to file a motion to vacate an order
of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, so the Tax Court's earlier decision
would not become final after the 90-day period for appeal had elapsed under
§ 7481(a). The Tax Court will no longer follow its decision in Manchester
Group v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-604, rev'd, 113 F.3d 1087 (9th
Cir. 1997).
2.
I'm from the IRS and I'm here to help you
comply with FIN 48. The IRS announced on 10/17/06 an LMSB initiative
to help taxpayers resolve on an expedited basis their issues with Financial
Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48), "Accounting
for Uncertainty in Income Taxes - an Interpretation of FASB Statement
109." 2006 TNT 201-17. Requests for FIN 48 resolution must be submitted
at least 45 days before the end of taxpayer's fiscal year; the expedited
procedure is not recommended for fiscal years ending after 3/31/07.
3.
T.D. 9300, Guidance Necessary to Facilitate
Business Electronic Filing, 71 F.R. 71040 (12/8/06). The Treasury has
promulgated final regulations on eliminating regulatory impediments to
businesses filing electronic returns.
4.
Individuals who
follow
Lauren Bacall's
instructions will be entitled to between 15 and 30 percent of the
collected proceeds resulting from their information. The Tax Relief and
Health Care Act of 2006 § 406 amends Code § 7623 to reform the reward
program for individuals who provide information regarding violations
involving an individual whose gross income exceeds $200,000 for the
relevant year if the tax, penalties, interest, and additional amounts in dispute
exceed $2 million. Generally, the provision establishes a whistleblower
reward floor of 15 percent and a cap of 30 percent of the collected proceeds
(including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts) if the
IRS moves forward with an administrative or judicial action based on
information brought to the IRS's attention by an individual. Under certain
specified circumstances, the provision permits awards of lesser amounts.
The provision allows an above-the-line deduction for attorneys' fees and
costs paid by, or on behalf of, the individual in connection with any award
for providing information regarding violations of the tax laws.
a.
Notice 2008-4, 2008-2 I.R.B. 253 (1/14/08).
This Notice provides guidance on how to file whistleblower claims on IRS
Form 211. One example of the grounds for not processing claims is "(2)
Claims submitted by an individual who is required by Federal law or
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regulation to disclose the information, or by an individual who is precluded
by Federal law or regulation from making the disclosure."
5.
Burton Kanter got in trouble again, and this time
it followed him to the grave. Investment Research Associates, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-407 (12/15/99). Burton Kanter was held
liable for the §6653 fraud penalty by reason of his being "the architect who
planned and executed the elaborate scheme with respect to ... kickback
income payments ......
a.
And the Tax Court's procedures are
vindicated and taxpayer Ballard loses on appeal on the fraud issue in
the Eleventh Circuit. Ballard v. Commissioner, 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir.
2/13/03), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court decision and rejected the taxpayers' argument that changes allegedly
made to the original draft opinion from the special trial judge by Judge
Dawson before he adopted it were improper.
b.
And the Tax Court's procedures are
vindicated and taxpayer Kanter's Estate ° loses on appeal on the fraud
issue in the Eleventh Circuit. Estate of Kanter v. Commissioner, 337 F.3d
833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) (per curiam) (2-1), aff'g in partand rev'g in part T.C.
Memo. 1999-407. The court found that the nondisclosure of the special trial
judge's original report was proper, following the Eleventh Circuit's Ballard
opinion. It affirmed the Tax Court's findings on the issues of deficiencies,
fraud, and penalties, but reversed as to other findings.
c.
And the Tax Court's procedures are
vindicated but taxpayer Lisle's Estate wins on appeal on the fraud issue
in the Fifth Circuit. Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 341 F.3d 364 (5th
Cir. 7/30/03), affg in part and rev'g in part T.C. Memo. 1999-407. The
Fifth Circuit (Judge Higginbotham) followed the Eleventh and Seventh
Circuits decisions upholding the nondisclosure of the special trial judge's
original report by the Tax Court.
d.
Justice Ginsburg to Tax Court judges:
"You Article I judges don't understand your own rules, so let me tell
you what you meant when you adopted them in 1983." Ballard v.
Commissioner, 544 U.S. 40 (3/7/05) (7-2), reversing and remanding 337
F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 7/24/03) and 321 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2/13/03). Justice
Ginsburg held that the Tax Court may not exclude from the record on appeal

10. Burton Kanter died on October 31, 2001.
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nor conceal from the taxpayers the original draft reports of Special Trial
Judges under Tax Court Rule 183(b) or under any statutory authority.
.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion, joined in by Justice Thomas, states that the "Tax Court's compliance
with its own Rules is a matter on which we should defer to the interpretation of
that court."
e.
The Eleventh Circuit orders that the
Special Trial Judge's report be added to the record. Ballard v.
Commissioner, 2005-1 U.S.T.C. 50,393 (11th Cir. 5/17/05).
Tax Court changes its rules. (9/20/05).
f.
The Tax Court adopted amendments to Tax Court Rules 182 and 183,
relating to Special Trial Judges' reports in cases other than small tax cases.
The Special Trial Judge's recommended findings of fact and conclusions of
law are to be served on the parties, who may file written objections and
responses. After the case is assigned to a regular Judge, any changes made
shall be reflected in the record and "[d]ue regard shall be given to the
circumstance that the Special Trial Judge had the opportunity to evaluate the
credibility of witnesses, and the finding of fact recommended by the Special
Trial Judge shall be presumed to be correct."
g.
The Eleventh Circuit remands the case to
the Tax Court - after reinstating the Special Trial Judge's report.
Ballard v. Commissioner, 429 F.3d 1026 (11th Cir. 11/2/05) (per curiam).
The case was remanded to the Tax Court with the following instructions:
(1) the "collaborative report and opinion" is ordered stricken; (2) the original
report of the special trial judge is ordered reinstated; (3) the Tax Court Chief
Judge is instructed to assign this case to a previously-uninvolved regular Tax
Court Judge; and (4) the Tax Court shall proceed to review this matter in
accordance with the Supreme Court's dictates and with its newly-revised
Rules 182 and 183, giving "due regard" to the credibility determinations of
the special trial judge and presuming correct fact findings of the trial judge.
h.
Estate of Lisle v. Commissioner, 431 F.3d
439 (5th Cir. 11/22/05) (per curiam). The case was remanded to the Tax
Court with orders to: (1) strike the "collaborative report" that formed the
basis of the Tax Court's ultimate decision; (2) reinstate Judge Couvillion's
original report; (3) refer this case to a regular Tax Court judge who had no
involvement in the preparation of the aforementioned "collaborative report"
and who shall give "due regard" to the credibility determinations of Judge
Couvillion, presuming that his fact findings are correct unless manifestly
unreasonable (in dealing with the remaining issues of tax deficiency); and
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(4) adhere strictly hereafter to the amended Tax Court Rule in finalizing Tax
Court opinions.
i.
On remand, in a 458-page opinion Judge
Haines of the Tax Court pours out Kanter and Ballard. Estate of Kanter
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-21 (2/1/07). The Tax Court (Judge
Haines) found that certain of the Special Trial Judge's findings of fact were
"manifestly unreasonable" because they were "internally inconsistent or so
implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not believe [the
recommended finding]" or they were "directly contradicted by documentary
or objective evidence." Judge Haines therefore found that the Kanter-related
entities were shams, that "Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle participated in a
complex, well-disguised scheme to share kickback payments earned jointly
by Kanter, Ballard, and Lisle," and that they earned income during the years
at issue which they failed to report.
0 Judge Haines found that - based upon
factors such as (1) failure to report substantial amounts of income,
(2) concealment of the true nature of the income and the identity of the earners
of the income, (3) use of sham, conduit, and nominee entities, (4) reporting
Kanter's and Ballard's income on IRAs (and another entity's) tax returns,
(5) commingling of Kanter's and Ballard's income with funds belonging to
others, (6) phony loans, (7) false and misleading documents, and (8) failure to
cooperate during the examination process by engaging in a "strategy of
obfuscation and delay" - the Commissioner demonstrated by "clear and
convincing evidence" that Kanter and Ballard filed false and fraudulent tax
returns for each of the years at issue.
* Judge Haines held that the Tax Court is
"obliged to review the recommended findings of fact and credibility
determinations set forth in the STJ report under a 'manifestly unreasonable'
standard of review, and ... may reject such findings of fact and credibility
determinations only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, [it]
conclude[s] that the recommended finding of fact or testimony (1) is internally
inconsistent or so implausible that a reasonable fact finder would not believe
it, or (2) is not credible because it is directly contradicted by documentary or
objective evidence." Furthermore, Judge Haines held that a special trial
judge's credibility determinations may be rejected under the "manifestly
unreasonable" standard of review without rehearing the disputed testimony.
* Judge Haines further found that the
appropriate standard for determining whether the assignment of income
doctrine should be applied had been appropriately articulated in United States
v. Newell, 239 F.3d 917, 919-920, as follows:
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To shift the tax liability, the assignor [taxpayer] must
relinquish his control over the activity that generates the
income; the income must be the fruit of the contract or the
property itself, and not of his ongoing income-producing
activity. ... This means, in the case of a contract, that in
order to shift the tax liability to the assignee the assignor
either must assign the duty to perform along with the right to
be paid or must have completed performance before he
assigned the contract; otherwise it is he, not the contract, or
the assignee, that is producing the contractual income - it
is his income, and he is just shifting it to someone else in
order to avoid paying income tax on it.
6.
Tax return information gets out if you sue the
IRS's towing company. Bowers v. J&M Discount Towing, LLC, 99
A.F.T.R.2d 2007-1607 (D. N. Mex. 2/28/07) The District Court denied the
taxpayer's motion to seal confidential tax records submitted by the IRS in
support of its motion to dismiss the case against the IRS and a towing
company retained by the IRS to tow the taxpayer's automobile to enforce a
levy for delinquent taxes.
7.
Be careful about who you invite into your house.
United States v. Yang, 478 F.3d 832 (7th Cir. 3/7/07). Mr. Yang called the
Eau Claire police to investigate a burglary in his home. In the course of the
investigation, and with Mr. Yang's permission, the police took some spiral
bound notebooks to examine for fingerprints. Unfortunately for Mr. Yang,
who was also being investigated by the IRS for tax fraud, the notebooks
contained financial information regarding the operation of restaurants by Mr.
Yang and his brother. The police, who were aware of the tax fraud
proceedings, notified the IRS, which subpoenaed the notebooks as evidence
in the criminal tax fraud proceeding. The court denied Mr. Yang's motion to
suppress the notebooks as evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds pointing
out that the notebooks had been voluntarily given to the police thus ending
any expectation of privacy.
8.
It's OK for the government to assist identity
theft in lien notices. Glass v. United States, 480 F. Supp. 2d 162 (D. Colo.
3/27/07). Taxpayer's pro se complaint for damages for disclosure of
taxpayer identification information, including her social security number, in
notices of tax liens filed with a county recorder. First, the taxpayer's action
filed under § 7431 (private right of action if a government employee
discloses return information in violation of § 6103) should have been filed
under § 7433 (private right of action against the United States if a
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government employee in connection with the collection of any tax
knowingly or negligently violates a provision of Title 26 or the regulations),
which is the exclusive remedy for unauthorized disclosure. In addition, the
court held that disclosure of the taxpayer's personal information was
permissible under § 6103 as necessary to locate assets in which the taxpayer
has an interest, notwithstanding exposure to identity theft.
9.
Pick your attorney carefully. United States v.
Simcho, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-2044 (N.D. Cal. 4/11/07). Judge Patel granted
the Government's motion to dismiss the defendant's counsel, Joe Izen, in a
prosecution for preparing false tax returns for others and filing false tax
returns. The defendant's attorney had been a speaker at seminars conducted
by the defendant to promote allegedly abusive tax avoidance trust schemes.
Memoranda of witness interviews submitted by the government indicated
that Izen was a featured speaker at seminars, that he was represented as a
"big shot tax attorney from Texas who dealt with the IRS all the time," and
that he "lectured about how trusts were legal and bragged about how he
always won cases against the IRS." Reliance on Izen's advice would be a
significant element of the defense. Judge Patel concluded that Izen's
conflict-of-interest and his presence as an unsworn witness disqualified his
representing the defendant. The court pointed out that an attorney acts as an
unsworn witness, creating jury confusion, "when his relationship to his
client results in his having first-hand knowledge of the events presented at
trial."
10.
When they called, should he have said, "I gave at
the office"? Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson announced
his resignation to become head of the American Red Cross. 2007 TNT 76-1
(4/19/07). In his message to IRS employees, he said, "Together, we have
rebalanced the organization, bringing to life the equation: Service +
Enforcement = Compliance."
a.
And Kevin Brown should have said the
same thing. Internal Revenue Service Acting Commissioner announced his
resignation as of September to become Chief Operating Officer of the
American Red Cross. 2007 TNT 145-24 (7/26/07).
b.
Now, we can all look forward to seeing
the IRS getting stiffed. Brown's successor as Acting Commissioner will be
Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support Linda Stiff, who will assume
the position of Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement and, on
Brown's departure, Acting Commissioner. 2007 TNT 146-2 (7/30/07). In the
press release announcing her appointment, her background was given as
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"As Deputy Commissioner for Operations Support, Stiff has
development of policy for IRS personnel services, technology and
She has also been responsible for the accounting of tax revenues
by the IRS."
c.
Wasn't anyone at the IRS good enough
for Everson? It appears that Everson was really "giving at the office." Mark
Everson resigned his Red Cross presidency on November 27, 2007 because
the Red Cross Board learned that he "engaged in a personal relationship with
a subordinate employee."
follows:
overseen
security.
collected

d.
Now, it's time for the IRS to loosen up
and shukel with the "shul-man." President Bush nominated Douglas H.
Shulman, Vice Chairman of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(formerly known as the National Association of Securities Dealers) on
11/21/07 to be Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
11.
Proposed Circular 230 changes that do not relate
to tax shelters are nevertheless controversial, what with new restrictions
on the use of contingent fees, monetary penalties for practitioners and
their firms, and public hearings before ALJs. REG-122380-02,
Regulations Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 71
F.R. 6421 (2/8/06). Proposed regulations issued based upon consideration of
comments received in response to questions posed in an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) at 67 F.R. 77724 (12/19/02), as well as
amendments made to 31 U.S.C. § 330 by the American Jobs Creation Act
of 2004. Changes include: (1) changing references to the office of the
Director of Practice to the Office of Professional Responsibility; (2) adding
to the definition of "practice before the [IRS]" in § 10.2(d) "rendering
written advice with respect to any entity, transaction plan or arrangement, or
other plan or arrangement having a potential for tax avoidance or evasion;"
(3) revoking the authorization of an unenrolled return preparer to represent a
taxpayer during an examination of a return that he or she prepared;
(4) eliminating the ability of a practitioner to charge a contingent fee for
services rendered in connection with the preparation or filing of an amended
tax return or claim for refund or credit, although contingent fees are
permissible for services rendered in connection with the IRS's examination
of, or challenge to, an amended return or claim for refund or credit filed
prior to the taxpayer receiving notice of the examination of, or challenge to
the original tax return, § 10.27; (5) adding to the standards applicable with
respect to tax return positions in § 10.34, the requirement that a practitioner
may not advise a client to submit "a document, affidavit or other paper ... to
the [IRS]" if (a) its purpose is to delay or impede the administration of the
Federal tax laws, (b) it is frivolous or groundless, or (c) it contains or omits
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information in a manner that demonstrates an intentional disregard of a rule
or regulation; (6) adding to the sanctions in § 10.50 the authority to impose a
monetary penalty on the practitioner who engages in conduct subject to
sanction, as well as the authority to impose a monetary penalty on the
"employer, firm or other entity" of a practitioner acting on its behalf
provided that the employer, firm or entity knew of reasonable should have
known of such conduct; and (7) modifying the definition of disreputable
conduct in § 10.51 to include willful failure to sign a tax return the
practitioner prepared or unauthorized disclosure of returns or return
information.
* The most controversial proposed change
is a provision in § 10.72(d) that all hearings, reports, evidence, and decisions
in a disciplinary proceeding be available for public inspection, with protection
of the identities of any third-party taxpayers contained in returns and return
information for use in the hearing.
a.
Monetary penalties guidance. Notice
2007-39, 2007-20 I.R.B. 1243 (5/14/07). This Notice provides guidance with
respect to monetary penalties under § 10.52 of Circular 230. The examples
indicate that the IRS Office of Professional Responsibility will interpret this
provision broadly to encourage compliance with Circular 230.
b.
Final regulations. T.D. 9359, Regulations
Governing Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 72 F.R. 54540
(9/26/07). Final regulations, effective 9/26/07, adopted the February 2006
proposed regulations, with changes.
* As to whether rendering of written tax
advice constitutes practice before the IRS, the final regulations hold that it
does, but that the attorney or CPA is not required to file a Form 2848 power of
attorney before doing so.
* The contingent fee rules were modified
to permit a practitioner to charge a contingent fee for services related to filing
an amended return or claim provided that the amended return or claim was
filed within 120 days of taxpayer notification of an examination. Also
permitted are contingent fees for interest and penalty reviews, as well as for
services rendered in connection with a judicial proceeding. These changes
apply to fee arrangements entered into after 3/26/08.
* As to disclosure of a disciplinary
decision by an Administrative Law Judge, this disclosure is to be delayed until
after the decision becomes final.
12.
FleetBoston Financial Corp. v. United States, 483
F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 4/19/07) The Federal Circuit interpreted Rev. Rul. 88-
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98, 1988-2 C.B. 356, and Rev. Rul. 99-40, 1999-2 C.B. 441, to provide for
interest to be charged where overpayments for a year with respect to which a
deficiency subsequently was assessed were credited to the following year's
estimated taxes even though the amount credited was not needed to meet the
taxpayer's estimated tax obligations but was treated as a payment of the
following year's estimated tax by operation of Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(5). The
court concluded that the result was not inconsistent with Avon Products,Inc.
v. United States, 588 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1978).
13.
T.D. 9327, Disclosure of Returns and Return
Information in Connection With Written Contracts or Agreements for the
Acquisition of Property or Services for Tax Administration Purposes, 72
F.R. 30974 (6/5/07). The Treasury has promulgated final regulations, Reg.
§ 301.6103(n)-i, regarding disclosure of confidential tax return information
by federal and state tax agencies to independent contractors under
agreements for goods or services. Disclosure is limited to that which is
necessary for performance of the contract. In addition, the final regulations
provide that a contractor receiving return information becomes liable for
penalties for unauthorized redisclosure.
14.
Timely filing goes postal worker. Blake v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-184 (7/12/07). The taxpayer's Tax Court
petition that bore uncancelled stamps and did not bear a postmark was
received outside the 90-day period for timely filing. Judge Chiechi
nevertheless held that the petition was timely filed based on the taxpayer's
attorney's unrefuted credible testimony that when he found the local post
office closed on last day of the 90-day period, he gave a stamped envelope
containing the petition to a postal worker who was parked nearby and was
assured by the postal worker that the envelope would be postmarked that
day.
15.
These attorneys missed a procedural step to
protect their own fees. Set-off sidesteps a possible trumping lien and
lienor must file an administrative refund claim before suing to recover.
Dunn & Black v. United States, 492 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 7/11/07). The
government set off unpaid taxes against the full amount due to a plaintiff,
under a Court of Claims judgment relating to a government contract with
plaintiff, notwithstanding the plaintiff's attorney's lien for fees with respect
to the judgment award. The court held that the law firm lacked standing to
sue for recovery of the fees because it failed to comply with the § 7422(a)
requirement that an administrative refund claim must have been filed.
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16.
These regulations were accompanied by two
published rulings. T.D. 9355, Clarification to Section 6411 Regulations, 72
F.R. 48933 (8/27/07) and REG-118886-06, Clarification to Section 6411
Regulations, 72 F.R. 48952 (8/27/07). Final, temporary, and proposed
regulations § 1.6411-3T(d), that allow the IRS to reduce tentative
adjustments with unassessed liabilities in some circumstances.
a.
Don't count on getting any refunds after
the IRS has issued a 90-day letter for any other tax year. This would
apply even if you are contesting the deficiency in the Tax Court. Rev.
Rul. 2007-51, 2007-37 I.R.B. 573 (9/10/07). Section 6402(a) permits the IRS
to credit an overpayment against an unassessed tax liability if it has
determined tax liability in a deficiency notice sent to the taxpayer pursuant
to § 6212. Similarly, § 6411 (b) permits the IRS to credit a decrease in tax
resulting from a tentative NOL carryback adjustment against an unassessed
tax liability if, within the 90-day period, it has determined the tax liability in
a deficiency notice sent to the taxpayer.
.
This ruling holds that § 6402(a) allows
the IRS to credit an overpayment in one year against unassessed internal
revenue tax liabilities determined in a notice of deficiency. There is a similar
rule for tentative carryback adjustments. This appears to be based upon the
principle of Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281 (1932), which held that taxpayers
were not entitled to a refund unless they had overpaid their taxes, although the
case was not cited.
b.
And it is even easier not to get a refund if
you're bankrupt. Rev. Rul. 2007-52, 2007-37 I.R.B. 575 (9/10/07).
Pursuant to § 6402(a) the IRS may credit an overpayment against unassessed
tax liabilities that have not been identified in a deficiency notice sent to the
taxpayer, when the liabilities are identified in a proof of claim filed in a
bankruptcy case. Pursuant to § 6411 (b), the IRS may credit a decrease in tax
resulting from a tentative NOL carryback adjustment against unassessed tax
liabilities that have not been identified in a deficiency notice when the
liabilities are identified in a proof of claim filed in a bankruptcy case.
17.
Unlike in a deficiency case, you can't diet your
way down to small case status by conceding some of the tax in a CDP
appeal to the Tax Court. Leahy v. Commissioner, 129 T.C. 71 (9/17/07).
The $50,000 "unpaid tax" limit for invoking the § 7463 small tax case
procedures in an appeal of a § 6330 CDP determination includes interest
accrued to the date of the IRS notice of determination. Even though the
taxpayer disputed only $41,097.54 of liability, an amount below the $50,000
threshold, the case was held not to be eligible for small case status.
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WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES

A.

Employment Taxes

1.
Wisdom from the Mount. Medical residents may
be students for FICA taxes. United States v. Mount Sinai, 486 F.3d 1248
(11 th Cir. 5/18/07). Section 3121 (b)(10) provides that employment taxes are
not payable with respect to services performed in the employ of a college or
university by a student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes. The
Government argued that legislative history with respect to the repeal of an
exemption for medical interns in 1965 (former § 3 121 (b)(13)) established as
a matter of law that medical residents are subject to employment taxes. The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that § 3121(b)(10) is unambiguous in its
application to students and that the statute requires a factual determination
whether the hospital is a "school, college, or university" and whether the
residents are "students."
a.
And the same holds for residents at the
Mayo Clinic. Mayo Foundation for Medical Education v. United States, 503
F. Supp. 2d 1164 (D. Minn. 8/3/07). The District Court held in 2003 that
stipends paid to medical residents in the Mayo Clinic were qualified for the
student exclusion from FICA taxation, and that the Mayo is a school,
college, or university for purposes of the exclusion. United States v. Mayo
Found.for Med Educ. & Research, 282 F. Supp. 2d 997 (D. Minn. 2003).
The Treasury responded with Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(c), (d), which limits
the definition of a school, college, or university to entitles whose "primary
function is the presentation of formal instruction." The regulation also limits
the definition of student to provide that only services provided as incident to
pursuing a course of study and that a person whose work schedule is 40
hours or more per week is a full-time employee rather than a student. In
granting a $1.6 million refund claim on summary judgment, the District
Court determined that the regulation is invalid as inconsistent with the plain
meaning of a statute that the court finds is unambiguous and held that
stipends paid to medical residents are subject to the student exclusion.
2.
Jordan v. United States, 490 F.3d 677 (8th Cir.
6/21/07). Meals, lodging, and transportation expenses paid by an air cargo
carrier to a pilot for travel from his home in Minnesota to the location of his
work assignment in Alaska (gateway expenses) are wages subject to
withholding for FICA taxes. Employment taxes do not apply to amounts
excluded from income by § 132 as statutory fringe benefits. The court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that the gateway expenses were a working
condition fringe. The gateway expenses would not have been deductible
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under § 162 as expenses for travel away from home, and, therefore, do not
qualify as a working condition fringe benefit.
3.
Without a contract, you're not your PSC's
employee. Arnold v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-168 (6/27/07). The
husband and wife taxpayers were, respectively, a realtor and an accountant,
and each of them owned 100 percent of the stock of an S corporation as a
"vehicle" for their respective businesses. They reported all of the income
from their respective businesses as income of the corporations, which passed
though to them under § 1366, but were not paid any salaries or other
compensation and paid no wage taxes. However, there were no contracts
between the taxpayers and their respective corporations recognizing the right
of the corporations to control their performance of services. The court
(Judge Vasquez) held that all of the income of each taxpayer was earned
personally, and not by their respective corporations, and upheld deficiencies
for self-employment taxes. Judge Vasquez noted that: "A corporation earns
the income if: (a) The service provider is an employee of a corporation
which has the right to direct or control that employee in some meaningful
sense; and (b) there exists a contract or similar arrangement between the
corporation and the person or entity using the services which recognizes the
corporation's right to direct or control the work of the service provider."
T.D. 9337, Withholding Exemptions, 72 F.R. 38478
4.
(7/13/07). This Treasury Decision finalizes Reg. § 31.3402(f)(2)-l providing
that employers are not required to submit employee Form W-4s that claim
excessive exemptions, or no withholding, unless the employee receives
notice from the IRS requiring submission of an employee's Form W-4. The
regulations provide procedures for the IRS to issue the notice to employers.
Colorado Mufflers Unlimited, Inc. v. Commissioner,
5.
T.C. Memo. 2007-222 (8/13/07). Full time workers in the taxpayer's muffler
shop are treated as employees where the taxpayer exercised control over the
manner in which work was performed, provided tools and other facilities,
paid the workers on a weekly basis, retained the right to discharge the
workers, and the workers believed they were in an employment relationship.
The court denied relief under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978 because it
had treated workers as employees in previous years. The taxpayer was fined
for advancing frivolous positions.
Hold 'em - then withhold the winnings. Rev.
6.
Proc. 2007-57, 2007-36 I.R.B. 547 (9/4/07). Sponsors of poker tournaments,
including casinos, are required to withhold tax from winnings in excess of
$5,000 under § 3402(q). Winnings include the proceeds of a wager, which
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the IRS says are determined by reducing the amount received by the amount
of the wager. The lucky winner is required to provide the payer a statement
on Form W-25 or 5754 with identifying information. The withholding rate is
the third highest rate of § 1(c), 31 percent. The Revenue Procedure is
applicable to payments made on or after March 4, 2008.
7.
FICA taxes and penalties hit the University of
Chicago's retirement payments. University of Chicago v. United States,
100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-6261 (N.D. Ill. 8/21/07). The University of Chicago
required employees to make payments into a § 403(b) plan and referred to
the employee contributions as being withheld from salaries. Employees were
required to sign a "salary reduction agreement." The University also
contributed to the plan on behalf of employees. Section 3121(a)(5)(D)
excludes from wages subject to employment taxes any payment under a
§ 403(b) annuity contract, "other than a payment for the purchase of such
contract which is made by reason of a salary reduction agreement." The
University argued that this language is ambiguous and should not be
interpreted to apply to every agreement that reduces an employee's current
compensation. Granting summary judgment for the Government, the Court
concluded that the "statute's language is not at all ambiguous, and covers
just the set of facts that are present in this case." The employees' wages are
subject to FICA withholding. In addition, the court found that the
University's failure to make the deposits was not due to reasonable cause.
The University asserted under the "divisible tax doctrine" that its payment of
a portion of the tax in order to bring the refund action absolved it of the
penalty. The Court indicated that "it is one thing to say that a taxpayer need
not pay the total tax in order to gain entry to the courthouse, and quite
another to say that the taxpayer may escape the penalty for failure to timely
pay the tax by filing a lawsuit."
8.
This one hurts. Early retirement bonuses for
tenured professors are wages subject to employment tax withholding.
University of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 11/02/07).
In a 2-1 decision, reversing the District Court, the Third Circuit held that
payments to early retirees to induce retirement are wages subject to FICA
withholding rather than non-wage payments for relinquishment of contract
rights to tenure. The Third Circuit follows Appoloni v. United States, 450
F.3d 185 (6th Cir. 2006), and joins the Sixth Circuit in rejecting the holding
of North Dakota State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d 599 (8th Cir. 2001).
9.
Employment tax wage base for 2008. Notice
2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036 (11/19/07). The OASDI contribution and
benefit base for remuneration paid in 2008 is $102,000. The minimum
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amount that a domestic worker must earn to trigger employment tax liability
for 2008 is $1,600.
10.
Section 403(b) salary reduction agreements
defined. T.D. 9367, Payments Made by Reason of a Salary Reduction
Agreement, 72 F.R. 64939 (11/14/07). Treasury has finalized regulations,
§ 31.3121(a)(5)-2, defining contributions to § 403(b) plans under a salary
reduction agreement that are subject to employment taxes. Employer
contributions to a § 403(b) plan that are not made pursuant to a salary
reduction agreement are not subject to employment taxes. A salary reduction
agreement exists if the employee elects to reduce compensation pursuant to a
cash or deferred election, the employee elects to reduce compensation under
a one-time irrevocable election made at or before the time of initial
eligibility to participate in the plan, or the employee agrees as a condition of
employment (whether imposed by statute or otherwise) to make a
contribution that reduces compensation.
11.
Bennett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-355
(12/3/07). Self-employment income earned as a minister is subject to selfemployment tax unless under § 1402(e)(3) the individual files a letter or
Form 4361 certifying that the individual is conscientiously or on religious
principles opposed to the acceptance of public insurance. Judge Swift
rejected the taxpayer-pastor's claim for exemption in the absence of
evidence that the taxpayer had filed the requisite certification. The IRS
search of its files in the Ministerial Unit failed to discover a form filed by
the taxpayer. The taxpayer was unable to produce documentary evidence of
the filing, and the taxpayer had in fact paid employment taxes in some years
subsequent to the taxpayer's claim of having filed the certificate in 1980.
B.

Excise Taxes

1.
IR-2007-16 (1/25/07). The IRS said that early
findings show some individual taxpayers have requested apparently
improperly large amounts for the special telephone tax refund, such as
requesting a refund on the entire amount of their phone bills, or making
requests for thousands of dollars indicating they had phone bills in excess of
$100,000 - an amount exceeding their income. The IRS also noted that some
tax preparers are helping their clients file apparently improper requests.
2.
This taxpayer's $54.84 telephone excise tax
refund claim challenges the IRS under the Administrative Procedure
Act. In Re Long-Distance Telephone Service Federal Excise Tax Refund
Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. D.C. 8/10/07). The District Court denied
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the IRS's motion to dismiss the taxpayer's claim under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) that the refund procedure of Notice 2006-50, 2006-1
C.B. 1141, is arbitrary and unlawfully restricts the taxpayer's refund claim
and potential class action suit by requiring refund claims to comply with the
documentation requirements of the Notice or accept a safe-harbor amount.
The District Court held that (1) the taxpayer has standing to raise the claim
because of the taxpayer's alleged financial loss under the approach of the
Notice, (2) the agency action issuing the Notice is not protected from APA
review as an exercise of discretionary authority by the IRS, (3) the Notice is
a final agency action subject to review under the APA, and (4) the taxpayer
is not required to exhaust administrative remedies by following the refund
procedure of the Notice in order to avoid the sovereign immunity of the IRS.
XII.

TAX LEGISLATION
A.

Enacted

1.
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub.
L. 109-432, was signed by President Bush on 12/20/06.
2.
The Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax
Act of 2007 (the "2007 Act"), which is contained in the U.S. Troop
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 110-28, was signed by President Bush on
5/25/07. This legislation also increased the minimum wage.
3.
The Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief Act of
2007, P.L. 110-142, was signed by President Bush on 12/20/07.
4.
A "blue Christmas" package is enacted on
December 26th, or is it a Christmas package for the blue states? The
Tax Increase Prevention Act of 2007, P.L. 110-166, i.e., the one-year
AMT patch, was signed by President Bush on 12/26/07.
5.
The Tax Technical Corrections Act of 2007, P.L.
110-172, passed both houses of Congress by unanimous consent on 12/19/07
and was signed by President Bush on 12/29/07. It alters the definition of the
alternative minimum tax refundable credit amount as provided in the Tax
Relief and Health Care Act of 2006; changes certain rules in the Pension
Protection Act (PPA) of 2006 for tax-free distributions from individual
retirement accounts to charities; and modifies the § 355 special rule for the
active business requirement as added by the Tax Increase Prevention and
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Reconciliation Act of 2005. It also deals with § 470 SILO transactions for
investment partnerships.

